

**PROVIDING FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE  
BY REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON  
NUMBERS AND LENGTH OF  
SERVICE OF DRAFTEES**

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**HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION  
ON  
H. J. Res. 217, H. J. Res. 218, H. J. Res. 220,  
and H. J. Res. 222**

JOINT RESOLUTIONS DECLARING A NATIONAL EMERGENCY,  
EXTENDING TERMS OF ENLISTMENTS, APPOINTMENTS, AND  
COMMISSIONS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, SUS-  
PENDING CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS UPON THE EMPLOYMENT  
OF RETIRED PERSONNEL OF THE ARMY, MAKING FURTHER  
PROVISIONS FOR RESTORATION OF CIVIL POSITIONS TO  
MEMBERS OF THE ARMY ON RELIEF FROM MILITARY  
SERVICE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

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**JULY 22, 25, AND 28, 1941**

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# PROVIDING FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE BY REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON NUMBERS AND LENGTH OF SERVICE OF DRAFTEES

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TUESDAY, JULY 22, 1941

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The committee met at 10 a. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Gentlemen, we have met this morning for the purpose of considering House Joint Resolution 217 and other similar resolutions [reading]:

to further provide for the strengthening of the national defense by removing the restrictions on numbers and length of service of draftees, and for other purposes.

We have this morning as the first witness Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

The general is in the witness chair, and the chairman would like to say to the general we would like to have a statement from him of the reasons for the resolution; and, during the course of your testimony, if you reach a point where you think some war secret is involved that should not be disclosed to the public, you are privileged to say so and to reserve that for further closed sessions of the committee.

Now you may proceed, General, and I am going to ask the committee to allow the general to complete his statement, after which he may be subject to questions by members of the committee.

## STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF

General MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared statement. I have already testified twice before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. The first hearing has been printed, and I assume some of you have read it. I do not know just to what extent I should repeat myself, but I can be guided in that by your questions, if what I say now is not sufficient for your purposes.

I would like to begin with a reference to my biennial report covering the period of my first 2 years as Chief of Staff. The recommendations submitted in that report were made by me at that particular time and in that specific manner because the situation was so serious that, in my opinion, it had to be brought before the people of the United States. My recommendations were based on military necessity only, and I was especially concerned that they be made in a manner that was clearly nonpolitical. I consulted no one with respect to them and no one knew that I was going to make them. I thought that my action was in the best interests of national defense.

At first there were a number of instances where the statements published in the press were not based on an actual reading of the report, but rather on a hasty glance at headings of sections of the report. One example was where I grouped certain specific recommendations under the heading "Legislative Restrictions." Apparently that heading was read at a glance and the conclusion reached that I was recommending an A. E. F., and it was so circulated on the press wires. I was doing nothing of the kind. So far as I could express myself I was definitely trying to eliminate any such idea from my recommendations, because it involves a most important matter of public policy that should be settled only by the President as Commander in Chief, and the Congress. I specifically endeavored to keep all political questions entirely clear of the problem of the necessity for the readiness of the military forces for whatever service might be required of them.

I believe now that almost everyone is familiar with the administrative problem, the administrative impossibility of managing the Army under the present limitations. I have repeated in my report, I have repeated twice before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, I have repeated in conversations with legislators, and in informal discussions, the complications involved in the direct business of operating our Army.

At the present time, the situation is such that the problem is not soluble without legislative assistance and immediate assistance, at that. I am confronted every day by specific recommendations of the Staff to do things that have to be done involving shipping, availability of tonnage, occupation of garrisons, and many other considerations, and I am stymied as to a solution.

I have already spoken about the problem in Alaska and the problem in Hawaii, where National Guard units are involved. Those units happen to include all the various factors in this discussion. They include principally the National Guard on which there is a limitation of 12 months of service; they include Reserve officers whose service is also limited to 12 months, but which will be of varying dates of expiration to that of the National Guard units; and they include selectees on whose service there is a limitation of 12 months and, again, a different expiration date from that of the National Guard organization in which they are serving.

As another example, I was being pressed by the War Plans Division of the General Staff to commit myself to a plan for the development of the garrison in Trinidad. At first we could send troops down in small numbers only because of the lack of the necessary shelter to guard their health. Now, we have the shelter and the problem is to find proper units to send to Trinidad.

We have now in Trinidad, a National Guard organization whose term of service will soon approach its limit. We have other units which make up a total of some 1,200 men. That small garrison should be reenforced immediately and brought up to an adequate size, not only because of Trinidad itself, but because of its location in the hemisphere defense plan and because of the necessity of having troops available in that immediate vicinity. The logical units for the purpose are hemmed about by the limitations I have mentioned and I declined (and that is the way it stands at the present time) to give my approval to the plan.

Now, the question is not merely a matter of a proper plan which may or may not be approved; it is a matter of ship tonnage, which is a very complicated affair, in which not only the Navy but the public interest is seriously concerned. At the moment we have an opportunity to use tonnage that can be diverted from some other purpose. We have the shelter ready for the troops, but I must not compromise the Army and, incidentally, the Navy by sending a unit down there that will have to be brought back in a very short time.

The same problem has developed with respect to other garrisons where the shelter has been completed and is ready for troops. What units are we to send?

I would like to ask you gentlemen to remember that we have only nine Infantry divisions in the Regular Army. That number is sufficient at the present time for our purpose, if we can use the other components as a part of the Army and not as a separate grouping which has to be given very different treatment from the remainder of the Army. Those nine divisions cannot carry the principal burden of this complex situation, because even they have in their ranks selectees under the limitation of 12 months' service; and they have in their ranks a large number of Reserve officers under the limitation of 12 months' service. The problem is not solvable, as I have said, under present limitations.

When I appeared before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs I referred to the problem we had in connection with the garrisoning of Iceland. Marines had to be sent. They did not belong there at all, as they were trained for another purpose, but it was impracticable to even consider sending any unit of the present Army for obvious reasons. One was secrecy, so necessary for the protection of those who went against the possibilities of hostile action, and the other was that we could not, at that distance from the United States, set up a command that required constant transfer of personnel in large numbers.

I might say that most arrangements in Iceland must be completed before October 1. That means that troops must have arrived by early September and have begun to move to their stations. To reach some of the stations they must arrive even before the 1st of September, in order to be able to reach the outlying points where they will remain isolated for the following 6 months. They must take with them supplies to last 3 or 4 months. Measured in ship tonnage Iceland is a long way from home. In other respects it is very close to the Western Hemisphere. Limitations imposed by law made it out of the question to send the unit that should have gone there, and, instead, marines had to be sent. Now we have the problem on our hands of relieving the marines—and they should be relieved—to free them for the duty for which they are specially trained. I do not know of a better example of the complications of the situation in which we find ourselves.

The Congress last August and September took a step in further developing our military policy as laid down in the National Defense Act of 1920 which even with its limitations put national defense on a much sounder basis than formerly. The law as it stands on the books today points the way clearly to what the further moves should be.

I have been disturbed by suggestions that we go back to the Civil War proposition of bounties, or volunteers, and quack remedies or

compromises of that character. I beg of you gentlemen not to repeat the colossal errors of that day. You have the laws on the books; you have your future course defined in those laws. The answer is plain, as I see it. Are the national interests imperiled? Does a national emergency exist? As I said before and as I say now again, in my opinion a national emergency decidedly does exist; in the opinion of the War Department, it does; in the opinion of the President, it does. He has already declared an unlimited emergency which, however, does not affect the military forces, because under the laws governing the Army a national emergency must be declared by Congress.

Our book of rules on personnel is a most complicated affair. I never fully understand it; I have to have General Haislip and his corps of pick-and-shovel men explain to me almost continually the legal complications involved in any military action.

You have laid down for yourselves in the law a course of action which is logical, which is in contrast to the history of our past errors, and which meets the present situation. I am most concerned over temporizing, over expediency, over a patchwork solution, when direct action is so clearly indicated.

Under half measures it is exceedingly difficult to develop military forces because soldiers are only human; they read the papers. Like all of us humans, with a little encouragement they can feel very sorry for themselves. I have been one of them myself, have intimately associated with them. As an illustration I would like to recite an incident that occurred shortly after I joined my first regiment, almost 40 years ago. I found myself on the coast of Mindoro in the Philippines. An insurrection was going on and I was out with a detachment of the Thirtieth Infantry. We were quite isolated, and without any service to help morale. No town, no ice in the tropics, no pay for 4 months, and not even a book or magazine supplied.

I, as a 21-year-old lieutenant, became the commander of that section of the country, the highest command I held for about 30 years. Among other things, I had to coal the boats that arrived periodically, and one of those contracts to economize in funds, made by the Quartermaster Department in Manila protected the crew against handling the coal until it was delivered on the deck of the boat. That passed the buck to the soldiers as someone had to handle that coal. Their pay was \$18 a month. They worked from the coal pile on the edge of the jungle to a little flat-bottom boat—we had only one—and rowed that through three-quarters of a mile of heavy surf to the ship, and laboriously transferred the coal to the deck of the ship. One day while working in a torrential rain a tall, lanky soldier from the mountains of Kentucky paused in the middle of his shoveling job, with this comment: "I didn't see nothing like this on that damned recruiting circular." My old first sergeant suppressed a laugh, and flashed back the order to "keep your mouth shut and shovel coal. That's your job." That gave me a lasting impression of the Regular Army; what discipline meant, what dependency meant in times of difficulty.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the first sergeant from Kentucky, too?

General MARSHALL. I may have moved him into that State from Tennessee, Judge, when I thought of your constituents. [Laughter.] The first sergeant was from America. Almost any reaction can be

gotten from young men under given circumstances. There is always a certain degree of grousing that seems to be inherent in the soldier, but does not detract from discipline if it remains within the bounds of his unit. But there are times when the leader must command, "Keep your mouth shut and shovel coal; those are the orders."

There are many disagreeable tasks that our Army has accomplished without comment, without notice or appreciation, throughout a long period of years; there is a great deal that is going to be difficult and hard to do in this program. But today, to have the men stirred up and agitated by outside influences is a most unfortunate business because under those conditions soldiers are very apt to begin to feel sorry for themselves. The business of the soldier, as I have found it, involves mud, or extreme heat, and irritating dust. It involves missing meals, long marches, bad weather, insects, and discomforts. It involves a great many inconveniences; it interferes with social affairs and sometimes it very seriously affects personal relationships. All of that is inevitable and is part of the life of a soldier. We have tried in every way in this expansion to avoid the worst of these, to an extent that has never before been attempted. The men have been kept in a perpetual state of agitation from this and that report or discussion. Yet we came out of the winter with the highest morale I have ever seen in United States forces.

At the present moment we are undergoing a very depressing, a dangerous experience. Yesterday afternoon I received a radiogram from General Drum that he had issued these orders as Commander of the First Army:

**There appears to be an organized effort from some source outside the Army to have petitions signed by members of the military forces and sent to the Congress in an effort to oppose legislation proposed by the War Department to continue the service of the National Guard and the Reserve officers in the service. Any such action by those in military service violates the provisions of Army Regulations.**

As you may have read in the press, some of those young men were led into this business. We cannot continue to ignore such actions. We must treat them as soldiers; we cannot have a political club and call it an army. I regard these disturbing activities from outside the Army, gentlemen, as sabotage of a dangerous character. I do not wish to be held responsible for the development of the Army under such conditions. We must enforce disciplinary measures to offset such influences, if the Army is to have any military value of dependability as an army. Without discipline an army is not only impotent, but it is a menace to the state.

I do not want to see our young men victimized, misled into unsoldierly conduct; I want to see them handled so that we can build up a splendid American Army. I cannot bear the burden of responsibility of maintaining the discipline and morale of our Army in periods of uncertainty and agitation such as is now going on. There is enough uncertainty at best in the military service, but today we have the additional legislative uncertainties, together with a broadcast of seeds of discontent. We ask you to reach a decision, to settle this matter, and leave us the opportunity to train and develop the Army for our national security. I realize the difficulties of your problem, but the logical solution, to my mind, is so unmistakable that I do not

see how sound, acceptable arguments can be developed against it, unless you definitely determine to change our military system and maintain a large professional Army.

At the moment I do not think of anything else to say. I would be glad to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you made a statement with respect to the difficulties of transportation or shipping facilities, and you were having difficulties with that, due to the demands of the South American commercial trade. That occurs to me as a problem that hooks into the efforts of the Government of the United States to maintain proper relations with the South American republics, which, as I understand, at this time is a rather difficult problem also. Now, that confronts you in one way from time to time?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would tell the committee just how far the members of the Army that are in the selected list or under the Selective Service and Training Act have been infiltrated into the Regular Army, and how they are intertwined with each other in these various set-ups.

General MARSHALL. The number varies in the different divisions, from a low in the First Division of 1 percent of selectees, up to the Seventh Division with 79 percent of selectees. There are only 9 regular Infantry divisions—

The CHAIRMAN. Have those figures been given to the Senate committee in their hearings?

General HAISLIP. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I doubt if it is necessary to put them in this record.

General MARSHALL. In the armored divisions, selectees vary from 48 percent in the Second Armored Division, to 80 percent in the Fourth Armored Division.

In the Second Cavalry Division, they are 61 percent; in the First Cavalry Division, 87 percent.

The engineers have had a tremendous expansion because of the great increase of air forces and mechanized forces. Their expansion has been greater than 1,000 percent, so we find in engineer units as high as 85 percent selectees.

In that connection, in laboring with the possibilities of substituting an Army command in Iceland in place of Marines, I found, when it came to the engineers, there was no way I could meet the situation without virtually demolishing 10 to 12 units in order to get 3-year men. Even then, I would have had a unit that was not trained at all as a team. It would have been very unwise to send to that critical point a group of men who have had no unit training.

Apropos of this problem, there has been talk of a volunteer system or remedy. We have been getting volunteers as rapidly as we could, and we have not reached yet the number of 3-year men we need. Our most successful period of recruiting was during the debates on the Selective Training and Service Act, which gave a great impetus to volunteering; while at the same time there was a tremendous recruiting campaign being conducted by the Adjutant General's Department. That campaign produced somewhere around 80,000 a month, but we required a total of approximately 600,000. To date we have gotten 476,000.

With reference to comments I made on the development of the Army and the national-defense system, based on the logical manner which our laws now permit, it might be of interest to outline for you gentlemen our experience in the World War. You must recall that we were protected on the sea in a large measure, and even after we landed in France we were behind the armies of Great Britain and of France. We were provided with all of our matériel after we landed. We were not involved in shipping abroad great masses of ammunition, guns, and heavy equipment of all kinds, but were provided with them on the other side of the water. The situation then was exactly the opposite to what it would be now. I sailed with the first convoy. I received a telegram to report at the Pennsylvania Station in New York to meet my division commander. I had never heard of his division; I had never served with its commander. I happened to be in New York as aide to the general officer at Governors Island, so I was directed to meet the division commander at the station, but for what purpose I then did not know. I met him and found that my desk at Governors Island was the only headquarters available for the next 18 hours. I discovered that we were going to France and that I had been assigned to the general staff of the division. The division commander did not even have tables of organization for his unit, which, I believe, were prepared by General Palmer, who is here today and who was then in the War Plans Section of the General Staff.

Units began to arrive from various sections of the southern border. They were 80 percent recruits, who had received their weapons, in many instances, after they had gotten aboard the train. The trains were pulled into the Jersey Meadows and then moved to Hoboken where the men were herded aboard recently acquired fruit boats which had not at the time been fully prepared to be troop transports.

We were being mobilized; we were being concentrated; we were starting on an expedition 3,000 miles from home, and not until we arrived in France did I ever see what our organization was. I remember specifically reading about a trench mortar unit. I had never seen a trench mortar and yet here I was a general staff officer of the division which contained such an organization.

General McNair, who is now the man principally responsible for our present training program was another general staff officer of the division, and he and I labored at length with the divisional organization to see what it meant. We could not communicate with the other boats, because wireless was not permitted, to avoid the possibility of our being picked up by a submarine, so it was not until we landed in France that we were able to find out what the other boats in the convoy had on them.

We were especially interested in the trench mortar unit. Did they have weapons? We wanted to make sure. We discovered that all they had was a typed table of organization, and a group of willing, courageous, untrained men. They had never seen the weapons, knew nothing about their employment, and there they were, 3,000 miles from home, in France, with 80 percent recruits in their ranks. That is the way we went to war in 1917.

I have been fighting against the repetition of such an experience in the development of our present Army.

Later on we had to organize our Army corps and our armies on the battlefield. I was in the middle of that picture, and I know what it

meant in terms of casualties. I saw 27 of our 20 divisions in action. I know just what our lack of preparation cost. The members of those divisions do not know because of the limited sectors in which they were confined. Everybody did his best, showed high courage and American initiative, but we lost men in a way that never should have happened. Our strength and effort were dimmed by the fact we were compelled to do these things without the essential preliminary training which we are trying so hard to give our Army today.

It is so unfortunate, so unfair, that just at a time when we are building an army I have to fight a problem of morale for which I personally am to be held responsible. I refer to the inspired agitation that is going on among the troops.

I may be expressing myself too forcibly, but I feel very deeply about the situation. I am responsible and must be held responsible. But, I submit, we have the procedure already set out in the law, and we ought to follow it, and not dodge the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General it is being argued and carried in the press and in the Congress and elsewhere that Congress made a contract with the draftees to remain 12 months and then be sent back home. I would like to call your attention to subsection B of section 3 of that act, which reads:

Each man inducted under the provisions of subsection (a) shall serve for a training and service period of 12 consecutive months, unless sooner discharged, except that whenever Congress has declared that the national interest is imperiled, such 12-month period may be extended by the President to such time as may be necessary in the interests of national defense.

Now I thought you stated, if I did not misunderstand you, you preferred that Congress pursue the simple remedy of passing such a resolution, declaring that the national interests are imperiled, rather than to undertake to amend the act. Was that your suggestion?

General MARSHALL. That is my suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I quite agree with you on it, although I have not stated that as a final conclusion.

General MARSHALL. I was going to make more than a mere suggestion because if the Congress attempts a patch-work procedure, it will probably do permanent, serious harm to the development of the Army. If you delay 3, or 4, or 5, or 6 months in finding a solution you are just postponing the problem. In reality, you are doing more than that because you are putting me in the very difficult position of trying to develop an army subject to all sorts of limitations, agitations, and uncertainties. You gentlemen must admit that it is disturbing to have these questions remain long in a state of uncertainty, of debate, and of public misrepresentation in one way or another.

I have received, quite naturally, an extreme reaction since my biennial report was issued. Most of it followed the newspaper headlines to the effect that I was recommending an A. E. F. for Europe. Nobody suggested where I was going to get the necessary ship tonnage for such an expedition. Apparently no one read the recommendations in my report. I would like to read the classification of that mail into the record. Of unfavorable comments, I received 241. Sixty-three came from New York State, and 53 of those from New York City. Twenty-four came from Illinois, and 20 of those from the city of Chicago. Eighteen came from California, nine of them

from San Francisco, and eight from Los Angeles. Sixteen came from Pennsylvania, and 10 of the 16 were from the city of Pittsburgh.

A large number of those unfavorable communications were post cards couched very much in the same language. Certain of them came from specific districts. For example, quite evidently a large number of the post cards came from a particular little group in Brooklyn, apparently of German stock. A large number came from the vicinity of Passaic, N. J. One hundred and seven of the unfavorable comments stressed the abrogation of a supposed contract or promise to which you have just referred, Mr. Chairman. Fifty-five, or 23 percent, were marked by extreme personal abuse or threats of violence against the President or the Chief of Staff. Twenty-one percent condemned the A. E. F., and another 10 percent were distinctly anti-British.

In the opinion of those who analyzed the mail, the following points gave evidence of collusion: Frequent and exact duplication of ideas and themes. That was particularly true in the post-card campaign. Frequent duplication of phraseology, sometimes exact and sometimes slightly varied in terms, from the same locality. Frequent expressions over German signatures, of belligerent and Christian Front attitude. There was a petition bearing 29 names obviously all written by three or four individuals. There were a number of instances where two or more letters were written by the same person and mailed from different post offices.

These people labor under a confusion of information and opinions, correct and incorrect, as to what the terms of the law actually are and as to what, of course, the degree of the emergency is.

It is, I think, out of the question for me to spread on the open record all of the facts in our knowledge. There are two general types of information. One comes from a great many small items that must be put together like a jigsaw puzzle which indicate with reasonable clearness, a general line of action which threatens our best interests. Then there are other items of information which are direct and complete in themselves and conclusive as to purpose.

I am under pressure to inform the people, at least to give our representatives in Congress this information. I believe, gentlemen, that such an exposure would be most unwise.

The CHAIRMAN. You may reserve those.

I have received, quite naturally, an extreme reaction since my report, I believe, to the fact I thought such action on my part would be decidedly against the public interest. In the first place, there is the great risk of stirring up a violent reaction on the part of the public. I referred to the fact that we had had several instances of that kind in our history. My hope is that we can meet the issue in a calm, businesslike manner. My purpose is solely the security of this hemisphere. I am interested in America and, because I am interested in America, I am also interested in the British Fleet, to put it coldly and selfishly. I do not want to see us stumble into a line of action. I want to see this country take deliberately, and I hope wisely, the various precautions and measures that the Axis Powers hope we will not take. Their disappointment or discouragement is my desire. They are capitalizing on our debates and delays; they are capitalizing on the difficulties we are experiencing in cry-

talizing our Army and our people into a unified force and not a collection of differing groups. They are advertising our weaknesses in a tremendous campaign of distortion and misrepresentation, which started 2 years ago, at least, and which now has reached a maximum of intensity in the Latin-American countries.

I want to see us proceed in the wisest way we can determine upon and not have us stumble along, aimlessly, hoping against hope. In other words, I want to see us protect ourselves against errors of our own choosing.

To me there is a wide difference between a national emergency and a state of war. A state of war does include a national emergency, but a national emergency does not necessarily include a state of war. A frank recognition of the existence of a national emergency gives us the authority to take the necessary measures, to fortify ourselves against trouble, to place ourselves in a position of such strength that our voice in this troubled world may possibly be determining.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I think as leader of the armed forces of the United States I should ask you one question, in order that you may be placed in a proper light before the public.

As I remember it—and I think the hearings will disclose it—when you appeared before this committee last year to advocate the Selective Service and Training Act, you then urged and argued very vehemently to the committee that anything else than a 3-year training period would perhaps be unwise, but you accepted the other as a compromise?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I said I regarded 18 months as the minimum.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General MARSHALL. I went on to say that I would be willing to compromise on 15 months but that we must have at least 12 months. I went from cold military reason to plain political expediency. I wanted the Selective Training and Service Act to pass and for that reason alone I was willing to compromise.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember it very well now, since you recall it to me.

General MARSHALL. Of course, there should be a well-understood proportion between the number of 3-year men and the number of selectees. What I am fearful of is a mandatory type of legislation that will tie our hands and force us into an inflexible procedure which is against efficiency or impracticable of administration. Allow me to illustrate what I mean. Some months ago I directed that 50 percent of the Reserve officers on active duty be released after completion of the 12 months' period of service. What we were trying to do, what General Haislip and the Personnel Division were urgently pressing us to do, was to rotate the officers on active duty so that we could bring in and train some 30,000 Reserve officers who had not yet been called to active duty. The commanders in the field are more or less opposed to that procedure. The strongest protest came from the head of the armored force, who wanted his percentage of turn-over decreased to 25 percent, because of the special nature of his force. I compromised on 40 percent. I wanted, and the Personnel Division wanted, to bring in other Reserve officers in order to build up a trained reserve of officers. Such a plan also permitted us to attend to cases of hardship; it per-

mitted us to systematize our selection and development of officers. It had the great advantage of being able to be carried out without destroying efficiency, because we did not have to meet deadline, like, for instance, the 2 years' foreign-service tours in the Philippines. We must get men back to this country before the expiration of the 2 years or be in violation of the law.

Exactly the same idea applies to the selectees. My report was distorted by assuming that I was proposing to increase the Army by 900,000. I had no such idea. We do not want to increase the Army by 900,000 at this time. We could not take that additional number at the present time because of lack of shelter; also, we must stabilize our existing units in order that their training may be completed. We prefer to have our existing units reach as high a state of efficiency as possible, rather than to take them apart, spread them into a larger number, and start all over again. I had a similar problem in the development of the armored force. We had two divisions almost a year old and two additional divisions organized just this spring. Our plans provided for two more this fall if the matériel could meet that schedule. Could we afford to draw cadres for these last divisions from the first two, or should we leave those two intact and untouched, and make the second two organized this spring assume the burden of the development of the remaining two divisions? The answer should depend on the international situation and should not be compromised by some legal stipulation.

We wish to pass the selectees out of the service as rapidly as we can after they have completed their 12 months of service. We definitely wish to take the older men out as rapidly as we can, and we think we can almost meet a dead-line with respect to them. We think we can release some of them ahead of time, both to our advantage, and also to theirs. We are settling hundreds of cases a month now of selectees who we are returning home before the completion of 12 months' service, for a variety of reasons. You are familiar with the procedure. When a case of hardship comes to our attention, it is sent to the local Red Cross chapter nearest the man's home. They make an investigation of the case, and also consult with the local induction board. A military review is made of the facts in the case, and the War Department makes a decision in the matter.

The units of our field forces have different priorities, depending upon probable tasks that have been assigned them and also depending upon their location. In those divisions that are on a low priority as to the possibility of use, we can proceed with speed in the replacement of selectees. In those divisions engaged on special work or located so that sea transportation is involved, we might be behind schedule. We want to be able to use our own judgment in applying a flexible rule. If we are compelled by law to meet a mandatory deadline we will be in a hopeless situation and will have to do many things actually against the public interest. There has been a good deal of talk at cross purposes. The very things that have been talked about in opposition to this resolution are the very things that we want to do not as incidental to the immediate public demand but for our own purposes. We want to bring in new selectees, so it follows that we must release men in order to make room for them.

The same idea applies to the officers in the National Guard. We want to release, on the completion of 12 months' service, a number of those lieutenants in the National Guard who received commissions without adequate preparation. We can also relieve hardship cases among the officers of the guard. Those released can be replaced by Reserve personnel; and by what we know is going to be the perfectly splendid product of the officer candidate school. I have been told that the first group at the Infantry School is the finest looking lot of men ever assembled there.

I can handle our men on a fair basis, but if you say "on September 22 you must do this," then I say that you may be imperiling the national interest. You must trust in my good faith, in our professional common sense. I have tried to be very frank. The War Department has been scrupulous in its efforts to meet, as far as possible, the desires of Congress. Though encompassed with too definite and too numerous laws, we have not tried circumlocution nor evasion.

The CHAIRMAN. General, if I understand your position, it is simply this: That you are trying to build an armed force sufficient for the adequate and proper protection of the United States and the Western Hemisphere; and that unless this legislation is enacted you will have military problems arising that you cannot solve without it.

General MARSHALL. That is entirely correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Mr. Thomason?

Mr. THOMASON. Just one or two. I should like for the record, General, a few more figures. What is the approximate strength of the Army today?

General HAISLIP. One million four hundred thousand, approximately.

Mr. THOMASON. How many of those are Regulars today?

General HAISLIP. Four hundred and seventy-six thousand, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. How many National Guard? You can give just approximate figures.

General HAISLIP. About 200,000.

Mr. THOMASON. How many selectees?

General HAISLIP. About 600,000.

Mr. THOMASON. How many Reserves?

General HAISLIP. About 50,000 Reserve officers.

Mr. THOMASON. How many of the National Guard, selectees, and Reserves would be affected, would be released, within the next few months if some legislation is not passed?

General MARSHALL. In the first place, I must have aboard boat by August 1 the relief for a National Guard regiment of some 1,400 men in Hawaii. That relief consists of a Regular Army unit with about 45 percent selectees in its ranks who will have to be returned to the United States, under present law, in about 4½ months. The unit in Hawaii should be aboard ship by the 15th of August in order to reach home in time for demobilization in accordance with present law.

Mr. THOMASON. How many men are affected by that situation?

General MARSHALL. I am talking now about the relieving regiment. Forty-five percent of its strength will have to come back in 4½ months.

As to the National Guard regiment that must be relieved, 1,400 men would have to be back in the United States by the 1st of September, in order to be able to accomplish their demobilization by the end of their 12 months' service in accordance with existing law. The same sit-

ution exists in Alaska and in the Aleutians. We have there a regiment of National Guard coast artillery which must be back in the United States by the first of September. For its relief the only unit that has a proper degree of training, together with adequate equipment, is another National Guard regiment, and that regiment that should leave the United States about the 5th of August must return to the United States about the end of December in accordance with existing law.

Mr. THOMASON. You are now referring to Alaska?

General MARSHALL. I am referring to Alaska. We have a National Guard regiment of Coast Artillery in Trinidad. I am not familiar with the exact date on which it will complete its 12 months' training, but I think it is September 16. On that assumption, we will have to start to relieve it by the 18th of August. The relief unit will also carry selectees who will have to be returned.

Mr. THOMASON. What is the situation in the Philippines, Panama, and Puerto Rico?

General MARSHALL. As to the Philippines, the garrison there is composed solely of 3-year men. There are a number of Reserve officers who are on active duty with their consent. As we can order a Reserve officer to active duty for 1 period of 12 months only, it would not be worthwhile to send him as far away as the Philippines. There is no particular problem at present in the Philippines, nor is there a problem in Panama.

Mr. THOMASON. You need not testify along this line if you do not think it necessary, but I just want to find out if you are going to have anything left in these outlying possessions except skeleton organizations, if the selectees and the National Guard go home at the end of 12 months.

General MARSHALL. We are on a sound basis in the Philippines and in Panama, and in Hawaii, with the exception of the National Guard unit I discussed. However, I have had to find additional available units. I am due to send additional men to Alaska. I approved their going just the other day.

I have formed two regiments that I can send. They must be gotten there in the summer season, so I am sending units now that will have to be brought back in 6 months.

Mr. THOMASON. In other words, practically all of your regiments are integrated and they are mixed up as between Regulars, selectees, and National Guard.

General MARSHALL. Exactly that, and I am trying to get them all unified into one army.

Mr. THOMASON. As I understand it, you say that the men of 28 years of age are going to be released as early as possible?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I think we can do that with great promptness, too.

Mr. THOMASON. What is the situation with regard to married men?

General MARSHALL. Very few of them were taken into the service in the first place.

Mr. THOMASON. And you expect to relieve all hardship cases.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. We are doing it to some extent now, but will give a broader application to our policy if the periods of service are extended.

**Mr. THOMASON.** Where the cases are meritorious?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir. We want to release certain men for still another reason so long as we are not in an actual state of war. A man who is suffering a hardship by a continued absence from home, adversely affects all of those around him. It is better for morale to release him.

**Mr. THOMASON.** I observe the resolution says that Congress hereby expressly declares a national emergency exists to the extent and for the purpose only of authorizing the President to exercise the same authority he now has under the selective service law.

It also confirms your statement that you do not have in mind any A. E. F., or anything in the world except adequate and necessary defense of the country.

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir.

**The CHAIRMAN.** May I interrupt there, if the gentleman would yield to me, to say that this resolution which I introduced yesterday is an exact duplicate of the one introduced in the Senate with the exception of the words just quoted by Mr. Thomason, "to the extent and for the purpose only."

**General MARSHALL.** I would like to have General Haislip make a tentative answer to that.

**General HAISLIP.** Mr. Chairman, we have made a very hasty study of the resolution this morning, and we feel that it will not accomplish our current objectives. In the first place, it will not authorize the holding nor the calling of the National Guard of the United States in service. And then, secondly, it is probably insufficient to authorize the holding of the selectees, because it does not declare that the national interest is imperiled, which is the condition set out in the Selective Training and Service Act.

**The CHAIRMAN.** This resolution was introduced hurriedly. The committee will draft its own form, before it gets through with it, based upon all the testimony that we get. And we are glad to have that testimony.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee go into executive session for such questions as any members of the committee may wish to ask the general.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Without objection, the Chair will order that the committee go into executive session.

(There was no objection.)

(Before the executive session was called to order, the following occurred:)

**Mr. CLASON.** I think we ought to go ahead and let the general answer such questions as he can answer without going into executive session.

**The CHAIRMAN.** The Chair has already directed that everyone leave but Members of Congress and Army officers.

**Mr. CLASON.** The public apparently has a one-sided picture of the situation, and any questions asked now, even though they are proper questions, cannot be brought to the attention of the public.

**The CHAIRMAN.** The Chair already thinks, Mr. Clason, that the general has already told some things that ought not to have been told.

**Mr. CLASON.** That is up to the general.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but the Chair disagrees with the gentleman. The public will please retire. That does not apply to Members of Congress and Army officers.

(Whereupon the committee went into executive session.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will hear next Mr. Grenville Clark, of New York.

Mr. Clark, will you state whom you represent and your association, and then proceed with your statement with respect to this resolution?

(The following testimony of the witness, Gen. George C. Marshall, was heard in executive session:)

#### EXECUTIVE SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomason, had you finished questioning the General?

Mr. THOMASON. I want to ask one other question. Then, as I understand it, you say to this committee as Chief of Staff of the United States Army that you do not think, but that you know, from information that perhaps you cannot divulge to anybody—at least some of it—that the national interest is imperiled and that some sort of legislation of this character is necessary?

General MARSHALL. Emphatically so, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. You do feel certain that the national interest is imperiled, and that this legislation is necessary?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. Would you like to elaborate further as to troop movements or troop integration, whether on the record or off the record?

In other words, all of us want to know the necessity for this and the reasons for it.

General MARSHALL. In a discussion off the record, I mentioned a comparatively small number of troops in connection with reserve garrisons, I used the example of a couple of regiments.

Mr. KILDAY. I made that suggestion, and that is why I wanted to get the rest of that story for the record, if you think it proper.

General MARSHALL. I also stated that there is a considerable number of troops that must be sent to Alaska, and the commander on the west coast is trying to get them off right now. The situation demands it and I have ordered him to send them. We think we can modify or fix up the existing shelter sufficiently to provide for them. But I had to put a stay of execution on several regiments because the only suitable units that are available must be demobilized in September and October. I still have to provide the garrisons, so I must wait for the decision here. I have told General DeWitt to go ahead with his other shipments. He wants to get them into their stations in time for the men to establish themselves, in a pretty harsh climate, before the cold of the early fall.

I have already referred to the fact that a number of men are due to go to Trinidad. The War Department wants to send them within the next 10 days, because the tonnage happens to be available at the moment. I think the number is about 6,000 for Trinidad.

None of those units can be sent without our being involved in the complication of existing legal limitations.

We have men to go to Newfoundland. We are only waiting until the shelter there is a little further advanced. Then we must rush them up ahead of cold weather. They ought to be there now. Again we are involved in the limitations of the law. The same condition applies to a number of the other bases.

(Discussion off the record.)

General MARSHALL. I still have the problem of the relief of the Marines in Iceland. I must not go into the matter of strength. The German secret service is endeavoring to determine the English strengths there, and I must not advertise it here.

Mr. FADDIS. General, I notice in your report, you make a statement to this effect, that you believe the material phase of this program is much better understood than the personnel phase.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. FADDIS. That is, of course, very dangerous in this country. I believe that the people will become firmly entrenched in the viewpoint that we can meet this situation merely by an output of matériel. And if we do as you would like to have them under the circumstances, it would certainly increase the appreciation of the people of the United States in the personnel phase of the situation.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. FADDIS. Furthermore, I notice in your report—

General MARSHALL. May I add to that?

Mr. FADDIS. Surely.

General MARSHALL. One of the great difficulties we labor under is that the public does not understand that matériel is worthless unless there is a highly trained personnel to operate it. People do not see the difference between a force in France in 1918, in a stabilized sector, and the fast-moving team which mechanization and air render necessary, and which require far more training, far more development, than the slow-moving tactics of the old World War. They do not recognize what an Army corps is, nor what a tremendously complicated agency it is; how much territory it covers, nor the difficulties under which it operates.

The difference in our problem as compared to that of the Navy, for example, is this: Only a team can fight a ship and it requires much technical preparation to develop that team, both as to the individual's knowledge of his job, and as to coordination among the members of the team. The team has to be so developed that despite the shock of battle, explosions, and so forth, it will continue to function according to a prescribed procedure. However, nobody runs from a ship, because there is no place to run and hiding in the hull is of no advantage. The ship is full of buttons and fixed gadgets that the electrical companies have built into them. And, Mr. Faddis, I think you will agree with me, that you never saw a button on a battlefield. There communications are not welded or built into the structure. They are scattered over the face of the earth. Your first glimpse of a modern battlefield would be when you plunge forward on it. You do not see the artillery unit that is supporting you. You may never see it in your lifetime, yet it is

the unit that has to pour down the artillery fire at the place and the time you need it.

There is an added complication, in complete contrast to the naval problem. A hostile vessel will lie somewhere between the horizon and your ship, and you fire directly at it. We have the problem of practically never seeing our target straight to the front, because as far as possible the machine guns and the other weapons fire from enfilade, and are behind the hill or cover to your front. All of which presents a tremendously difficult problem and all of which requires a tremendous development of technique and the highest standard of discipline. Our men must be hardened and trained until they will respond to orders to do what they think is not humanly possible to do.

We have had some tragic examples in our history of good men, sound men, being involved in humiliating reactions on the battlefield and the very same men performing magnificently at a later date, when they had been thoroughly organized and trained. We had such situations in the Civil War. In fact, most of the Union army ran into the arms of Congress I think after the first Battle of Bull Run. And yet later on those same men did some of the heaviest fighting and took the heaviest punishment in the history of the world. But it took years to develop that state of discipline.

The personnel phase, as you say, has been dwarfed by the material phase. The public interest has been focused on statistics, on huge sums in billions, and in debates as to whether the schedules are all that they should be, as to whether the weapon is the right type or not.

**Mr. FADDIS.** Do you not believe the reason for that is this, that they are guilty of exactly what they accuse the War Department of being guilty of, all the time, in that they are always thinking of the next war in terms of the last war.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

**Mr. FADDIS.** The public has its mind fashioned on the World War and the systems and methods used in the World War. The public in general has failed to grasp the idea that warfare today is geared to the spirit of the times, the machine age.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

**Mr. FADDIS.** Further along that thought, I gather that the actual training program has been badly broken into because it has been necessary to reach into the various outfits you had when it started, and take out valuable personnel and transfer them around to the new increments as they came in, and that it has been necessary as to many of these units to break them up and make them into units of a different character because of the change in the methods of warfare.

For instance, I see in your report where you broke up 17 cavalry divisions, I believe it was?

General MARSHALL. Four cavalry divisions.

**Mr. FADDIS.** Seventeen cavalry regiments, I believe.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

**Mr. FADDIS.** And you made them into mechanized cavalry and tank units and field artillery, and so forth. So that has interfered with the training program up to this point. And because of the

necessity of this reorganization and because of the necessity of reaching in and getting valuable officers and noncommissioned officers, and transferring them around, our training program really has not reached the state of efficiency that it might have if that had not been necessary.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that is correct. The National Guard infantry divisions were kept as clear of changes as possible in order to give them a full opportunity for development. The special units that you refer to were converted into corps cavalry, half mechanized and half horse units, and also into antiaircraft units. All Regular units had to provide cadre after cadre for the development of new units or for the setting up of the great replacement training centers—all of which interfered very seriously with the program of training. We are just now coming out of the woods.

Mr. FADDIS. That is all.

Mr. ARENDS. How large an army do you think it is necessary to have to defend the Western Hemisphere?

General MARSHALL. Under present conditions, over and above the 152,000 additional men for the Air Corps already provided for, we need about 150,000 more men. Specifically, we do not want to create additional divisions at the present time. We wish to avoid that, if it is possible to do so. We want to improve the quality of the divisions we now have. We want to establish one basically sound force. It may be that later on, if the situation becomes more serious, we will have to add additional divisions. But we would do that in the rear of our present force, which we now have well on the way to dependable efficiency and without breaking up present units.

The additional 150,000 men are needed to restore to units men taken away in order to provide signal, engineer, antitank, and other special units that we need but for which we have had no authorization. Also we need men to replace those taken out of divisions to garrison the leased bases for which no men had been provided.

If the situation develops into actual operations there would be a number of units that would have to be hastily created, such as port units, military police companies, engineers, and elements of that sort. But as matters stand now, we do not want to increase the present number of divisions of the continental Army, except for the Armored Force.

Mr. ARENDS. In other words, a million and a half or a million six hundred thousand more would be sufficient.

General MARSHALL. About a million seven hundred thousand. There have been proposals that we take on 900,000 selectees in addition to those that we wish to hold in service. We do not want to do that. In the first place, we have not the shelter. In the second place, such an increase is not needed at the moment. We will want to induct as many of the authorized 900,000 as we need, but we will want to exchange them for others that we will release from active service and send back home.

Mr. ARENDS. In other words, if these selectees remain in for a longer length of time, the induction will be slowed up with these new selectees?

General MARSHALL. It will be slowed no more than is necessary. We have gone ahead in July and August to an overstrength in order to level off the numbers in our 3-month training centers.

**Mr. ARENDS.** Following up Mr. Thomason's inquiry, could we possibly get a list of the number of selectees going out over the period of the next 6 months beginning September 1?

**General MARSHALL.** We have data here that shows the numbers inducted each month to include June 1941. The 12-month period of training and service will naturally be finished 1 year later.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

*Memorandum—Induction of selectees by month*

November to December .....	19,327
January .....	73,633
February .....	80,239
March .....	153,437
April .....	124,082
May .....	62,450
June .....	79,522
 Total .....	 603,595

**Mr. ARENDS.** Just one other thought I had in mind. I can see from your standpoint the desirability of a declaration of a national emergency. But I think it goes even a little further than the Army. I think the national emergency goes pretty wide, probably beyond the Army.

**General MARSHALL.** There is now a national emergency in regard to everything but the military forces. The President has declared an unlimited emergency, but this does not affect the Army and Navy.

**Mr. ARENDS.** But not declared by Congress.

**General MARSHALL.** No, sir.

**Mr. ARENDS.** I think there is a great difference between that and a national emergency declared by Congress. That is all.

**Mr. CLASON.** General, I would like to ask you this. How many men would you expect to have in all branches of the Army by July 1, 1942, under your present plan?

**General MARSHALL.** About 1,700,000.

**Mr. CLASON.** Then, on the theory either you are not going to keep these selectees in very long, whom you now have in—that is, much longer than 1 year's service, or else you are not going to induct many new men.

**General MARSHALL.** We are not going to keep the present selectees, all of them, for an indefinite period. We are going to bring in as many new men as are needed to replace the ones we release.

**Mr. Clason,** what I am trying to avoid is a fixed rule which cannot be applied without damage to the Army.

**Mr. CLASON.** Following your theory, then, certain inductees, if they happen to be unfortunate enough to get into certain regiments, may be held on for 2 years, while others, who were brought in at the same time, and are equally needing the training, are likely to get out at the end of 12 months?

**General MARSHALL.** Even a young man at isolated Dutch Harbor would not be held for such a long period as you mention.

**Mr. CLASON.** I thought your idea was that you want to keep up the regiments, filled to their enlisted strength, by using the selectees and keeping them there?

**General MARSHALL.** We have already filled them up to full strength with selectees.

Mr. CLASON. You wish to keep those men in those particular regiments?

General MARSHALL. Not indefinitely, but we should not be compelled to release them at the end of 12 months. There is a regiment in a division in Texas, we will say; for which there is no immediate prospect of special employment. It would be very simple to meet that problem. A certain percentage per month could be released and they would be replaced by others coming from the training centers, men of the new 800,000 authorized under the terms of the Selective Training and Service Act.

Mr. CLASON. On the other hand, you keep Regular troops in the Philippines and in Hawaii and in Panama Canal Zone except for a number possibly less than 4,000. If that is true, and those places are all built up and well-established fortifications, it seems to me, that if they need the presence of Regular troops, certainly the Army which is going into Iceland or going into Brazil, ought to be made up only of Regulars, well trained, and not men who are merely inductees, who have had from 3 to 6 months of training.

General MARSHALL. How are you going to get the Regulars?

Mr. CLASON. As I understand, under the records which were before this committee the last time we had hearings, you can get approximately 85,000 new enlistments every month.

General MARSHALL. I said the largest number we ever received was from July to September 1940, under the impetus of the selective-service debates, and under the greatest recruiting campaign we had ever undertaken, and that number averaged about 89,000 a month. Men are going out all the time at the end of their service so that the number of enlistments does not represent the net gain.

Mr. CLASON. Surely.

General MARSHALL. So while we are enlisting 89,000, we are losing somewhere around 9,000. In other words, the net would be 80,000 and we actually have requirements for 600,000 3-year men.

Mr. CLASON. Where are you going to put those 600,000 men outside of continental United States? It would take only a very small fraction of the number that would go to Iceland or to Brazil, unless you are thinking about an expeditionary force.

General MARSHALL. Mr. Clason, we have our numerous bases and our regular overseas garrisons and we have got to maintain a continental army. I must not transfer from our home forces all of the experienced soldiers, the 3-year men.

I have to provide 3-year men for the huge Air Corps, which is struggling to get such volunteers right now, even though it is a very popular service. Your scheme, I think, means attempting an impossible proposition.

The Air Corps must have 75 percent 3-year men. The Armored Force has to have a substantial nucleus of 3-year men.

Then there are other requirements. Each of the triangular divisions must have a nucleus of 3-year men. The National Guard divisions must have a similar, dependable corps or nucleus of 3-year men. Otherwise, we would have merely a training school, instead of an army. Training schools are necessary, but there must be an army, too.

Then there are the outside or overseas considerations; the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama. Those garrisons require 3-year men.

The conditions and requirements add up to an impossible problem for solution on a volunteer basis. And besides, please keep this in mind. Volunteering is an uncertain proposition, and we are not in a speculative situation. We are preparing to stand off a highly professional crew. We must know within reasonable limits what we are to have in men.

Mr. CLASON. Since September of last year, has any attempt been made, any real attempt, to secure as many voluntary enlistments for 3-year terms as the Army could get?

General HAILEY. Yes, sir. We have been trying to get up to a strength of 500,000 3-year men and have not gotten it yet.

We have 470,000 3-year men in the Army now.

General MARSHALL. And we must have a minimum of what?

General HAILEY. About 640,000.

General MARSHALL. That is the very minimum we must have, and we are working towards that.

Mr. CLASON. General, if I understood the statements made by officers in the Army, about selectees and the National Guard, apparently many of them are anxious to remain beyond the 12 months' time. Has any attempt been made to ascertain if that is so?

General MARSHALL. Mr. Clason, such an action would involve the question of a national vote, as it were. We must not use political methods within the Army. They are highly desirable for a democracy, but not for an army. That sort of thing is going on now and is wrecking morale. All sorts of agencies are working upon the individual soldier to stir up dissension. No such army can be depended on to defend America.

Mr. CLASON. How many troops do you need in Iceland, for instance?

General MARSHALL. I must not tell you that.

Mr. CLASON. How many do you expect to have in the bases you secured from the British?

General MARSHALL. I do not want to give out that information, sir. We have 125,000 men on foreign service at the present time, and there must be a further increase.

Mr. CLASON. Do you think it is fair or proper to send selectees with only a few weeks' or months' training into Iceland, where they might be involved in war, since they are in contact with the enemy?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not think it is fair or proper to do so and I think it is most unfair to the War Department to put it in the position of either doing it or failing to provide the necessary security. I am resisting such action because we cannot afford to send men to such distant localities and then have to bring them back by boat a few weeks or months later.

Mr. CLASON. Well, you would send Regulars there?

General MARSHALL. Mr. Clason, I am trying to get a unified army and you are trying to have a collection of classified groups.

Mr. CLASON. No; I am wondering why a year ago, when the question was brought up, you did not get a Regular Army of as many 3-year enlistments as possible at that time, when they were coming into it?

**General MARSHALL.** Well, we did, but the minute the selective-service debates ceased, enlistments went down. We cannot build up large forces on a volunteer basis. Our history proves conclusively the wastefulness of such a procedure.

**Mr. COSTELLO.** General, do not you think a lot of those men who might otherwise go into the Army are getting jobs in industry?

**General MARSHALL.** You have brought up a very serious problem. We are not at war and the men in the Army are giving us their services for small pay, not small in terms of soldiers' pay in other parts of the world but very small in terms of the wages now being received by other men in industry.

One serious consideration pertains to the possible future of the National Guard. We have had to make up our plans for the return of the National Guard at the end of 12 months, because of that requirement in the law. What happens when a National Guard division goes home? It returns to its State status and becomes a State unit under the Governor; it ceases to be in the Army of the United States.

The Federal Government has a contractual relationship with the guard under which it provides regulations for its training, its type of organization, its arms, its uniforms, its equipment, and the pay of its members for certain prescribed drills, and camps.

The guardsman himself is at perfect liberty to go beyond the boundaries of the State. Take, for example, a division recruited largely from a farming district. When it returns to its home district the men will disperse toward the jobs at high pay which are to be found in the industrial centers. That division will be washed out, and will cease to have a value as a military asset.

The very fact that this is a great industrial program introduces a complicated situation in the development of an army while we are still on a peace basis.

**Mr. CLASON.** I thought the argument or the reason why we do not have more volunteers was that the trouble is not on account of our national interests being imperiled from abroad, but due to a change in economic conditions, which is an important one.

**General MARSHALL.** I do not agree on that, sir. From my point of view, that is not a correct statement of the cause.

**Mr. CLASON.** Before the Senate you testified, as I understand it, on page 9 of this report of the hearings of July 9, 1941. You were asked questions in regard to this volunteering for service of those 3-year men, and you said:

Yes; we figure at the present time and under present conditions that we should have a minimum of approximately 640,000 3-year volunteers. However, as we occupy the Atlantic bases and increase our overseas garrisons this figure will have to be increased progressively to approximately 800,000.

Then the question was asked:

Did I understand you to say 3-year volunteers?

Your reply was:

Yes; we should have a minimum of approximately 640,000 3-year men at the present time. \* \* \* We now have 476,000.

Now, as I understand that statement, it is not your intention to use these inductees in connection with the overseas bases, but to use 3-year volunteer men, whom you plan to get, and use them when those bases are developed?

**General HAISLIP.** That statement was made under the assumption that the selectees would go home at the end of 12 months, and that they could, therefore, not be used there. If the selectee stays in he will be sent wherever needed, because, to all intents and purposes, all the men will be on the same basis.

**Mr. CLASON.** Then do I understand from your statement, General Haislip, your idea is to consider now these inductees, if this resolution goes through, as being in the position of 3-year service men?

**General HAISLIP.** Yes; but only in that they will not have to go out on a particular date and will then become part of one Army, which is what the Chief of Staff is trying to get. He is trying to get all of his troops on the same basis; then they can be used interchangeably for any mission that happens to come.

I might say, generally, the whole idea is to maintain and continue the Selective Training and Service Act by training men, releasing them, and building up a trained reserve. No one has the idea of freezing the Army as it is now, but the idea is to release men under a flexible system without destroying the efficiency of our present forces.

**Mr. CLASON.** With reference to this 800,000 figure, the 800,000 Regulars were going to be secured with this Selective Service Act remaining in effect, were they not?

**General MARSHALL.** I do not think that we could possibly get them.

**Mr. CLASON.** What effort is being made to secure them at the present time, as compared with what was done a year ago between August and September?

**General HAISLIP.** Colonel Stout, will you answer that question?

**Colonel STOUT.** To get 3-year men in the Army, the Adjutant General put on a very intensive recruiting campaign. He tried radio broadcasts, paid advertising, and everything else. In addition to that, there had been much discussion in Congress and in the papers about selective service and many men were trying their best to get into the service of their own volition, instead of waiting to be drafted. The recruiting went up in July to 32,000 men, and on up to 43,000 men in October. In November it went down to 24,000, and at that time we also took them in for 1 year—anything, to get them in.

In November, when we took in our first selectees, the recruiting dropped down to 28,000 or 24,000, and it has averaged about 18,000 to 20,000 since then—because of 2 reasons, primarily: The big pressure of getting in first, which all Americans want to do, was off; the Selective Service Act was law and, as they were subject to induction, they waited for that. There was no incentive to volunteer. Another thing was the high rates of pay that were being paid in industry on the outside. And the whole history of recruiting has been that the higher the rates of pay on the outside, the harder it is to get recruits and the poorer the quality of the recruits. I imagine if we made a graph of the recruiting records and a graph of the pay rates, we would find that when the one went up, the other went down exactly in proportion.

**Mr. SMITH.** General, if the national interests were not imperiled, it would be all right to let them go out?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. SMITH.** If the law states it is imperiled, you could plan on that; if the national interest is not imperiled, you could plan on that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. And if the national interests were not imperiled, then they could be replaced?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

(The committee thereupon took a recess until 2 p. m.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee resumed in executive session, at 2 p. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Mr. CLASON, you may proceed.

Mr. CLASON. General Marshall, do you make any distinction between the need for the National Guard and for the selectees?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. CLASON. You think one is just as essential to keep in the service as the other?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. The National Guard apparently, according to your report, on page 8, was particularly necessary in order to provide what really amounts to a skeleton organization for the training of the electees?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. I understood this morning that you felt that the selectees might be allowed to leave the service very shortly after the 12-month period.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Would you expect the same of the National Guard?

General MARSHALL. Generally, as to individuals, but not as to units, sir.

Mr. CLASON. How about the selectees? They are not units, are they?

General MARSHALL. They are individuals.

Mr. CLASON. They are individuals.

General MARSHALL. I am speaking about the organizations of the National Guard—regiments, brigades, and divisions. When I speak of selectees, I am talking about individuals. And I would like to say, also, Mr. Clason, that when I spoke about the National Guard being necessary for the training of the selectees, I was talking about it in that light because at that time we had no replacement training centers nor did we have the personnel to create them. Replacement training centers had to be officered by Reserve officers, and they had to be trained in order to be able to function. We utterly lacked the necessary amounts of matériel for the centers. That matériel existed in the hands of the National Guard. The officer force and the noncommissioned officer force were present in the National Guard. So, as a plan for the prompt building up of the Army, not for its development over a period of years, it was essential from that point of view alone to utilize the National Guard by bringing it into active service. Otherwise, we would have had to emasculate it by taking away its equipment, and, psychologically, destroying it.

However, we needed their regiments and divisions. We had been working on them for 20 years, trying to build up their efficiency,

trying to train staffs. I personally worked with division and brigade staffs and with the divisions generally of the National Guard. That had been part of my duties during the period of 20 years following the World War. It seemed to me, aside from the fact that it was not in accordance with the national policy—it seemed to me out of the question to abandon all of that development when we needed an armed force as quickly as we could get it.

If you recall, in the early summer, when the National Guard issue first came up, I spoke to you gentlemen specifically about our urgent desire to bring in a first increment of 4 divisions, and I think 25 separate regiments, antiaircraft and coast artillery. We wanted to put them in summer camps the 1st of July; we wanted to get them started on a schedule of intensive training because in case of an emergency we would have needed them urgently for specific assignments.

I would have you keep in mind also that, at that time, we did not know whether or not the British Empire would be in existence at the end of the next 6 weeks or 2 months and whether or not we would find ourselves with the Atlantic completely open to naval forces hostile to our interests.

All of those things came into the picture at that particular time—training possibilities, matériel, the necessity for having units available for specific purposes.

I recall saying then that we wanted to develop deliberately, and, again to use the phrase that I have used too much, we wanted to do things in a businesslike fashion.

We wanted to start with a modest increment. We did not want to bring all the guard in at once. We have never wanted to do that.

Now, today, we do not want to let them all go out at once. I am not now speaking solely of the National Guard organizations. If the National Guard is sent home now, it is automatically necessary to create new units, and if that decision is made, it will change our military policy. It will eliminate the National Guard from further serious consideration as a factor in the national defense. It will have to be placed in a much lower category for the immediate defense of this country, and it would be necessary to maintain large forces of some other kind.

Whether that other force is composed of some units of 3-year men, some units of 50 percent 3-year men, and other units of 25 percent 3-year men, depending on the degree of readiness necessary, the organization of such a force would constitute a new national policy. You would be nullifying the National Defense Act of 1920. The Selective Training and Service Act is merely an amplification of the National Defense Act—a system that was wanted at the time of its passage, but which could not be voted. These are the reasons we are not considering at the present time the sending home of National Guard organizations.

The selectee should enter the ranks of the National Guard exactly as he goes into the ranks of the Regular Army, from the replacement training center, after the completion of 3 months of individual training.

Once he is with his unit in the present situation, his period of service should depend on developments. If there is a prolonged period of

uncertainty, such as we now have, we wish to continue the rotation of the selectees as far as possible, in order to bring new men in for training. The longer we freeze the men in the ranks of the Army the more difficult it will be to maintain their morale, unless real trouble starts. Then morale takes care of itself.

I would like to read an extract from my testimony before the Senate committee on July 17, which has not yet been printed. Is that agreeable to you, Mr. Clason?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Go right ahead, General.  
**General MARSHALL** (reading) :

The President has deemed it expedient to declare an unlimited emergency concerning civil functions and the War Department, and I personally, now believe it to be urgently necessary in the public interest for Congress to declare the existence of a national emergency.

In answer to a question of Senator Austin's, I made this reply:

Senator Austin, on questions of legislative strategy, I am a layman, a novice. On the urgency of the situation, however, I do not regard myself as a layman nor as a novice, but rather as a highly responsible military agent of the government. There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever about the existence of an emergency.

The declaration of an emergency does not create it. An emergency exists whether or not the Congress declares it. I am asking you to recognize the fact—the fact that the national interest is imperiled and that an emergency exists. I am not asking you to manufacture a fact.

Because an emergency exists it is necessary that authority be granted to hold National Guard units, Reserves, and selectees in the service beyond 12 months. The emergency creates this necessity. What form of statute you enact is unimportant so long as it authorizes that which the national interest requires. That is, the creation and maintenance of a strong, ready, armed force. One which can respond to whatever may be required. Not a force, fettered by inelastic rules. And, if I may say so, rules do not recognize emergencies, nor do emergencies permit the existence of hampering rules.

**Mr. CLASON.** It seems to me—and I was wondering what your position might be—that the Congress might well consider the two groups in two different resolutions, because it seems to me that the National Guard is in an entirely different position from the position of the selectees. It is contained in a different law, contained in a different wording, and with an entirely different background. One is by nature a voluntary group, the National Guard; the other is a drafted group.

Do you not feel that that would be a better way; and that the two types of men are in different positions?

**General MARSHALL.** Practically all of the National Guard units have from 30 to 50 percent of selectees in their ranks. So the one includes the other. Practically all of the National Guard units have a certain number of Reserve officers. All of the National Guard units have the 3-year volunteers of the National Guard and the original officers commissioned in the National Guard.

My problem is to create an army out of all of these differing categories, several of which have not yet been mentioned. We also have the Regular Army Reserve. That is another category and a special law refers to it. We have brought the Regular Army Reserve into active service.

We have the Reserve officers in three different categories. We have the National Guard officers, and 3-year enlisted men who are a normal part of the Guard. We have National Guard officers who have been given temporary commissions from noncommissioned rank and who will go back to noncommissioned grades at the end of the emergency. We have the officers who have been commissioned, on 3, 4, 5, or 6 weeks' preparation, in the National Guard, either as it was preparing to come into Federal service or shortly thereafter.

We have the Regular Army units, with everything in their ranks but the National Guardsman. But the larger units such as the Army Corps, include a number of National Guard organizations.

So we have a veritable mélange, a complete interweaving of all components in the Army, with separate laws applying to each.

I submit that the most effective service you can render the national defense at this time is to permit us to create a united army, that I can treat as an army, and eliminate the forced special consideration of various groups.

As the Army exists today, I need a lawyer constantly at my side, but lawyers and legal complications are inappropriate to a battlefield.

I am utterly sincere in this. The other day I told a number of the leading Members of Congress that the way to go at this matter is to recognize the emergency and do it boldly, and squarely, without quibble or circumlocution. We are in a most serious situation, and I cannot believe that we will benefit by any evasion of the fact. An Army at best is a very difficult instrument to create, and to maintain at high efficiency. A scrambled army, an inefficient army is both costly and a dubious investment. That is my sincere reaction, Mr. Clason.

Mr. FADDIS. Will the General yield for a question?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. FADDIS. Is it not a fact that the piecemeal approach to this question has seriously hampered you?

General MARSHALL. Very much so. Let me add this thought. You asked me a question this morning that gave me a fine opening, but I was too slow to take advantage of it. You were talking about the matériel phase being better understood by the public than the personnel phase. I can get billions of dollars with comparative ease; but, when I get down to the practical proposition about personnel, then my real difficulties begin. I can go before a committee and get billions, and we have urgently needed them. Also, they appall me in their amount, but the point is, every one seems willing to do business on those terms. But all of that effort, all of those billions are futile unless you provide the highly trained personnel.

I think it is a perfectly remarkable thing, in our form of democracy, with its complete liberty of the press and differing points of view, that we were able to have the Selective Training and Service Act written into the law as early, or as late, whichever way you want to put it, as September 1940. That was a truly remarkable accomplishment of democracy. Some may say that it might have been done earlier. I do not feel that way about it, though I suffer from the apparent delay. For I do think that it was a splendid demonstration of the practical workings of democracy, that we were able to secure that definite action in time of peace.

I admit that we had to have a frightening situation, a catastrophic situation, but we did take the necessary, the great preliminary step of preparation, and everybody submitted to that decision.

Throughout the winter the men in our new Army showed a fine state of morale, without evidence of the confused reactions of the civilian communities, and in great contrast to the present morale in some units, I am sorry to say, as a result of all of this uncertainty and debate, these allegations and recriminations—and I have the responsibility of struggling with morale under the difficulties of the present situation. With a united public, with a united people, and a united front, my problem would be vastly simplified. I think now we have reached the point where we must be exceedingly direct and frank.

Mr. CLASON. I notice you spoke of this as being a secret proposition. The newspapers carried the statement you had stated to a group of congressional leaders that regardless of legislative hindrances, if the time comes when the United States security requires troops to be dispatched outside of the Western Hemisphere they will be sent first and Congress will be informed of the action later.

General MARSHALL. That is not a correct statement, sir. There have been a great many statements credited to me that I have first learned of in the press.

Mr. CLASON. I agree with you. I notice on page 10 of your report you stated you called for the National Guard 2 weeks or a month earlier than you felt was necessary, for the purpose of securing the passage of the Selective Service Act.

General MARSHALL. For the purpose of preventing its defeat. I was very intent on arranging matters in an efficient manner, but I had to send troops intended for New England to camps down in Texas. It was necessary for me to arrange matters personally in order to meet the legislative situation. I had been reliably informed that had we delayed as much as a week in putting the men in camp we would have been charged with not being ready. We would have had a volunteer system forced on us instead of securing a democratic selective service system, or, at least, the selective service system would have been put off until after election, and then possibly would have been fatally emasculated into some volunteer compromise method. The emergency at that time did not permit of such delay or legislative compromise, in my opinion.

So I had to accept the situation and do the best I could to manage things, accepting all the hazards involved. Later I had to meet the recriminations and criticisms, but I expected that. It cost about \$900,000, for example, to prepare the temporary tent camp for the Forty-fourth Division. We had planned to put the Forty-fourth Division in camp about the 1st of July, which could have been done at small expense, while the cantonment was being built. But we were not allowed to do that, all of which is an illustration of the extreme difficulties under which we have had to labor in such matters.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been in a strait jacket all the time?

General MARSHALL. The problems have been extremely difficult. That is why I say the time has come to meet this particular problem head on, without evasion, with cold logic rather than with political compromises. The times are too serious for the latter, I think.

**Mr. CLASON.** What would you say with regard to the item in the newspaper of Churchill's speech on February 10, 1941? Do you agree with the things in his statement, which was to the effect that in the last war the United States sent 2,000,000 men across the Atlantic, but this is not a war of vast armies hurling immense masses of shells at one another. We do not need the gallant armies which are formed throughout the American Union. We do not need them this year, nor the next year, or any year I can foresee.

**General MARSHALL.** I do not wish to comment on his statements.

**Mr. CLASON.** You do not visualize, then, an expeditionary force at all?

**General MARSHALL.** I do not know where it could land, or where it could obtain the necessary shipping for a long time to come, unless you are referring to the Iceland proposition as an A. E. F.

**Mr. CLASON.** You do not see it?

**General MARSHALL.** Frankly, I do not see it today.

**Mr. CLASON.** Do not you also feel that Russia, which at the time the Selective Service Act was passed was aiding the Germans and is now an ally of the British, and with our fleet increased in power by the new battleships and other units, and the fact England did withstand the threat of its collapse in 6 months, according to Secretary Knox—do you not feel, so far as the international peril is concerned, that there is less danger today of attack on the United States by Hitler than there was at the time the Selective Service Act was passed?

**General MARSHALL.** No, sir; I think just the opposite is the case.

**Mr. CLASON.** Then will you tell us why, please?

**The CHAIRMAN.** That is all foreign to the issue here.

**Mr. CLASON.** I think it is very important to determine whether or not the Selective Service Act should be extended.

**The CHAIRMAN.** I wish the gentleman would go ahead and get through as soon as he can, because we have a dozen other men who want to question the General.

**General MARSHALL.** I think the Russian campaign has delayed the possibility of attack on England, but it appears from the meager data available that the German armies are pretty well up to schedule. Whether bad weather, whether heavy losses, whether later resistance will cause long delays or a crippling morale effect on the German Army, I cannot say at this time. But I feel, with Russia disposed of, as far as the Volga, for example, the next move will probably come quickly in a rush through Spain and Portugal into North Africa, and possibly a farther movement into the Near East.

(After discussion off the record.)

**Mr. CLASON.** You do not expect any activity on the part of American troops in any foreign country in the near future?

**General MARSHALL.** No; I do not foresee any such activity.

**Mr. CLASON.** What would you say about releasing the men from 28 on, and all married men from selectees, in view of the legislation that has gone through?

**General MARSHALL.** As I have already said, we want to do that and intend to do it. I included that idea in my biennial report. I was talking about 28-year-old men and older then, but we can go

into the married cases also. Some of the men were quite different from others in their attitude toward marriage.

Mr. HARNESS. General, you do not mean young men who got married after the act was approved?

General MARSHALL. No; I am not referring to those cases.

Mr. HARNESS. You mean those who were married at the time of the draft?

General MARSHALL. Yes. Some of the local boards inducted married men, others did not. As I said before, we are now releasing men from all components. We can broaden the application of this policy when we see our way clear and have a legislative decision on existing limitations. We can then make replacements on a more businesslike basis. We intend to do those things because it is to the Army's interest to do so, aside from questions of expediency. If we have men in the ranks who are in a mental foment, men who have reason to feel great anxiety as to their families back home, they should be released, if practicable. If the man is merely a stubborn, opinionated, undisciplined character, that is yet another matter.

Mr. CLASON. I notice this joint resolution concerning this provides—

That the Congress hereby expressly declares that a national emergency exists, to the extent and for the purpose only of—

doing two things.

One, keeping the selectees in the armed service?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. In other words, there is no national emergency nor any other reason, so far as Congress is concerned, to release the law under which the selectees came into the service, which says they shall be discharged after 12 months except whenever Congress has declared the national interest is imperiled. Now, why does not that open up the entire controversy again, as to whether or not there has been a contract with those draftees?

General MARSHALL. I do not favor that resolution, sir. I think that is putting the cart before the horse. The existence of an emergency, in my opinion, is a fact, not a theory. I have the form of a resolution here—

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the same one I have in my office?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that is the one you have.

Mr. CLASON. I wonder if you would read that. Can you tell us what the purpose is?

The CHAIRMAN. I have copies here for the committee, and I am going to give a copy to each one of you as soon as we get through with the hearings.

Mr. CLASON. We would like to see it now.

The CHAIRMAN. If you want one, I will give it to you now.

Mr. EDMISTON. General, I have been listening to your testimony very attentively and am very much impressed by the seriousness of the situation. The thought occurs to me that we are not going to have much trouble, I do not think, in remedying this situation so far as the members of this committee are concerned, who have the picture which you painted for us here. In other words, you can sell it to this committee because you can lay the cards on the table and talk, but we cannot go on the floor of the House with this off-

the-record testimony and say things there that have been said here. And the thought does occur to me, it seems to me, the country needs a little arousing; that we should be permitted to tell the country more of the situation as it does exist. I do not want to be an alarmist, but I do think we are too complacently smug in America about what could happen to us and happen in a hell of a hurry.

General MARSHALL. I have tried in my limited way to meet that situation, because I find that, in general, what I have said had been so ignored in the major part and so distorted in the minor part that a state of confusion existed not only among the camps but also at home. So I have had the hearings of July 9, 1941, before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs reprinted and they are being sent to every organization in the Army. My biennial report is being printed also so that each company day room will have one, and the men can see exactly what was really recommended, and why.

The question is how to bring the people to a realization of the situation. They are laboring in a state of complete confusion. I agree with you that in some way or other we must make the situation apparent.

Mr. EDMISTON. That was what I have in mind.

General MARSHALL. I have always felt an aversion to the War Department undertaking anything that might be characterized as a propaganda service. As a matter of fact, our proposals are now getting a much better reaction from the public.

Mr. EDMISTON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I think the serious error with regard to my report lay in the fact that I did not have a summary available for the telegraph services, so that the first news flashes would have presented a more accurate statement of what I had recommended.

Mr. ELSTON. General, you say you are getting a better reaction now from the public?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. Because of the fact that the public is getting a little more information?

General MARSHALL. I believe that is the reason, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. Do not you think if the public is fully advised as to the danger of the country, that reaction is going to be even better? Do not you believe that today a great many people are opposing this type of legislation because they feel they are in the dark; they feel they are confused, and they are confused; they do not know generally what the situation is in the country, and there are too many people going out and making speeches and taking an entirely different view from what you take before this committee—talk of immediate war from the members of the Cabinet? Therefore, to the minds of the public that means an expeditionary force. And, because of those statements, we cannot blame the public for feeling like they do.

Now, you have given us some information today, in executive session, which is secret, and of course, is something that won't be violated, as to these dangers that we are confronted with—the dangers you spoke of in South America. Now, Hitler knows all about that, does he not, because he is the one who is doing the threatening? And if Hitler knows about that, why should not the American people now about it?

General MARSHALL. You have put your question in a very effective form, Mr. Elston. We have frequently commented publicly on the tremendous German propaganda service in South America. But we are restricted in talking about certain phases of the matter.

(After discussion off the record.)

Mr. SMITH. General, you feel that the situation is such that it meets the provisions that were put in the Selective Service Act?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. And that our interests are in peril?

General MARSHALL. That is the situation exactly.

Mr. SMITH. Unless we have a declaration by Congress?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. And you feel that if the Congress does not make that declaration the Army will go through a process of disintegration?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. And you are in the difficult situation where the revelation of everything known to the Government would probably bring about a violent public reaction which would carry us farther than we want to go?

General MARSHALL. Exactly that, sir.

Mr. SMITH. And we may be faced, if we do not pass this legislation, with that alternative—either disintegration or acceptance of violent public reaction?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. That is all.

Mr. HARNESS. General, following what Mr. Elston first asked you about the reaction of the public because of the lack of information, of course Hitler, as he said, and as we all know, knows what he is doing down in South America. Certainly, by letting the people know what we know about what he is doing is not going to divulge anything to any of our potential enemies. Don't you think that if our people were adequately informed and advised of these things, it would make this problem much simpler for everybody? Our people would just insist that something be done to protect our interests if they knew the facts.

General MARSHALL. If you will read the President's message to Congress, you will find he says that specifically about South America.

Mr. HARNESS. But they are all generalities and nothing specific, and you know what has been happening in this country in the last 8 years about speaking in generalities. The people have gotten to the point where they do not know what to believe. They are confused.

General MARSHALL. There has been so much in the press about South America that there is no reason why there should be any secrecy about the general fact that the tremendous German propaganda and planning service that is working throughout Latin America, is inimical to our interests, that it threatens our security in this hemisphere.

Mr. HARNESS. I believe it, too.

Just one other thing in this connection: I have gathered from everything you have said, every time you have been before this committee, that your objective is to keep this country out of this war.

General MARSHALL. That is my objective, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. Yet we have Secretary Ickes and Secretary Knox making speeches demanding that we get in now. That creates an

additional state of confusion on the part of the people, and they are reluctant to grant these extraordinary powers that are requested because they just do not realize the necessity for them except to go to war. I do no know whether you want to comment on that or not.

But going back to this proposal to keep the drafted men, has it come to your attention that under the acts that we passed in August of 1940 and in September of 1940 the President now has the power to keep these drafted men in for an additional year?

General MARSHALL. Will you please develop your thought further, sir?

Mr. HARNESS. Well, under the first act that we passed in August of 1940 we provided that the President had the right to call the reserve component of the Army into service for a period of 12 months.

General M(ARSHALL). You mean to transfer the men into the reserve and then call them back to active duty?

Mr. HARNESS. As soon as they are discharged, automatically they go into the reserve component of the Army and are subject to such additional training as the law provides.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, but I think it would be most unfortunate to do that at this time because the soldier would feel that he had been victimized by a maneuver, by sharp practice, under the cover of the law. Also we would have to release our soldiers, transfer them to the reserve, and go through the procedure of recalling them to active duty. We would defeat our own purpose. We would be doing what is often done in law where through clever maneuvers within the law matters are managed contrary to what the normal person has a right to expect.

We must not indulge in such a procedure.

I want to go right straight down the road, to do what is best, and to do it frankly and without evasion. I think it would have a most unfortunate effect on morale if we adopted the other method. We would give our men the feeling that we were taking some unfair though legal advantage of them. That provision of the law was intended to meet a different situation.

Mr. HARNESS. I agree with what you say, General, in what has been suggested here, that we ought to come out honestly and say what we are going to do. It just adds to the confusion.

General MARSHALL. Otherwise we evade the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Costello.

Mr. COSTELLO. This language does not say that we were entering into contract with the selectees that they be in for 1 year; the very language itself shows that they could be kept in for a longer period in case there was a real emergency.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. I think the Congress knew the situation when the act was under consideration, that it did not mean to suggest a year's service.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the fact that it was discussed shows very definitely there was no suggestion of a contract of 1 year.

Now, General, what was the actual size of the Regular Army at that time?

General MARSHALL. It was about 240,000.

Mr. COSTELLO. And how many men were in foreign service and at points like Alaska?

General MARSHALL. About 70,000.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then you actually had about 170,000 in the Regular Army within this country available to aid and train selectees and help with the National Guard.

General MARSHALL. Less the Air Corps, which was about 25,000; less the overhead of depots and everything of that sort, probably about 80 or 40 thousand, leaving us about 100,000 available for the purpose.

Mr. COSTELLO. My purpose in asking this question, which as you have already said, the only manner in which you could train the selectees was to increase the Regulars?

General MARSHALL. We had two things to do at the same time; first, to train the selectees; and second, to bring all units of the Regular Army and National Guard to full strength as quickly as possible. The training had to be in the ranks of the Regulars and the Guard because we did not have the personnel prepared or the equipment available—or the shelter to start at that time the establishment of training centers. Both requirements were met by assigning selectees to units. It was the only way we could have managed last fall and early winter. Now we proceed quite differently.

Mr. COSTELLO. That explains your reason for asking to send men out to these various places.

General MARSHALL. There is no other way.

Mr. COSTELLO. Because it takes longer to train them.

General MARSHALL. If we had had a selective service system 8 years earlier we could have gone about it gradually. My idea would have been to start with a much smaller number and gradually build up the system. At least, it would have been possible to have set up training centers initially and to avoid sending untrained selectees to organized units. Also to have avoided assigning any selectees to certain units of a high priority of readiness.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your real purpose, your effort at the present time is to be able to train selectees, and to discharge those who can be conveniently discharged.

General MARSHALL. Yes. But we must also train an army. We want to do pretty much what we have been doing, but without inelastic limitations which hinder or defeat us in protecting the interests of the Government and the country at large.

Mr. COSTELLO. Even if this legislation goes through, the effort of the War Department would be to release selectees from service at home.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Even though you would have the foreign service, which might have to stay longer, for as much as 2 years?

General MARSHALL. Well, I would hardly think so long as that, unless we get into deep trouble. It would largely be a question of ships, of tonnage. The extension would be a matter of months rather than a year or so.

Mr. COSTELLO. So far as the others are concerned they would be released from the service just as fast as they could be released?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is also proposed in this legislation to extend the time of the Regulars by increasing it to a 3-year period?

General MARSHALL. Yes, if you mean by extending the time of the 3-year men.

**Mr. COSTELLO.** That is proposed legislation that has been submitted by the War Department?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir; personally I would be in favor of giving the 3-year man more consideration than the short-term men, because many of the former have already been in the service for almost 3 years. But we do not want to find ourselves in the situation of our Army in the Philippine campaign in 1898, or the situation that confronted General Scott in his campaign in Mexico when he had to march out of Vera Cruz and fight as quickly as possible because the term of service of his volunteers was about to expire. And we must prevent the recurrence of another disaster like Bull Run, where an unprepared Army was rushed to the battle because it was due to go home in a few weeks. We must not do things that way any more. We are a great Nation with a terrible responsibility.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mr. Martin.

**Mr. MARTIN.** General Marshall, I was very glad to hear your statement regarding the matter of discharges of the individual trainees as soon as practicable after 12 months in case the training period is extended.

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. MARTIN.** And I understand that policy would be in effect both as to individuals in the National Guard and in the inductive force?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. MARTIN.** The general policy of discharging individuals as soon as practicable upon completion of the 12 months' period of training?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. MARTIN.** And in some cases prior to the completion of the 12 months' period?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. MARTIN.** So there will be real effort made to relieve any individual cases of distress.

**General MARSHALL.** We do that now wherever possible.

**Mr. MARTIN.** There is one question as to officer personnel in the senior grade: We have a very large number of wartime officers who are now serving in the field grades, so that there is a less shortage of officers in the field grades now than we have ever experienced before, and for that reason individual cases can be given much more liberal consideration in the field grades.

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. MARTIN.** Now, as to the officers in the senior grades, or field officer grades, there are a great many Reserve officers of the World War age in the field officer grades who are very anxious to come into duty, which makes more or less top heavy the officer personnel, but I am wondering why those officers cannot be called to duty even though it does result in a surplus.

**General HAISLIP.** We are ordering some of them to active duty. However, there is a very definite understanding between the Reserve officers and the War Department that senior officers are not needed in our present stage of mobilization but that if we have another large augmentation in the Army they will be needed to a much greater extent.

In other words, the status of mobilization today does not call for many senior Reserve officers on active duty.

Mr. MARTIN. Of course, it would result in rather a large surplus of officers on duty if they were all called to duty.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. But possibly it would bring their training up to date and it seems to me it would be a very good investment from our own national point of view to call them to duty even if there is a surplus.

Now, as to the emergency that you have brought to our attention here today, General, and the suggestion that legislation be passed, or recommending that it be passed. Do you have any objection to limiting the legislative declaration of emergency to one affecting the administration and control over the armed forces?

General MARSHALL. I was considering the legal difficulties. General Haislip suggests a reference to the quotation I had read, to the effect that the emergency is now an actual fact. As long as you are speaking in legal terms—

Mr. MARTIN (interposing). We have to make our legal concepts in dealing with legislation of this character, because it affects a great host of other legislative acts, and I would like the General's opinion on it.

The CHAIRMAN. He has already told you what his opinion was, and we are going to get some lawyers up here to discuss the legal phase.

General, he wants your legal opinion about it again.

Mr. MARTIN. I want his opinion as Chief of the Staff of the Army as to whether or not the declaration of emergency he wants the Congress to pass should go beyond its effect on the armed forces.

General MARSHALL. My opinion is that you should recognize the emergency by declaring that the national interests are imperiled and that a national emergency exists. Under that declaration you have made an announcement to the world, and especially to Latin America, that we mean business and are ready and determined to do whatever may be necessary for the better security of this Nation and the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. MARTIN. You would have no objection to our limiting the effect of such a declaration to the armed forces?

General MARSHALL. Well, I must not say that I have an objection, I made such a recommendation in my biennial report because the question of where or when our Army was to be employed are matters to be decided by the Commander in Chief and the Congress. Also, as I understand the situation, it is the proposal of the administration that you consider action in that manner, that is, as you have just expressed it. I personally prefer the more direct approach. Our interests are imperiled, there is a national emergency. Let's put the Axis Powers on notice that we recognize those facts and are determined to meet the situation they are planning to create, without burying our heads in the sand until the last moment.

Mr. MARTIN. By that you mean without any reservation?

General MARSHALL. Without reservation. I think the cure by indirect methods is usually worse than the bite that frightens us from direct methods.

Mr. MARTIN. But that the declaration of a national emergency by the Congress, to the extent that it affects the administration of the

armed forces would carry out all that you are personally asking here?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; or that I recommended in my report.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. General Marshall, I know you are tired, and I am inclined to go along with you in what is necessary, and I think the people of the country I am from feel similarly. I merely want to ask one or two questions to summarize what has been said. As I understood you to say, you feel like a general resolution would have a deep moral effect on the country as a whole?

General MARSHALL. That is my belief, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. In reference to the discharge of these men under the Selective Service Act, where training is authorized for a year, when you go beyond the year you are not holding the men so much for training purposes but because you need them for service purposes; is not that it?

General MARSHALL. That is it, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. In releasing them, I know you will conscientiously try to be fair in releasing them in groups. But do you have any idea about how you would relieve them from service? Would you do it in units or groups, or individually, or how would you do it?

I can recall when units of the A. E. F. were in service after the World War in France and Germany a notice was posted there one day that one outfit in the First Division, the Sixth field artillery, was about to be retained for service in Germany 4 years because the emergency would probably exist that long and they needed two regiments there in Ehrenbreitstein, and those men felt pretty badly about it.

How would you work that out? Suppose you sent men to Iceland, to Alaska, or to the Philippines; are they apt to be forgotten in those places?

General MARSHALL. I feel sure they would not be forgotten. They might not secure as much special pleadings in the press as they do while in the local camps.

But we have a section of the staff devoted to those very considerations, to calculate and advise regarding those matters. We have a human interest in the men, and a deep professional interest in maintaining morale. Always this is a foremost thought. We must have morale. When you neglect or forget soldiers you lose their most important qualification. In the past we have had to stumble through. Now we are organized to pick our way with great discretion.

Mr. BROOKS. I think the illustration which you have given us informally indicates what I am driving at. Where you have a group that might possibly be overlooked, or perhaps this emergency might continue or perhaps get just a little worse for a period, we will say 8 years, and you would have men in Iceland or somewhere else that were peculiarly adapted to that type of climate and the country, who had been specially trained for it, would your plans contemplate some organized effort to replace them with men with a limited amount of extra service, beyond a year's period, rather than keeping those same men over there year in and year out?

General MARSHALL. We would not keep them there.

**Mr. BROOKS.** You could, under this resolution.

**General MARSHALL.** But we must have morale in order to have efficient units. We cannot avoid considering the effect of such matters.

**Mr. BROOKS.** You think the question of morale would solve that.

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir. General Haislip is bringing up a question that I have mentioned two or three times. We desire to rotate the selectees so long as we are not in an actual state of war, because we must build up a reserve; we want to keep the Officers Reserve Corps alive, and we want to have places for the graduates of the R. O. T. C. and the Officer Candidate Schools. So we would wish to release Reserve officers as we do not desire to continually increase the active corps, like a rolling snowball.

**Mr. BROOKS.** When that time comes and you have some selectees in Iceland and they have no plans for coming home, their morale will be a little low, will it not?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes; but if they have, as they will have, good leadership, they will be on the job.

**Mr. BROOKS.** You are going to put men serving under Regular Army enlistments on the same relative basis as far as extra training is concerned as the selectees? In other words, those men enlist for 3 years, while the selectee enlists for 1 year.

**General MARSHALL.** I would give the 3-year man the same consideration after 3 years as the selectee after 1 year.

**Mr. BROOKS.** Suppose he is in Iceland and his term runs out? Are you going to let him start home and leave the selectee there beyond his 1-year period?

**General MARSHALL.** No, sir.

**Mr. BROOKS.** You will treat them in relatively the same way?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes. We would consider the interests of the 3-year volunteer in the same way as we would the interests of the selectee who has been inducted for 12 months. However, the 3-year volunteer had no obligation to transfer to the Reserve.

**Mr. BROOKS.** And the same thing would apply to the National Guard men?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir; to the 3-year men.

**Mr. DURHAM.** General, your statement has been very enlightening and clarifying to me, and I for one would like to expedite consideration of this matter and deal with the problem in a businesslike way.

I gather from your statement that Hitler, at the present time, is using his technique on the American continent that has been so effective in Europe.

Is that correct?

**General MARSHALL.** That is correct, sir.

**Mr. KILDAY.** With reference to the proposal that we might limit the existence of the emergency to the armed forces, would not that put us in an inconsistent position if we did that?

**General MARSHALL.** I am not an expert on the legal questions involved. From my own personal point of view, a direct, clear-cut approach is the method to adopt.

**Mr. KILDAY.** Is there any reason for a boy who did not wait for his number to come up, but volunteered to be inducted, to feel that he is in a different category than the one who waited? There is a state-

ment that has been made that a man, if he desired, could, under the inducements of the provisions of this act, volunteer for a year and get it over with, and that such a man had done that and made his plans.

**General MARSHALL.** You gave him the opportunity under the law, as I saw it, to select his time and not to continue on a speculative basis. Other than that, he is on the same basis as the other man.

**Mr. KILDAY.** And he would be in the same category in the extension of his time.

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. KILDAY.** He is subject to a 10-year reserve, and the Regular Army Volunteer would not be subject to that?

**General MARSHALL.** That is right, provided he served 3 full years.

**Mr. KILDAY.** Is there any objection on your part to including in the record a statement of the composition of our existing divisions, both Regulars and National Guard, as to the percentage of Regulars and draftees, to show how interwoven they are.

**General MARSHALL.** We have that data, and will put it in the record.

(The statement above referred to is as follows) :

*Selectees in Regular Army and National Guard Divisions (proportion of actual strength as of July 1<sup>st</sup>, 1941)*

	Percentage of 3-year enlistments	Percentage of selectees
<b>Triangular divisions:</b>		
First Division.....	99	1
Second Division.....	75	25
Third Division.....	67	33
Fourth Division.....	61	39
Fifth Division.....	61	39
Sixth Division.....	31	69
Seventh Division.....	21	79
Eighth Division.....	46	54
Ninth Division.....	50	50
<b>Armored divisions:</b>		
First Armored Division.....	50	50
Second Armored Division.....	55	45
Third Armored Division.....	28	72
Fourth Armored Division.....	20	80
<b>Cavalry divisions:</b>		
First Cavalry Division.....	63	37
Second Cavalry Division.....	39	61
<hr/>		
<b>National Guard divisions:</b>	Percentage of National Guard men	Percentage of selectees
Twenty-sixth Division.....	45	55
Twenty-seventh Division.....	57	43
Twenty-eighth Division.....	100	0
Twenty-ninth Division.....	44	56
Thirty-first Division.....	66	34
Thirty-second Division.....	60	40
Thirty-third Division.....	54	46
Thirty-fourth Division.....	60	40
Thirty-fifth Division.....	60	40
Thirty-sixth Division.....	61	39
Thirty-seventh Division.....	41	59
Thirty-eighth Division.....	43	57
Fortieth Division.....	55	45
Forty-first Division.....	62	38
Forty-third Division.....	100	0
Forty-fourth Division.....	64	36
Forty-fifth Division.....	67	33

**Mr. KILDAY.** Will you also put in a further statement showing the increments by which they were brought into these divisions, to show whether there would be any large holes in these divisions by reason of the fact that their year of service would expire in gradual numbers or by large numbers at one time, so as to seriously dislocate the organization?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir; we will put that in the record.  
(The statement above referred to is as follows:—)

Division	Number of selectees June 30, 1941	Periods of greatest augmentation	Numbers received
First Division.....	970	.....	.....
Second Division.....	2,844	.....	.....
Third Division.....	4,848	Feb. 28 to Mar. 16 .....	6,400
Fourth Division.....	5,112	do .....	5,300
Fifth Division.....	5,353	Mar. 31 to Apr. 15 .....	2,000
Sixth Division.....	8,052	June 15 to 30 .....	4,100
Seventh Division.....	10,803	Jan. 15 to Feb. 18 .....	5,500
Eighth Division.....	8,688	Feb. 28 to Mar. 15 .....	2,300
Ninth Division.....	8,863	Jan. 15 to 31 .....	4,800
First Armored Division.....	8,707	Feb. 28 to Mar. 31 .....	3,000
Second Armored Division.....	8,131	Feb. 15 to 29 .....	2,300
Third Armored Division.....	8,007	June 15 to 30 .....	4,200
Fourth Armored Division.....	9,219	May 15 to 31 .....	6,300

**Mr. MERRITT.** The big exodus will start in November, increasing in December and January?

**General MARSHALL.** The numbers of selectees are comparatively small for November and December, but they begin to pile up into large figures thereafter.

I would like you to have in mind when you look at those figures that there are only 9 Infantry divisions in the entire Regular Establishment, and that the Nation we are considering as antagonistic to our interests has about 300 divisions, all of which have the invaluable experience of actual campaign, following a long, deliberate training schedule through a period of years, from boy to man to soldier. There is a highly developed huge army of veterans. We have only been developing our Army since last fall.

**Mr. KILDAY.** These figures show that, after all, 476,000, which may sound to the average citizen as being a considerable number, when you take from the 476,000 the thousands of men in the Air Corps and those assigned to small organizations, it leaves you in a position so that you would not have available any considerable number of total units; is not that true?

**General MARSHALL.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. KILDAY.** I have been much gratified with your statement, General. I think perhaps the reason the country does not realize just what the situation is is the fact that everybody was running for office, from the President down, and the country was led to believe that we were going to win the war without fighting it.

So I am hoping that the General Staff and the War Department can see their way clear to take this mass of information and separate that which you could disclose from that which should not be disclosed, and let the people get some such idea of the situation as we have gotten today. Do you think it would be possible to do that?

General MARSHALL. We are at work on that now, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. In the case of a man who contracts to serve for 3 years, do you have some sort of a stipulation by which you can keep him over that time?

General MARSHALL. In time of war, only, as provided for in the National Defense Act of 1920. In other words, if we should become involved in a state of war we can hold these men. In a national emergency we cannot. The picture changes instantly if we were forced into actual hostilities, because everybody would want to see things through. Our problem is the long period of maintaining ourselves in a state of readiness.

Mr. BROOKS. It would take a declaration of an emergency by Congress to make that possible, to retain these men?

General MARSHALL. More than that. It would require a state of war.

Mr. MARTIN. Along the line of Mr. Brooks' questions, relative to limiting the period of the extension, could it be worked out in any practical way to put an outside limit on the length of the extension of the service for the National Guard and the inductees?

General MARSHALL. I would urgently recommend against that. You can just as well, and with less possibility of doing harm, reserve to yourselves the congressional right to cancel the emergency when, in your opinion, it has ceased to exist.

Mr. MARTIN. What I had in mind was a definite period of limitation.

General MARSHALL. I think that would be unwise, because you would be creating the basis of another political dilemma for yourselves, and an administrative dilemma for the War Department. If you reserve to yourselves the right to cancel the emergency when you think the national interests are no longer imperiled, you would have a check on developments.

The CHAIRMAN. General, on behalf of the committee I want to thank you very much for the very excellent statement you have made. You have presented your case exceedingly well, and I think it has about solved your problem.

General MARSHALL. I want to thank you gentlemen very much.

Mr. FADDIS. I think this committee ought to express itself as having the fullest confidence in the sincerity, patriotism, ability, and professional qualities of the Chief of Staff.

General MARSHALL. Thank you, sir.

#### STATEMENT OF GRENVILLE CLARK, NEW YORK, N. Y., REPRESENTING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY COMMITTEE OF THE MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I represent a group of members of the national emergency committee of the Military Training Camps Association of the United States. This is substantially the same group of men who, as the national emergency committee, drafted the Burke-Wadsworth bill as introduced, and sponsored it, all of which was fully stated on the records of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and of this committee a year ago.

Naturally, we have retained a strong interest in the workings of the Selective Service Act. When the issue now before you came up, our committee being still in existence and functioning, it seemed to many of us that we would like to be heard in view of our original sponsorship of the act. We have therefore prepared a written brief which will be sent to every Member of Congress and of which I have some copies here.

This brief represents the views of a group of perhaps 200 signers, although all of their names are not on copies now in print. The great majority of these men were in military service in the World War, and I think most of them served in command of troops in France. A good many of them have sons in the Army, the Navy, or the Marine Corps now. I think this will identify us.

We are here to support the Chief of Staff in every respect on the policy he recommends, on the reasons he states, and on the measures he asks for.

We think it is absolutely essential and vital to the interests of the country that the request of the President and War Department be granted by the Congress.

We think also, as to the form of the legislation, that not only should it take the form, but almost must take the form already contemplated and provided for in section 3 (b) of the Selective Service Act, namely, a declaration that the national interest is imperiled.

This question of an extension of service beyond 12 months was discussed at length before the House and Senate committees a year ago, and I supposed it was thoroughly understood that if a situation developed where further service was required, it would be so required under a declaration that the national interest is imperiled. It is only a half truth to say that the Selective Service Act provides for a 12-months period of training, for there is that proviso, which was always in there from the beginning, that if the national interest is imperiled, according to the opinion of Congress, the service should go on. Every man inducted came in with notice that that was the law.

What I have so far said fairly represents, I believe, the group view of those signing our briefs. What I now say represents, in the main, only my personal views.

I will tell you frankly, and here I know I speak for many others of our group who would say the same, that I have listened with a profound sense of unreality to many of the questions asked here. Many of them have been directed to the situation that would exist if these were almost normal times, and as if all we needed to do to beat Hitler, is to raise an Army but not to use it.

I do not think that is so. I think we are organizing a fighting army which will very likely have to fight on a great scale, possibly anywhere at all. I think we are living in a fool's paradise if we indulge in the sort of wishful thinking that assumes we can prevent Hitler from dominating us without firing a shot.

The important thing is not merely the passage of this law to lift the restrictions; I take it for granted that it must be passed, or else we will stand before the world as making ourselves virtually helpless, so far as power on land is concerned. The important thing is to have the people in the country and the men in the Army understand why it is necessary to extend the service period.

I saw a striking letter recently from a major commanding a battalion mainly of selectees, saying that the morale of the men is and will remain good, provided they know why their service has to be continued. A great many persons say: "I have a sense that there is a grave crisis; I don't doubt that there is; but tell me more exactly what it is." If you tell him, he will be satisfied. And gentlemen sit here and ask the same questions along that line. I sympathize with those inquiries; they should be answered.

I think it is true, however, that the average informed person who reads a good newspaper, for example the New York Times, from cover to cover every day, has seen most of these things in the press. To illustrate, my law firm happens to represent the Pan American Airways Co., and has for many years; so I happen to have known something about the South American situation for many months. But this enables me to know also that the essential facts about Nazi intrigue in South America were put in the New York Times months ago, and any informed person could have read them. There were headlines the other day that General Marshall had made an important disclosure in the Senate committee hearing about South America. But for the most part he was simply mentioning things that were published some time ago.

What does this crisis consist of? First of all it arises from the vast growth of Hitler's power, combined with the Nazi hostility to us. Consider what Hitler has done.

Hitler in less than 4 years has taken over or conquered 13 countries. Here is his record since 1938: Austria, with 7,000,000 population; Czechoslovakia, with 10,000,000; Poland, with, say, 20,000,000—now he has it all, but I refer to his share on the partition in September 1939; Norway, with 3,000,000; Denmark, with 4,000,000; Holland, with 8,000,000; Belgium, with 8,000,000; France, with 42,000,000; Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, with 35,000,000 together; Yugoslavia and Greece, with 22,000,000 together—thus dominating and enslaving 159,000,000 people, partly by coercion and partly by military conquest. Adding the 70,000,000 in the old Germany, he now has under control about 230,000,000. Adding Italy with 44,000,000 population, the total is 274,000,000; and if he conquers Russia, even up to the Urals, he will have under him about 100,000,000 more, or a total of some 375,000,000 people.

Besides the countries mentioned there remain in Europe: Sweden, with 6,000,000; Finland, with 4,000,000; Switzerland, with 4,000,000; Spain, with 25,000,000; and Portugal, with 6,000,000; making about 45,000,000 more.

So, if as General Marshall said, we must contemplate the possible overrunning by Hitler of Spain and Portugal, and remember that Sweden and Switzerland are at his mercy. We see that Hitler now has virtually all Europe in bondage. If he continues his schedule in Russia, he will have the complete domination of more than 500,000,000 people. Nothing like that has happened either in the modern or ancient world, nothing even approaching it.

What then does the real crisis consist of? It seems as if nearly everyone wants to circle around it.

The real crisis for us is the question of survival of the British Isles and the British Commonwealth of Nations. Every thoughtful person knows that. So why not talk about it?

The real question for the United States is not this vague thing called "hemispheric defense"; it is the question whether the British Commonwealth of Nations is to be conquered by Hitler. The issue for the United States, and what constitutes the present crisis, is the question whether the British Isles and the British Commonwealth of Nations outside of this continent are to stand. If Hitler gets them, if he gets India, with 350,000,000 people; the British Isles, with 45,000,000 people; Australia, with 7,000,000; New Zealand, with 1,750,000; Singapore and Hongkong—all the British possessions all over the world (except Canada and the British colonies in the Caribbean, because if he conquers them he conquers us)—if he conquers all these, Hitler would control, even leaving out Japan, over a billion and a half people out of the less than 2,000,000,000 people in the world.

It would be folly not to see that world domination is Hitler's purpose, and that following other conquests he would try to take possession or control of South America, and then attack us. But he cannot do those things if the British Isles survive, upon which survival, in turn, rests the British Commonwealth of Nations.

If, on the other hand, he should force the capitulation of the British Isles, then he will be ready to operate on us as surely as the sun will rise tomorrow.

So when we talk about building an army, is it on the assumption that we are going to stand back on our own shores and watch the British Commonwealth of Nations go down? We speak of being in readiness; but in readiness for what? Would it be in readiness to stand aside and see the British Commonwealth of Nations gradually forced toward surrender for lack of our active participation, so that we would stand alone in the world? Or is it a readiness, if and when the people want to do it, to fight Hitler, and fight him anywhere in the world where it is the most effective place to fight? What I am driving at is the sense of unreality as to what we are facing that one gets from some of the questions raised in this discussion. What we are facing, in my judgment, is the probability of a great and arduous war. Moreover, what most people do not realize, I think, is that if we do not go into the war that would probably mean a bigger mobilization than if we should go into the war. By going in with the British Commonwealth, Hitler can be stopped. But if we do not go into the war, and if, in consequence, the British have to capitulate, is it not clear that we would have to have a still bigger army and a longer period of mobilization—unless, indeed, we surrendered ourselves without a struggle, which we would not do.

**Mr. Elston.** Do you advocate a declaration of war?

**Mr. Clark.** Yes. But I do not want any of you to think that I am any more warlike than others here. Perhaps I am less so for a good family reason. My purpose here is not to advocate war. That is not the present issue, but rather to present my analysis of this situation. I think it is time to tell the truth. It has been well said that the trouble is that there is too little plain speaking and hard thinking on what we actually are up against. Unless there is plain speaking about the crisis, you cannot expect to maintain the morale of the troops or the public. I think they should be told in plain language what the nature of the crisis is. They should not only be told that there is a crisis; they should be given specifications as to what it consists of. Unless that is done, many of them may not understand it, although they are

amply able to do so if they have the facts. You must remember that most of these selectees are over 21 years of age, and that they are above the average in intelligence with relation to the general population, as the figures show. What the informed people of the country are thinking is indicated by the recent Gallup poll taken among people in Who's Who only, showing that 45 percent of them favored an immediate declaration of war. This shows what people who know maps and distances and populations and who can size up pretty well what the situation is are thinking. It shows that the well-informed people of this country understand pretty well what we are up against. This means, I believe, that as the facts are better understood the whole people will come to the same conclusion.

With further reference to the nature of our problem I want to ask if you gentlemen would like to have me send you copies of a pamphlet containing a reprint of Professor Staley's article entitled "The Myth of the Continents," published in the April 1941 issue of Foreign Affairs. I think it is one of the clearest and most forcible articles I have seen in recent years on our strategic position in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. I will be glad to have it. I think we would like to have this brief printed in the record also.

Mr. CLARK. This article explodes and destroys the idea that so-called hemisphere defense is feasible without the aid of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It shows exactly what would happen if Britain should go down. Professor Staley in this article shows that the distance from Madison, Wis., to Buenos Aires is as great as the distance from Madison, Wis., to Manchuria. He shows that it is farther from Madison, Wis., to Buenos Aires than from Madison, Wis., to Cairo, Egypt.

The fact is that the only way to defend South America and to prevent Hitler from going there, is by a combination of sea and air power. It is true, as General Marshall publicly said, that Pan-American Airways is building airfields, but they would be building them for the Germans if they should get there first, and not for us.

Now, one word about the relative strength of our position, as compared to a year ago. A Member of Congress happened to sit down next to me this morning; and he made the same remark that has been made so often, that the thing to do is to explain to people what the nature of this crisis is. He pointed out that the President had said two distinct things: First, that there is a great crisis, and secondly that this crisis is greater for us than a year ago. You will remember that in his message the President sharply stressed that the crisis is greater than it was a year ago, but that he did not assign any reasons. He asked, in effect, that the people accept his judgment. It is time that the people should to a large extent follow the President's judgment; it would be foolish for them not to do so, because he has sources of information from all over the world. However I do not blindly accept anyone's judgment, for I want to do my own thinking; just as I assume Congress wants to do its own thinking, and most of the people want to arrive at their own conclusions.

There is a tendency, I believe, to underestimate the intelligence of the American people on an issue like this.

I am not talking now only about the people in Who's Who, for there are people of sound judgment, intelligence, and shrewdness scattered all through the population. There are tens of millions of them, and only 15,000 are represented in Who's Who. But our people want to know the facts. They want to know what are the facts and inferences that justified the President in saying, first, that the crisis exists, and, second, that it is greater than it was a year ago. I have no doubt of their ability to appraise the situation, if given the facts. They know that we cannot afford to let Britain go down. If you had put the question to the Who's Who group in the Gallup poll a little differently by asking, "Would you favor going into the war immediately if it is apparent that otherwise the British Commonwealth of Nations is going down in defeat?" it would not have been 45 percent in favor of war, but it would be 90 percent.

In a recent Gallup poll in England, some 40 percent of the people polled--a plurality of those voting--said that they believed that they could not win this war without the participation of the United States. Now, I believe that to be a military fact, and I have seen hardly any informed military man or observer who would not say so.

I do not know any military authority of greater experience than Col. Frederick Palmer, the noted war correspondent. Perhaps he has seen more campaigns than anybody else in this country. I remember a conversation in October 1939 with Colonel Palmer. I asked him if he could envision the course of the war, and he answered about as follows:

It is risky and maybe foolish to try an answer but I have this in mind. I think Hitler every day is making his preparations for a campaign in the West. I think he will invade Holland, Belgium, and France in May or June of 1940 and I think he will probably conquer them. Now, if he does that, there will be nothing to prevent him from conquering the whole of Europe.

Colonel Palmer did not say anything about Russia, but he referred to every country on the continent of Europe except Russia. It came true that France and those other countries collapsed and that Britain was isolated. Colonel Palmer had anticipated that, but he also said:

I think the British will not collapse even if the Continent goes under. A great people like the British will not go down easily; they are too brave and tough to go down without a great struggle.

Then he went on to say about as follows:

There will probably come a time when virtually all the ships in the world will be concentrated on two routes, one from Halifax, on the northern route, and one from New York, to the British Isles. Then at last all will know that we are facing the threat of Hitler's domination of the whole world; and, indeed, that would probably be the outcome unless the United States takes its part then. Before that time comes the United States will probably not have taken its part, because of inertia, propaganda, and misinformation. But finally must come the great decision for the United States and the world.

It is amazing how right Colonel Palmer has been. I think, therefore, that we would be fooling ourselves if we should approach this problem from the standpoint of taking these men into the Army to remain there for 12 months for training, and then sending them home. If we do that, we would be dealing with the issue from a wholly unreal standpoint.

You gentlemen, I suggest, should know precisely what you are doing when you vote on this question of maintaining the Army organization

and preventing its disintegration. You will really be voting on the question of the existence of a national peril. The issue will not be that of going into war now, but it will be a question of having an effective army ready in the event of war, if and when it should come about. I believe also that the question should be determined with the thought in your minds that very likely, and, indeed, probably war has got to come about—not, of course, because we want war, but because the alternative is the probable complete domination of the entire world by Hitler. As I see it, the practical alternative is a surrender to Hitler or fighting it out with him.

The likelihood that this alternative would develop is what we envisaged a year ago. That is why we brought forward the Burke-Wadsworth bill. That is why we recommended an inventory of our manpower from 18 to 65 years of age—a proposal that was ahead of its time but will be adopted later, I think, just as has been done in England, Australia, and Canada. That is why we added to the provision for the training period a proviso that the service could be extended if the national interest was imperiled. We were, indeed, hoping against hope that the present situation would not happen. But, now, the situation is developing exactly as the signs of the times and the events indicated all along. And if this matter is approached from the viewpoint that to safeguard our interests we must have an army ready to fight the necessary joint resolution would pass, not by a vote of 2 to 1 or 3 to 1, but by a virtually unanimous vote. That is what I think the Congress of the United States should do.

Mr. ELSTON. The original Conscription Act, which, I believe, your association sponsored, provided, I think, for only 8 months of training.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir; but always with the proviso that the service be continued if Congress declared the national interest to be imperiled. Our original suggestion for an 8-month training period was for the same reason that was mentioned by General Marshall, with reference to his acquiescence in the 12-months' period. We thought that the people of the country did not visualize the situation of affairs clearly enough to be willing to accept more than an 8-months training period at that time. As soon as we saw that they would accept more, we readily acquiesced in a longer period and, indeed, urged that the period be increased.

Mr. FARRIS. Do you recognize the fact that the idea in the minds of many American people that the war cannot be won except by some enemy, or except by an offensive nation, would be broken down if they were apprised of the truth, not only as to this situation, but as to all like situations that the world has ever seen? They have drawn the curtain over their minds and refuse to see it.

Mr. CLARK. I think it is up to our leaders to warn them. There is a chapter in the Book of Ezekiel that is exactly in point. I cannot quote the language, but it refers to the watchman on the wall to warn against the enemy's approach. The prophet says that the watcher was put there to warn the people of the approach of danger, and "woe be to him, if he fails in that duty." Our leaders have warned us, but only in general terms. The President of the United States, going back to 1938, has often visualized the world situation and has repeatedly warned us against the aggressors. Yet he was accused of being rash and of urging the people to war; and that was the most unjust charge ever made. The Secretary of War has warned us; the Secretary of the

Navy has warned us; and the Chief of Staff. But for various and sundry reasons that I do not agree with, they have, until very recently at least, refrained from giving chapter and verse and stating the specific facts of the situation that comprise the threat. However, the other day General Marshall spoke up publicly in mentioning the possible or probable overrunning of Spain, Portugal, and North Africa, and I am very glad that he did that. He also publicly spoke of the garrisoning of Alaska. Now, why do we need to garrison Alaska? I do not think there is any mystery about that. The facts are plain on the map.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a series of air bases already established up there, and the Bering Strait is only about 50 miles wide.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir; that is true. It is obvious that we should have bases there. We do not know what the fate of Russia may be. It is very possible that Hitler may attack Russia beyond the Urals, and advance into and conquer Siberia. In that event, Hitler would stand right opposite our coast.

Mr. FADDIS. We have today in the Army something slightly in excess of 1,800,000 men?

Mr. CLARK. There are 1,400,000, I believe.

Mr. FADDIS. There are 1,400,000 men. Do you, or not, believe it is ridiculous for us to claim that it is military preparation to have an Army of that size here that may have to face an army of at least 5,000,000 men?

Mr. CLARK. General Marshall stated publicly to the Senate committee that 152,000 additional men had been already authorized, which number he wanted to raise. He asked also for slightly less than 160,000 more men, bringing the enlisted strength up to 1,700,000 men, with, I suppose, about 125,000 officers, or a total of over 1,800,000. To that you would add the Marine Corps, and there are 275,000 men in the Navy proper. With regard to the numerical strength of the Army, I was asked in the Senate committee whether I thought the 1,800,000 total strength, as indicated by General Marshall, was too small, and I said that I would not presume to express an opinion contrary to General Marshall's judgment. However, I stressed the point that General Marshall was speaking only as of the present moment, and that he thought this would be a proper program under the present conditions. I think General Marshall said that he would assume that for the protection of this hemisphere, that should be an adequate force under present conditions and if the men were highly trained and equipped I think the context will show also that General Marshall was assuming that the British still stood, and that if the British Isles did not stand he would not have answered in the same way.

Mr. FANNIS. If Hitler should conquer Russia, or taking the portion of Russia already conquered by him, how many men could he raise over there for his army?

Mr. CLARK. I do not think that he could get dependable troops from all those countries. General Marshall said, I think, that he has something short of 300 divisions of German troops alone. If Hitler could discipline all those other peoples to serve in his army, and assuming that he defeated Russia, then he could raise out of those 500,000,000 people 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 men, I suppose. But that would be after they were amalgamated and trained in his ideology.

Mr. FADDIS. Of course, hunger would have its effect, and he would control the food supply of Europe.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir; and he now has Czechs making munitions for him, and the Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, and French are building ships for him. I think they are also making planes for him in France. With the pressure of hunger over a period of years, he can persuade many people that it is better to be on his side. The point is that in face of this vast, unprecedented and hostile force, to say that our national interests are not imperiled is, I think, to be willfully blind or hopelessly complacent. I have heard it said that if the American people are so blind that they cannot see grave peril to the United States in that picture, it is time that Hitler did take us over. But I do not like that cynical view; and I do not think it possible that our people will be so blind as not to see the danger at last.

Mr. CLASON. Did I understand you to state that you expected that the United States would engage in actual fighting before the war was over?

Mr. CLARK. Yes; but I want to give my answer very carefully. I think in the first place, that we should have a well organized and trained force of troops so that it will be able to fight on good terms and not against hopeless odds against any force likely to be brought against them. To answer more directly, I think it is very probable, or, at least, quite likely, that before the end, a part of our Army will be in the fight.

Mr. CLASON. Outside of the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir; some of them.

Mr. CLASON. It was the purpose of your committee to bring in the first part of the Selective Service Act, and the committee thereby brought it into being?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir; we had something to do with it. We proposed it.

Mr. CLASON. And the idea now is to keep this Army in a fighting position, and your committee has in mind using this Army in foreign lands.

Mr. CLARK. I expressed my personal views in saying that I believed some, at least, of our Army would need to fight abroad before this thing is over. I was expressing my personal view to that effect, except that I am sure that many of the members hold the same opinion that I do. However, the committee contains some men who would certainly differ with me in that point. It contains, in fact, a few men who are isolationists. However, I am certain that all of them hold the same view that I do about having the Army ready to fight. I want to be frank about the other question; and I believe that most of the members of our group think that part of our Army will probably or very likely have to fight outside of what is commonly called the Western Hemisphere. Please do not get that mixed up with the question of favoring a declaration of war now, because that is an entirely different matter. Some of our members would doubtless vote for an immediate declaration of war, and some would not. There may even be one or two who, while advocating preparation, would take chances on letting Hitler conquer the whole world outside the Western Hemisphere without our trying to stop him, but few, if any, of us would want to take that risk.

I wish to make it clear, however, that our committee is not here to advocate war, but all of our group firmly believe that the Army should be prepared and ready, just as well prepared as if we were certain now that it would have to fight.

Mr. CLARKE. Are you one of the Committee of Eight for Freedom, which is interested in advancing theories or facts in regard to the war situation?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir. I personally belong to the Eight for Freedom Committee.

Mr. CLARKE. Are you an officer in that committee?

Mr. CLARK. I am on its board of directors.

Mr. CLARKE. You are an active member of that committee?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir. I do not have much time to give to it, but I believe in it. I personally think that it is in the interest of the United States, just as the 46 percent of the people represented in Who's Who poll think, to enter the war. I think it is to the cold-blooded interest of the United States to enter the war now. I think that fewer lives would be lost if we did it now. I think that would be the wise policy. I think that most of the people would be for that if they had full information on the world situation.

Mr. CLARKE. Do I understand that if you should read recent issues of the New York Times you would find all of the facts that have been brought out in this hearing before the committee today?

Mr. CLARK. No, sir; not at all. But I think about 90 percent of them would be found there. When I say this, I qualify it to this extent—that facts have been printed which, if read by informed readers, who could read between the lines, would give the information about South America and the intrigues going on down there in Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, and so forth, that have been brought out here. Those facts have been fully reported in the New York Times in great detail during the last year.

Mr. MARTIN. What size Army does your organization figure on keeping in the service?

Mr. CLARK. We have no view on that as an organization.

Mr. MARTIN. Do you have any recommendation to make in that regard?

Mr. CLARK. No, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. Are you opposed to releasing any of the trainees from the service?

Mr. CLARK. No, sir. On the contrary, men over 28 years of age should go out, as well as all those men that would suffer undue hardship.

Mr. MARTIN. You are not opposed to releasing individuals from the training?

Mr. CLARK. No, sir; I am not opposed to that. We would be in favor of it in certain classes of cases, just as General Marshall said publicly. That would apply to men over 28 years of age, and men who, by reason of marriage or other circumstances, would be involved in undue hardship.

Mr. MARTIN. Did your organization write the provision in the original Conscription Act last year providing \$5 per month for pay?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir; we did. We made a mistake, and we took it back at the first session.

**Mr. ELSION.** Your organization also wrote in the bill the provision that requires all men between the ages of 21 and 45 years to serve in combat forces, and that all between 18 and 21 and 45 and 64 years of age should be registered.

**Mr. CLARK.** As to the provision for registration from 18 to 64 years of age and liability for military service from 21 to 45, that statement needs qualification. The bill carried a careful formula with respect to the men in the various age ranges. As to those within the range from 30 to 45, I think not exceeding 7 percent of those inducted were to be in that age range; as to those within the age range from 31 to 36, I think not exceeding 10 percent of those inducted were to be in that age range; and in the age range from 25 to 31—I have forgotten the exact formulas, but they were so drawn that older men would, in practice, have been called upon only in small numbers and only where they did not have dependents. All this was explained in the hearings a year ago. The theory was explained by Colonel Donovan when he was here. Some thought that in the German Army the infiltration of some older men worked out very well, that a slight stiffening and sprinkling of older men would make for a better army. We were proceeding upon that theory. Whether Colonel Donovan was right about it I do not know; but his arguments were not to be lightly ignored.

**Mr. ELSION.** You just got through saying that you agreed with General Marshall that all of these men over 28 should be deferred from military service.

**Mr. CLARK.** That is my personal view. I have myself become educated on that point.

**Mr. ELSION.** When did you become educated to that?

**Mr. CLARK.** Gradually, I believe, in the course of the last year, hearing reports from the camps and so on. Nevertheless, I think there was great merit in Colonel Donovan's argument, which is in the minutes of this committee, that there should be a small sprinkling of older men. Of course, there is such a sprinkling in our Regular Army. But he thought it should apply, too, in this new draft army. It was, I believe, what the Germans do and he thought that such a sprinkling would make the most effective Army.

Our General Staff apparently does not think so. They apparently think that under the present conditions, at least, the older men do not fit in very well, and had better be discharged. That is an expert opinion and I defer to it.

**Mr. MARTIN.** When did you abandon your attitude on the matter of \$5 a month?

**Mr. CLARK.** The first day the bill came up.

**Mr. MARTIN.** The \$5-a-month concept, then, did not carry over into the present idea of unlimited service.

**Mr. CLARK.** The \$5-a-month idea was simply to apply during an 8-month training period.

**Mr. MARTIN.** During an 8-month training period.

**Mr. CLARK.** That is, if the men were called into service, as distinguished from the 8 months training, we never had any idea of \$5 a month but on the contrary assumed they would have the regular pay. We looked on this idea of training for a limited period as a duty of citizenship.

**The CHAIRMAN.** I think that is immaterial on the question of whether or not there is an emergency here now.

**Mr. MARTIN.** I have one further question. Did your organization agree with the American Legion's national convention resolution of 1919 drawing a distinction between conscription for service and conscription for armed forces?

**Mr. CLARK.** The purpose of our association following the World War—

**Mr. MARTIN.** Did you agree with those resolutions of the first national convention of the American Legion drawing a distinction between the two?

**Mr. CLARK.** Could you tell me a little bit more about that?

**Mr. MARTIN.** The distinction made in the resolution of the first National Convention of the American Legion in Minneapolis in 1919 was as between conscription for training and conscription for armed service.

**Mr. CLARK.** No; we never agreed with that. Our platform always was—compulsory military training in peace and compulsory selective service in war. We thought every time you raise an army for war, that the system adopted in 1917 was correct; that it is a duty of citizenship, and that is the theory upon which the bill that we proposed in June 1940 was drafted.

**Mr. MARTIN.** Did your organization have anything to do with the shaping of the National Defense Act of 1920?

**Mr. CLARK.** I think only with regard to the citizens' military training camps which we were very much interested in.

**Mr. MARTIN.** Did you have any part in setting the length of time for training that was set out in that proposal for conscription, in that act?

**Mr. CLARK.** Yes; we did, but that unfortunately did not pass; I was speaking of the National Defense Act, as enacted.

**Mr. MARTIN.** Do you know the length of time specified in that act?

**Mr. CLARK.** Four months.

**Mr. MARTIN.** Two months optional extension, was there not?

**Mr. CLARK.** Yes, sir; and other features for further training as reservists. That was a peacetime measure. On that basis we thought 4 months was good enough, and also that it was all that could be passed. That training act passed the Senate committee and I think was unanimously recommended. But it failed in the Senate and never even got to the House. If it had passed Congress we would probably not be meeting here today; it would not have been necessary. I thank you for your patience.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Thank you very much, Mr. Clark.

(**Mr. Clark filed the following brief:**)

#### REMOVAL OF TIME RESTRICTIONS ON ACTIVE SERVICE OF SELECTEES, NATIONAL GUARD MEN AND RESERVE OFFICERS

#### STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT

This document contains a short statement of the reasons why the restrictions on length of service should be removed by the Congress. The broad grounds upon which this action is advocated are: (1) In view of the world situation and to prevent the disintegration of the Army of the United States, the Congress should forthwith declare that "the national interest is imperiled." (2) If this disintegration were per-

mitted the power and influence of the United States would be seriously impaired and its interests endangered. (8) Any objection that the extension of service would involve a breach of contract or of good faith is unsound.

(Submitted by Members of the National Emergency Committee of the Military Training Camps Association of the United States, New York, N. Y., July 21, 1941)

**REMOVAL OF TIME RESTRICTIONS ON ACTIVE SERVICE OF SELECTEES, NATIONAL GUARD MEN AND RESERVE OFFICERS**

**INTRODUCTION**

In this statement the undersigned members of the national emergency committee of the Military Training Camps Association of the United States<sup>1</sup> support the urgent recommendation of the President and his military advisers for the prompt removal of the legal restrictions (under the Selective Service Act) limiting the time of service of the selectees and the restrictions (under Public Resolution 98 or August 27, 1940) with respect to the National Guard and Reserve components.

Nearly all the undersigned are former officers of the Army of the United States, and most of us had experience in the command of troops in France in 1917-18. None of us is a professional soldier; and we are all now in civil life. We are all members of the National Emergency Committee of the Military Training Camps Association, which was formed in May 1940, to draft and sponsor the bill that was introduced by Senator Burke and Representative Wadsworth on June 20-21, 1940, and became law on September 16, 1940, as the Selective Service Act.

Representatives of our committee appeared before the Committees on Military Affairs of the Senate and the House in July 1940, in support of the Burke-Wadsworth bill. We have retained a strong interest in the workings of the Selective Service Act. We believe it of crucial importance that the Congress shall declare that "the national interest is imperiled" pursuant to section 3 (b) of the Selective Service Act, so as to permit the President to extend the time of service of the selectees. We also believe that similar action should be taken by the Congress with respect to the time of service of the National Guard and Reserve officers.

**I. IN VIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AND TO PREVENT THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES THE CONGRESS SHOULD FORTHWITH DECLARE THAT THE NATIONAL INTEREST IS IMPERILED**

The Chief of Staff conservatively and carefully stated to the Senate Military Affairs Committee on July 9 and July 17 that the practical effect of continuing the present restrictions would be to disintegrate the Army, and that the problems presented in such event would be insoluble.

General Marshall also stated on July 9 and again on July 17 that our Nation is confronted by a grave crisis and that the dangers to this country are greater than a year ago, when the selective-service bill was under debate. He gave impressive reasons for his conclusions. We concur with those conclusions and those reasons.

We believe that what the Congress and the whole people have to face is that a great and conquering power is loose in the world; that the entire resources of an immensely powerful nation with a strong military tradition have been supremely organized, not only to conquer all Europe, but to dominate the whole world. Until we face up to these simple facts, we cannot visualize the nature and the degree of the threat to our Nation.

Prior to the introduction of the Burke-Wadsworth bill on June 29, 1940, Nazi Germany had already taken Austria, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Holland, and

<sup>1</sup>The Military Training Camps Association of the United States was formed in 1918 to embody the so-called "Plattsburgh Idea." The association sponsored the pre-World War Plattsburgh Camps, and aided the War Department in the organization of the great Officers' training camps of 1917. After the World War it advocated, without success, the enactment of compulsory universal training. Subsequently, the association, for 20 years, aided the War Department in the recruitment of the Citizens' Military Training Camps—since 1922 in a semiofficial relation with the War Department through the system of civilian aides to the Secretary of War.

Belgium. In the 18 months since June 20, 1940, this course of conquest has been steadily and relentlessly pursued. We have seen the capitulation and complete subordination of France. We have watched vast and destructive attacks upon Britain, both by sea warfare and by the bombing of her ports, factories, and cities. While these attacks have failed to crush the spirit of the British people, they have inflicted a greater loss of life on sea and land than is commonly realized in this country. They have destroyed an enormous tonnage of merchant vessels and a large number of warships, and they have caused immense material damage to industrial resources and homes in Britain. We have witnessed the subjugation of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary by coercion and threats. We have seen the military conquest of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece.

The net result of these vast events has been to give Nazi Germany actual possession or dominance of virtually all Europe. Now, we are witnessing the sudden and ruthless attack of Germany upon Russia—an attack which has already penetrated far inside the Russian borders and threatens to render Russia virtually, if not entirely, impotent. If Russia be conquered or rendered helpless, Hitler's conquests will have gone farther than those of any conqueror of modern times; his power will have increased to an extent that plainly constitutes a critical threat to every other country in the world.

We must face the fact that this danger may become still greater. In his testimony on July 17, General Marshall mentioned the possibility of the sudden overrunning of Spain, Portugal, and North Africa. Such an event would plainly endanger all of West Africa, and indeed the whole African continent, with tremendous implications for us. General Marshall also mentioned the urgent necessity of reinforcing our garrisons in Alaska for reasons which he did not specify but which any reasoning person can perceive. If the German invasion of Russia should run its full course through Siberia, the threat to our interests in the Pacific and our Northwestern territory is plain.

We must further face the fact that German ambitions go beyond the conquest of vast territories and extend to the establishment of bases throughout the world and the ultimate control of all the oceans, as was publicly stated by Admiral Raeder, chief of the German Navy, in January 1941.<sup>2</sup>

Beyond all these things is the doubtful position of Japan; and as to Latin America the various disquieting signs which make it clear that a victorious Germany would seek domination over some or all of those countries.

It is a literal fact that danger looms from every continent and from nearly every point of the compass. The truth is that the encirclement of this Nation is underway to an extent that few, until recently, have realized.

In the face of these facts anyone who denies the existence of a critical military danger to the United States and its interests is, we believe, either hopelessly complacent or willfully blind.

With the world situation as it exists today, irrespective of the greater dangers which may well develop, no reasonable man can deny that our "national interest is imperiled" and gravely so. It follows that the Congress is not only fully justified in declaring, in the words of the Selective Service Act, that our "national interest is imperiled," but is obligated to do so. This obligation is inescapable when the effect of a failure to make the declaration would disintegrate the Army which we have been building to meet the very threat which looms before us.

#### II. IF THE DISINTEGRATION OF OUR ARMY WERE NOW PERMITTED, THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE IMPAIRED AND ITS INTERESTS ENDANGERED

It is obvious that the question of removing the existing restrictions on length of service cannot be considered apart from the dangers of the world situation and the effect of a failure to lift the restrictions upon the power, the influence, and the diplomacy of the United States.

Nothing, we submit, could be better calculated to lower the prestige of the United States at this critical moment than the retention of restrictions on our Army which have been correctly and publicly announced as destructive of the Army's effectiveness.

<sup>2</sup> In a speech to German shipyard workers at Bremen, on January 28, 1941, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Commander in Chief of the German Navy, is reported as saying (N. Y. Times January 29, 1941): "Our fleet will be developed and enlarged to a size befitting our world power. It will take the protection of German interests in the world into its strong hands and will carry the German flag and the German name together with the German merchant fleet over the space of the globe, proclaiming the greatness and beauty of our country in which the socialism of labor has become a reality. In our large naval bases overseas there will be plenty of work of all kinds."

It goes without saying that a defeat of the pending proposal, strongly urged as it is by the President and his military advisers, would mean to the whole world that our democratic system had broken down in a crisis; that our professions of opposition to the totalitarian powers are empty; and that the United States does not really mean to go through with its resistance to the aggression of the Axis Powers.

Unquestionably, the general staffs of Nazi Germany and of the other totalitarian powers are watching with keen eye the action of the Congress of the United States on this issue. Nothing could be better devised to encourage them in their belief that democracy, and especially the United States, is unable to function at a dangerous moment, than the defeat of the President's recommendation. It would be treated and advertised by them as a repudiation of the President and of the whole policy of the United States under the Lend-Lease Act and many other measures.

Just as a defeat of the President's recommendation would vastly encourage the Axis Powers, it would have a correspondingly depressing effect upon the morale of the British Commonwealth of Nations, to whose active support the United States has been so strongly and so repeatedly pledged.

It has been fairly said that from the standpoint of our power and prestige in the world the defeat of the President's recommendation would be equivalent to the sinking overnight of a third of our battleship force.

We beg the Congress to estimate these considerations as of prime importance.

We submit that it should be unthinkable in so grave a crisis of world history that the United States should consciously and deliberately cripple its growing military power.

### III. THE EXTENSION OF SERVICE INVOLVES NO BREACH OF CONTRACT OR GOOD FAITH

The suggestion has been made that some sort of breach of contract, or at least a breach of faith, would be involved in an extension of the time of service of the selectees, National Guard, and Reserve officers. While no actual or express contract has been asserted, it has been said that, since both the Selective Service Act and Public Resolution 90 provided for 12 months' active duty, a "virtual contract" or something "in the nature of a contract" thereby arose.

We believe that such suggestions are irresponsible and without any foundation in fact or law.

It is first to be said that even if there were a contract it would necessarily have been made subject to the inherent, sovereign right of the Nation to protect its safety. This right is implicit in every relation between a government and its citizens. The self preservation of the Nation is the first and paramount law. In the present instance, however, it is unnecessary to invoke this principle because it is plain that no contract, virtual or otherwise, can be spelled out.

The statutory provisions regarding length of service are different in the case of the selectees from those relating to the Reserve components, and therefore the questions are technically separate.

With relation to the selectees we stress the fact that the Selective Service Act was not intended, advocated, or worded as a measure adapted to normal times. This is true of the Burke-Wadsworth bill as introduced on June 20, 1940, and, we believe, equally true of the bill as it became law on September 16, 1940.

The Burke-Wadsworth bill was conceived as an emergency measure to assist in raising and training a new emergency Army. That and only that was its primary purpose. It may have been in the minds of some to make a test of compulsory military training that might be valuable for the framing of a more permanent long-time system designed to avoid the errors of the past and to prevent us from once again being caught unprepared. However, any such purpose was purely subordinate and incidental.

It was repeatedly testified in the hearings when the bill was presented that it was framed to meet the emergency, which was envisaged as already existing and likely to grow greater. And it was distinctly stated that if it had been intended to propose a measure adapted to quieter times the bill would have been framed on entirely different lines.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The following witnesses represented the National Emergency Committee of the Military Training Camps Association before the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate and the House in July 1940: Col. Julius Ochs Adler, Grenville Clark, James B. Conant, Col. William J. Donovan, Col. Frederick Palmer, Brig. Gen. John McA. Palmer (retired), and Col. Lewis Sanders. All of these witnesses advocated the bill as an emergency measure, and one (President Conant) made it clear that he was not committed to the principle of compulsory military training in normal times and supported the bill only because he deemed it necessary to the safety of the Nation in time of crisis.

The language of the bill, as introduced, was written strictly in accordance with this conception of the bill as an emergency measure to raise an effective fighting force. As introduced the bill contained the following (sec. 4 (b)) with regard to liability for training and service:

"If and so long as the United States is not at war, each man selected for training and service shall serve for a training period of 8 consecutive months: *Provided*, That if during his training period the Congress shall declare that the national interest is imperiled, he shall be subject to service until the national interest permits his being relieved from active service."

While under debate the above-quoted provision was amended to increase the training period to 12 months; and the language of that part of the provision relating to an extension of the period of service was amended without, however, changing its substance. As enacted (sec. 3 (b)) the language is as follows:

"Each man inducted under the provisions of subsection (a) shall serve for a training and service period of 12 consecutive months, unless sooner discharged, except that whenever the Congress has declared that the national interest is imperiled, such 12-month period may be extended by the President to such time as may be necessary in the interests of national defense."

It is clear, therefore, that not only the draftsmen of the original bill but the Congress contemplated and provided for the very contingency which has now occurred. This contingency was that the international situation was likely to become still more serious than it was in July, 1940, and thus require an extension of service.

Accordingly we submit that the history of the bill while under discussion in the Congress evidences an intent that the period of service should be extended if the situation so developed that "the national interest is imperiled." Beyond that, the precise language of the law is such as to negative any idea of a contract, virtual or otherwise, against extending the 12-month period of service.

Under all these circumstances, we submit that no man inducted under the Selective Service Act can with any justice, legal or otherwise, claim that his rights are being infringed upon by an extension of service made in accordance with the very terms of the law under which he was inducted.

It is true that it was hoped that the inducted men might be placed in their reserve status at the end of 12 months' training. But this was no more than a hope. It is true also that instances of undue hardship will arise from a service longer than 12 months because of home circumstances or other reasons. These cases, as General Marshall has testified, will be taken care of considerably. The essential point, however, is that the hope of restricting the active-duty period to 12 months and the cases of inevitable hardship have nothing to do with the unfounded claim that any breach of contract is involved or any breach of good faith.

We all hate the situation which has been brought about by the aggressions of the dictators. We all hate war. We all hate the inconveniences and hardships that arise from the necessity of preparing to defend the country as the price of retaining our integrity and our independence as a free and uncoveted people. We all hope that the crisis will pass. But all these legitimate hates and hopes do not alter the fact that in the world as it is today we must have an effective army of trained men ready to fight. Nor do our emotions change the fact that we cannot have such an army unless the time of service restrictions are removed.

The problem as affecting the National Guard and the reserve components under Public Resolution 90 of August 27, 1940, and the provisions of the National Defense Act, is technically different because of the difference in the wording of those laws from the language of the Selective Service Act. However, in substance the underlying considerations are the same as in the case of the selectees.

The National Guard, the Reserve officers, the retired officers of the Regular Army, and the enlisted reserve all form, with the selectees, elements of a single Army of the United States. It need hardly be argued that if it is necessary to invoke the provisions of the Selective Service Act to extend the service of the selectees, the National Guard and reserve components should not be treated differently.

#### CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we express the thought that there may be a tendency to underestimate the common sense and intelligence of the American people as applied to this issue.

We believe that the American people fully comprehend the absolute necessity at this time of having an effective fighting Army, even though this involves

Inconvenience or hardship to themselves or their relatives. We believe that the vast majority now perceive that it would be the grossest folly to disintegrate our Army of 1,600,000—now only partly trained—by leaving in force legal provisions that permit two-thirds of the men in the ranks and three-fourths of the officers to return to civil life at the end of a year's duty.

The people perfectly understand that the practical effect of the present restrictions on time of service would be to dissipate the efforts of the past year and seriously impair our Army's strength just at the moment that our power is growing to formidable proportions.

The people do not want to diminish our strength in the present era of ruthless power; they want to increase it. They prize the dignity and prestige of their country. They would resent having it improvidently destroyed. If there be those that think the contrary, we believe that they underestimate the intelligence of the people.

We submit, therefore, that—as recommended by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff—the Congress should forthwith declare that "the national interest is imperiled" as contemplated and provided by section 3 (b) of the Selective Service Act, and thus empower the President to extend the time of service of the selectees. The Congress should also, by appropriate legislation, provide for a like extension of service of the National Guard, the Reserve officers, and other reserve components.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul Shipman Andrews, Francis R. Appleton, Douglas Arant, Charles Arbuthnot 3d, Ernest L. Bell, Jr., David M. Bowes, Dr. A. L. Boyce, Kenneth P. Budd, Edward R. Burke, Henry B. Cabot, Phillip A. Carroll, William M. Chadbourne, William C. Chanler, Gaylord Lee Clark, Grenville Clark, William Clark, James B. Conant, Dudley Davis, Harold W. Dodds, William J. Donovan, Lewis W. Douglas, John P. Freeman, Duncan G. Harris, Henry S. Hooker, Colgate Hoyt, Henry James, Robert H. Jamison, Benjamin Joy, Roger D. Lapham, Loyal Leale, Ralph Lowell, Tompkins McIlvane, J. Craig McLennan, George G. McMurtys, Robert C. Rand, Charles B. Reeves, Alfred Roecker, Elihu Root, Jr., Harry S. Semmes, Archibald G. Thacher, Dallas S. Townsend, Samuel A. Weldon, Westmore Willcox, Jr., Tom R. Wyles.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is General Palmer.

#### STATEMENT OF JOHN MCKAY PALMER, BRIGADIER GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED, HILL, N. H.

The CHAIRMAN. General Palmer, will you please give us your name, state your connection, if you have any, whom you represent, and tell us of your past experience so that we may profitably weigh your testimony.

General PALMER. My name is John McK. Palmer, brigadier general, United States Army, retired. My residence is Hill, N. H.

The CHAIRMAN. What military experience have you had?

General PALMER. I was on the General Staff both before and during the World War. I prepared a plan of military organization for Secretary Stimson and General Wood before the World War, in 1912. It was published by Secretary Stimson under the title "Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" and attached to his annual report for 1912.

I was back on the General Staff just before the war, and took part in the organization of the war Army. Then I went to France as an Assistant Chief of Staff under General Pershing, and after the armistice I was sent back by him to take part in the plans for a permanent military organization.

A little later I became the advisor of the Senate Military Committee and assisted in the preparation of the National Defense Act of 1920.

In 1922, when General Pershing became Chief of Staff, I was detailed as his aide-de-camp, and assisted in carrying that law into effect.

I retired from active service for disability in 1926, and since then have devoted myself to historical and literary work, principally on the subject of military institutions.

Mr. Chairman, I have a short statement of certain historical incidents bearing upon the issue before the committee, and also upon the general world situation. It is not a long statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it in writing?

General PALMER. It is in writing, and if you prefer, I can simply hand it to the reporter.

The CHAIRMAN. I should prefer if you would do that, and we will print it in the record. We shall be glad to have you comment on it, generally, if you wish.

(The statement filed by General Palmer is as follows:)

#### STATEMENT BY GENERAL PALMER

There are certain incidents in our past history which throw a clear light on the subject matter of these hearings and also upon the present world crisis.

In the summer of 1919, the Senate Military Committee under its chairman, James W. Wadsworth, sought to erect a sound and permanent military system upon our costly experience in the World War. In the following January, after exhaustive hearings in his committee, Wadsworth introduced a bill in the Senate. It provided that the divisions of the National Guard and National Army which had fought in the World War should be perpetuated as a permanent institution for the future, and that they should be kept full of trained men through a system of universal military training. This plan was not so novel as may appear, for Wadsworth simply proposed a modern adaptation of a plan which Washington transmitted to the First Congress in January 1790.

If the Wadsworth bill had passed we would have been prepared for present world crisis which Hitler precipitated in 1940. In addition to the Regular Army there would have been 55 divisions in the National Guard and the Organized Reserves, all of them filled with men who had had military training and all of them commanded by officers accustomed to lead them in the field. In addition, there would have been an unorganized reserve of about 10,000,000 men who had graduated from the citizen army during the past 20 years. In these circumstances it would not have been necessary to pass the Selective Service Act last summer for the reservoir of trained manpower would have been full. The problem of further preparedness would have been the simple problem of calling out existing units for additional training.

But Wadsworth was unable to get his plan through Congress. The country was not yet ready to accept the great Washingtonian principle of universal military training and service. As we had just won a war to end war, why spend money on future military training? As we had just made the world safe for democracy, why arm her for the future? And so we joined Britain and our other sister democracies in creating a culture medium of pacifism, appeasement, and narrow isolation for the bacillus of Hitlerism to thrive in.

In the actual case, we were taken by surprise when Hitler overran Europe in the spring of 1940. Instead of being filled, the reservoir of trained manpower was empty. It was obvious that a great army must be created and that the empty reservoir must be refilled. To do this under a system of voluntary recruitment was obviously impossible. The only possible solution was selective military training and service, and this solution was promptly adopted by Congress in the Selective Service Act of 1940—and in doing so it finally accepted a principle that Washington urged in the beginning as one of the essential foundations of the new American Republic.

With this great law on the statute books, the War Department, under the leadership of the Chief of Staff, has been creating a great modern army, and for

the first time in our history we have been able to make effective preparations to meet a great military crisis. But now, that great constructive work is threatened by the fact that the whole organization will begin to disintegrate in the near future unless the terms of service of citizen-soldiers now in the ranks are extended. Fortunately, it was provided in the original law that the 12-month training period should be extended in a time of great national peril—and that time is now here.

Since Congress has adopted a scientific solution of the manpower problem in the Selective Service Act of 1940, it may be interesting to consider a period in our history when the future of America was seriously threatened because Congress had adopted a bad manpower policy.

In the summer of 1775, soon after the Battle of Bunker Hill, an adequate army might have been filled with men who were willing to enlist for the duration of the war. This was Washington's opinion, as formally expressed in letters to the President of Congress. If this policy had been adopted, the Continental Army would soon have become a veteran force, and it would have outnumbered the enemy on every subsequent battlefield. In these circumstances, the war should have ended in decisive American victory before the winter of Valley Forge, before the collapse of the public credit and before it was necessary to call France in to bolster up a tottering cause. But, the Continental Congress would not adopt this sound policy. Instead, all enlistments were made to terminate with the current year. When the first year ended, the enthusiasm inspired by Bunker Hill had subsided. Most of the volunteers of 1775 refused to reenlist for the campaign of 1776, and now it became difficult to obtain even raw recruits. As a result of this policy, it became necessary to form a new army each year, and each year the Army was smaller than it was the year before. Later, Congress adopted a longer period of service, but not until it was too late to maintain an effective army. If Washington had been permitted to retain the soldiers trained in 1775, Howe's Army might have been defeated in 1776, and could not have survived the campaign of 1777.

And so, the war dragged on through 1778 and 1779. Washington had many opportunities to end it but his Army was always too weak. In the fall of the latter year, word came to him that Rochambeau would come to America with French troops next spring. If Congress would give him an effective Army to cooperate with the French the campaign of 1780 should lead to decisive victory. Washington reported the situation to Congress. The organized strength of the Continental Army was about 40,000, but there were only 20,000 on the rolls and of these many were absent from sickness and other causes. By next spring there would be only 10,000 men on the rolls and many of these would not be available for duty with the Army. There would be an unpredictable number of trained soldiers and an unpredictable number of raw recruits. With such uncertain resources as these it would be impossible to plan an effective cooperation with the French. Washington, therefore, proposed that each State should draft enough men to fill its quota and that they should be sent to the Army by New Year's Day so that they could be trained before the spring campaign. This was the only possible solution of the problem that confronted him. But, Congress paid no heed to his recommendations. It would not provide for a draft. It would not even establish the quotas until late in the spring and until this was done not even voluntary recruiting could begin.

By May of 1780 Washington had only 11,000 men under his immediate command, and of these 2,000 would be discharged within the next 2 months. Small as his Army was it was necessary for him to send reinforcements to South Carolina, where General Lincoln was confronted by superior forces. In the fall of the following year after providing a meager garrison to guard the strategic fortress at West Point, Washington had only about 2,000 Continentals to march with him from the Hudson down to Yorktown.

Why did Congress ignore Washington's advice? Chief Justice John Marshall gives us an answer to this question. In his *Life of Washington*, he wrote:

"Notwithstanding the embarrassments with which Congress was surrounded it is not easy to find adequate reasons for the neglect of representations so interesting, and of recommendations apparently so essential to the safety of the United States."

"Private letters disclose the fact that two parties still agitated Congress. One entered freely into the views of the Commander in Chief. The other,

jealous of the Army, and apprehensive of its hostility to liberty when peace should be restored, remained unwilling to give stability to its Constitution by increasing the numbers who were to serve during the war. They seemed to dread the danger from the enemy, less than the danger which might be apprehended for the civil authority from its permanent character. \* \* \*

What this boils down to is this: Congress denied Washington the certain means of speedy victory because an obstructionist faction feared that if given an effective army, he would make himself a dictator. This faction was only a minority, but it was strong enough to thwart every attempt at effective military organization since the beginning of the war. There was a delicate problem in equilibrium. They would make their Army just barely strong enough to defeat King George, but not strong enough to make Washington an American Cromwell after the victory. This was the sole cause of a prolonged war with all of its attendant economic and social distresses. It is well for us to remember that in his struggle for American independence, Washington had much less opposition from the British Army than he had from jealous and narrow obstructionists in the Continental Congress.

The military system which President Washington proposed was strictly a national-defense organization. Though he proposed it as a means of preventing war, his countrymen rejected it. But the military system which Frederick the Great bequeathed to Germany was never a defensive organization. It was deliberately designed as a conquest machine from the beginning. Frederick employed it to aggrandize Prussia within Germany. He probably never thought of world dominion in his day. But the seeds of future world conquest were inherent in the organization which he contrived and would inevitably develop with growing opportunity in the future. Bismarck used the conquest machine; first, to crush a growing democratic movement in Germany, and then to unite Germany under autocratic Prussia. After Bismarck's victories over Austria and France, a conquest machine was no longer needed for the defense of Germany or for the protection of legitimate German interests. If retained, the German General Staff must find grist for it outside of Germany, and so with growing opportunity it would eventually and inevitably aim at world dominion. But for the unexpected awakening of America this was all but accomplished in 1918.

Since World War I the German General Staff has consistently aimed at world dominion as the ultimate goal of the German people. But the opportunity came sooner than was expected. The English-speaking peoples to whom the strategic outposts of civilization were entrusted were found to be doped in pacifism, appeasement, and narrow isolation. Herein lies the real cause of the present crisis. There was a high barometer of overmilitarism in the region of autocracy and a low barometer of undermilitarism in the region of democracy. Hence the inevitable storm. The complacent pacifism of the democracies gave Nazi militarism its tempting opportunity.

After rejecting Washington's advice for 150 years, the American people returned to it in the Selective Service Act of 1940. Our future and the future of civilization depend upon preserving and perfecting the organization that our Government is creating under the provisions of that act.

In my opinion, our peril is greater than it ever has been in our history. All of the forces of nazism are deployed against us. In order to achieve his clearly revealed aim, Hitler must conquer or encircle the United States.

**General PALMER.** Referring to the statement that I have filed for the record, I would call attention to the fact that if the bill introduced in the Senate by Chairman Wadsworth had passed the Congress we would have been fully prepared when this Hitler crisis occurred in 1940. There would not have been any manpower problem and it would not have been necessary to pass a Selective Service Act. We would have had, in addition to the Regular Army, 55 divisions in the National Guard and the Organized Reserves, all filled with men who had had training, all units commanded by officers accustomed to lead them in the field. And in addition to that there would have been an unorganized reservoir of about 10,000,000 men in the country who had had some military training.

If we had been in that situation, the only thing that would have been necessary would be to order existing units out for such additional training as might be necessary. But that bill failed to pass. The country was not prepared for universal military training at that time.

The actual situation when the crisis did occur was that instead of having a reservoir full of trained manpower we had an empty reservoir. It was obvious that it was necessary to form a great Army and to refill that reservoir as soon as possible. It was utterly impossible to do it under the system of voluntary recruitment. The only way it could be filled was under some system of compulsory military training and service. Congress adopted that solution in passing the Selective Service Act. And in passing it, it adopted a principle which President Washington proposed to the First Congress 150 years before.

Having adopted that rule, which is the only possible scientific way of securing manpower, we have now reached a situation in which the Army, being organized under those powers, is about to disintegrate and it becomes necessary to extend the temporary service, as was indicated in the original act itself.

It seems to me that this should be done, and it can be done without great hardship according to the arrangement proposed by General Marshall during his testimony. I am satisfied that it will be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are in favor of the declaration by Congress, through a form of resolution, that the Nation is imperilled at this time in such manner as to require the retention of the different components of our present military forces.

General PALMER. Yes, sir; I am.

The CHAIRMAN. The other question which you mentioned, that of the Wadsworth bill, which was introduced into the Senate at the time, I presume, when he was chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee?

General PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And when you were his adviser?

General PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That we would have over a period of 22 or 23 years built up in an orderly fashion trained personnel throughout the country from which we could draw now without very much difficulty, and at very much less expense than we are now put to.

General PALMER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the error that we made.

General PALMER. I would like to call attention to the fact also that there was not anything particularly novel about the Wadsworth bill, because he proposed nothing in the world but a modern adaptation of a proposal that President Washington made to the First Congress in 1790.

Mr. MARTIN. This reservoir of trained men that you refer to, that could have been trained had that bill passed, would have had 4 months of training?

General PALMER. Yes, sir; unless Congress increased the period of the training. But I would like to say, sir, in that connection, that 4 months would have been the amount of training of the newest recruit in the ranks. During a 4-year period after the initial training, each of these men would have served either in the National Guard or Organized

Reserves, and would have attended field maneuvers twice. No man could have become a noncommissioned officer and later an officer, unless he had prepared himself by further training for each step of promotion.

I do not mean to say that they would have had a sufficient amount of training. But suppose you had had 2,000,000 men a year ago who were organized and had had that much training, and all of these could have been called out immediately and given additional training. That would have been a tremendous preparation.

Mr. CLASON. On the basis of your military experience, would you express an opinion as to whether or not any of these American troops will be called upon to fight outside of the Western Hemisphere?

General PALMER. I think that they should be prepared for that, if the national interest demands it.

Mr. CLASON. Yes; but that is not the question. I asked --we are sure that is why they are being trained, to be ready for service, of course—but I asked now, based upon your knowledge of international affairs, have you any opinion as to whether or not any of them or any number of them will be called upon to fight outside the Western Hemisphere?

General PALMER. No, sir; I have not. That is a question for the future.

Mr. CLASON. Then you do not see anything in the present picture, in the international crisis, or in the European war, which would lead you to believe that any of these troops will be called upon to fight outside the Western Hemisphere.

General PALMER. I do not know whether that situation will arise or not. But it may in the immediate future. If it does, of course, they ought to face it.

Mr. CLASON. But at the present moment, from what you know of the situation in connection with the European war, or from what you know of the international crisis, is there anything which leads you to believe that any of these troops will be called upon to fight outside the Western Hemisphere?

General PALMER. I cannot say; I do not know. In the first place, I do not know what the Western Hemisphere is.

Mr. CLASON. Well, outside of North or South America.

General PALMER. I think some of these troops may have to be used to defend the necessary strategic outposts of the United States—just where, I do not know. I am not on the General Staff. I believe this: That to say that they shall or shall not do certain things on one side or the other of an imaginary line is an utter absurdity from the standpoint of military strategy and military history.

Mr. CLASON. Then do you think this bill should include an amendment providing that these selectees, as well as others, may be used in the discretion of the President or of the General Staff at any point in the world?

General PALMER. What is that?

Mr. CLASON. Is it your opinion that this bill should be amended to permit the President or the General Staff to use these troops in their discretion anywhere in the world?

General PALMER. Mr. Clason, I do not think I said anything that could be interpreted to mean that.

The CHAIRMAN. This bill does not have any effect like that.

Mr. CLASON. I am asking the gentleman if he thought the bill should be amended to that effect. You have read the bill?

General PALMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. You know that according to this resolution and its relation to the present law, the selectees cannot be used outside of the Western Hemisphere or the possessions of the United States.

General PALMER. If that is the law, I do not believe any such limitation should be written into the law.

Mr. CLASON. You think the present law is defective in that respect?

General PALMER. Yes, sir. That is my personal opinion.

Mr. CLASON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether or not troops should be used and where they should be used generally should depend--practically all the time should depend--on the judgment of the military command in charge of them, is that correct?

General PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And subject to the orders of their superiors?

General PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To the direction of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

General PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose they were stationed on some of our island bases and were attacked. Would they not have to fight back or do you think they should await an order from the President?

General PALMER. They would have to fight. I think there is a very serious danger of war. We do not know when it is going to come or how it is going to come. But if it does come, I do not think we ought to be hampered. I think our mission would be solely to defeat the enemy.

The CHAIRMAN. On that very point, an army that is partly insufficient to meet the opposition is just as futile as one that is wholly insufficient.

General PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If it loses even by a small margin, it has lost.

General PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, gentlemen? We thank you for your appearance and your testimony, General.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask one more question of Mr. Clark.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. MARTIN. Did your organization help to draft the National Defense Act of 1920?

Mr. CLARK. No. Let me explain. Prior to the war and during the war, we worked with the War Department actively in organizing the officers' training camps, and so forth. After the war we decided to continue. Let me explain that our organization—I speak of the Military Training Camps Association—came out of the first so-called Plattsburg Camp in 1915. The association was formed in 1916.

When the previous war came on we offered our services to the War Department and suggested that the best means—in fact, the only means—of raising a corps of officers to officer the respective arms of the services, would be by adopting the system of the Plattsburg

camps. We were asked to cooperate with the War Department, and we took part in that in a big way. We worked with them.

Now, you are speaking of 1919. We decided to continue. Our group of men did not want to see us caught again in the same predicament without any manpower, organized, trained manpower. We thought it was to the best interests of the country to have a system of universal training and service, both. That was the principle that we adopted in our constitution. One purpose of our organization is to prepare, if possible, a Federal system of universal training and service. I remember the words. We pushed that. We published a magazine called National Service. We had a committee that we called the military affairs committee of our association. They put forward ideas and drafts for a system of universal training and service, and had some touch with it. After that, Colonel Palmer who, as he just testified, was advisor to Chairman Wadsworth's Senate Military Affairs Committee, we had some touch with the framing of that act, which was recommended by the Senate Military Committee, but failed in the Senate. We had some touch with it. We did not sponsor the bill. We did not draft it ourselves.

Mr. MARTIN. The reason I was asking the question is that in that proposal, in the conscription part of the bill, they likewise provide \$5 a month pay, and I wondered whether you, in drafting the bill last year, just took that proposal from the original bill back in 1920, or whether you had sponsored that level of pay during all that intervening time.

Mr. CLARK. I think the fact that it was in the prior draft of 20 years before influenced us, because there was a philosophy behind it, namely, that for training in peacetime as distinguished from service in war, you had presented a different situation. The young men, when they got in there, received their clothes and their shelter and their food, and they were in for a relatively short time. And we thought that it should be regarded as a duty of citizenship.

Mr. MARTIN. I see quite a distinction, though, between conscripting a man and forcing him to go into Army duty and taking him and inducing him to go into an officers' training camp. I attended the first officers' training camp before they decided to pay a cent of money. You also attended the one in Plattsburg. But we had a goal to shoot for. It was an entirely different matter. We were not in the armed forces until the third training camp of the World War. We were not in the armed forces; that is, unless we had been brought in from the armed forces. But, in offering a man training for a commission, you were giving him a prize to work for. We were not in the Army.

But when you conscript a man and put him in the armed forces, that caused me to wonder whether you or your organization had sponsored the \$5-compensation provision all during these years.

Mr. CLARK. We did, but again I say for short terms of training in quiet times, in peacetimes; but not for service. And again I say I am not defending that. I think we made a mistake.

Mr. MARTIN. You sponsored it a year ago. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is nothing further, we thank you very much, Mr. Clark; and you, General Palmer. We appreciate your coming before the committee.

The committee will now go into executive session.

(Whereupon the committee went into executive session.)

# PROVIDING FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE BY REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON NUMBERS AND LENGTH OF SERVICE OF DRAFTEES.

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FRIDAY, JULY 25, 1941

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The committee met at 10 a. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman), presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee please be in order.

Gentlemen, we have a number of quite important witnesses this morning on this matter of the joint resolutions under consideration and, as many of you know—all of you know—Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord has been representative of the National Guard here for a number of years. General Reckord is present this morning. We will be glad to have you come around, General, and discuss this proposal in your own way, and make whatever statement you care to make about it; then, after you are through, maybe some of the gentlemen will wish to ask you some questions.

## STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MILTON A. RECKORD, COMMANDING GENERAL, TWENTY-NINTH DIVISION, FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MD.

General RECKORD. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee: I am very glad to have this opportunity to speak upon the resolution, because it does give me a chance, perhaps, to refresh the minds of the members of the committee as to the position of the National Guard of the country, as an institution, over a long period of years.

The chairman may remember, in 1933, a large group of officers of the guard came before this very committee with what was then known as the National Guard bill. Up to that time, you may recall that section 111 of the National Defense Act provided, that when Congress authorized the President to use troops in excess of the Regular Army, members of the National Guard could be drafted into the Federal service as individuals. And in the World War, notwithstanding the fact that officers and members of the guard had volunteered, we had to be drafted for that service.

That was not satisfactory to us, so we studied the subject within our own councils for many years and finally came before this committee with a plan and a bill; the heart of the bill being a change of section 111 which would eliminate the draft provision or draft feature and, in place of that feature, give us the present section 111, which provides that when the Congress shall declare a national emergency and authorize the President to use troops in excess of the Regular

Army, he may order the units of the National Guard and the members to active Federal service and that those units will then go into the active Federal service as at that time organized, as far as practicable.

That section is on the books. It was enacted in 1933. Last year, when the selective-service legislation was being considered, the bill which was at first presented to the Congress was most unsatisfactory to the guard, because we thought we saw this large group of trainees being placed in between the National Guard and the Regular Army, which would result, in a few years, in relegating the guard to the rear, or to a State status. So we came before your committee and also went before the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff and, if I may, I will read from the letter which was signed by the president of the National Guard Association and the president of the Adjutants General Association, indicating the position of the National Guard. This was written July 9, 1940:

Deliberate misrepresentations, savoring of "fifth column" activities, as to the attitude of the officers and men of the National Guard toward emergency plans for the defense of this country have been made.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding on your part or in the minds of the people of the United States, or the National Congress, or in any other agencies concerned, as to the attitude of the National Guard, the aforementioned organizations representing the National Guard of the United States do here state in the most emphatic manner possible that the National Guard stands ready and willing to enter into the service of the United States, as provided in the National Defense Act, today, tomorrow, or at any time the President of the United States sees fit to use the National Guard in the defense of this country.

The National Guard does here and now reaffirm its traditional position on matters pertaining to national defense and desires to pledge to you and the War Department its fullest and most complete cooperation for the development and training of the land forces of the United States, of which it is a component, to meet the emergency that now confronts our country and our people.

That was signed by General DeLamater and General Grahm.

The CHAIRMAN. What positions did they occupy?

General RECKORD. They were, respectively, president of the National Guard Association of the United States and the Adjutants General Association of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. If I remember correctly, you were urging this committee last year, in the testimony on the Selective Service and Training Act, for it to be made possible that the guard could remain in the service longer than the period of 1 year, if necessary. Is that correct?

General RECKORD. That is correct. And I might give the members of the committee the steps which took place in connection with that effort. The bill which was prepared in the War Department and sent to the White House had in it language to the effect that the Reserve components would be authorized to serve for not more than 1 year. The National Guard, in convention, passed this resolution on that feature—Resolution No. 8:

Whereas the language in the National Guard bill recently enacted makes it mandatory that the National Guard be returned from their active Federal service at the end of 12 consecutive months; and

Whereas the language of the Selective Service Act is contrary to the spirit of section 111 of the National Defense Act, in that it places men in training ahead of the National Guard of the United States in an emergency: Therefore be it,

*Resolved*, That the executive council of the National Guard Association is hereby directed to take steps to amend the National Guard bill by deleting the

words "twelve consecutive months" and inserting, in lieu thereof, the words "not less than one year."

In other words, we desired then and have always desired to rest our case on section 111 of the National Defense Act, which places the National Guard next behind the Regular Army, when troops in excess of the Regular Army are needed. So, we went to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff and asked them to change that language, but the bill got out of the White House and down here and the language was not changed.

Acting on this resolution, we appeared before this committee and the Senate committee and urged the committees to make the change. I recall very distinctly in the Senate what happened. The selective service bill had been reported out of the Senate committee 3 days before we appeared on the National Guard bill for a hearing. The Senators, as were you gentlemen, were very anxious to have the two bills parallel one another and they had reported the selective service bill with the language in it reading "12 consecutive months." So, while they listened to us very attentively, they decided to parallel the Selective Service Act and to change that language, but did not give the language we asked for. They used the identical language that was used in the Draft Act.

So we are confronted today with a law which precludes the use of the National Guard after 12 months' service.

As explained by the Chief of Staff, in his judgment it is necessary that some amendment to the present law be enacted. I am here to say I have felt all along that the Guard should be in such a position that it could serve indefinitely if the need for its service exists. Frankly, I think the need does exist.

I have discussed this matter with many of my officers, some of whom would like to go home.

The CHAIRMAN. If the country were at peace?

General RECKORD. If the country were at peace, actual peace; yes, sir. I sat in a group of officers a few nights ago. One officer said:

Well, he just wished it were possible to have us all return home—

but he said he—

thought it would be the height of foolishness to disrupt these trained organizations, or organizations that are now partially trained, but at the end of the year will be trained—to disrupt those organizations before we are faced with a peaceful world.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I believe you are in command of Fort Meade, Md?

General RECKORD. I command the Twenty-ninth Division at Fort Meade, made up of National Guard troops of Virginia, the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. And it may be interesting to you gentlemen of the committee to know that our present strength in that division is 60 percent selectees. Forty percent are National Guard men and 60 percent are selectees.

Mr. THOMASON. No Regulars at all?

General RECKORD. No, sir; no regulars.

Mr. HARTER. What about Reserve officers?

General RECKORD. We were one of the National Guard divisions that went in with a full war-strength complement of National Guard officers.

In the National Guard Act, you may recall, Mr. Harter, there was a provision which enabled the selected enlisted men, in time of peace, to study and receive appointments as second lieutenants and we were able, in my division, to take in with us, when we were inducted, about 37 line officers more than we required when we went to war strength. In that respect, we are very fortunate.

Mr. HARTER. You are quite different from the usual or ordinary National Guard division in that respect, are you not?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir; we are.

You may remember I had a lot to do with the legislation as the chairman said, I have been around here and have spoken for the guard for many years and, in the 1933 legislation, we provided that enlisted men who would study could continue as enlisted men on the active list, but could be examined for lieutenancies and be appointed, and those appointments would become active upon induction into the Federal service.

Mr. HARTER. As I understand it, then, General, you have no Reserve officers with your division?

General RECKORD. At present I have two engineer officers and one Signal Corps officer, and I have been authorized to ask for 15 additional Reserve second lieutenants. Those 15 will be additional over and above our requirements. I think this is an effort on the part, probably, of General Marshall to give us a few over strength to compensate for those absent at school and other places. From now on, as vacancies exist, we will have a few Reserve lieutenants, or will have second lieutenants to come to us from the training schools, rather than come up through the grades.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming there is a large percentage of the trainees that would be brought in under the Selective Service and Training Act, in all of the divisions of the Army throughout the country and in the regiments as well, what in your judgment would be the effect of withdrawing all those young men from service at this particular time? Will you discuss that feature?

General RECKORD. Mr. May, it would completely disrupt the entire Army in my judgment—completely disrupt it. Take the case of my own division: We went in on February 3. It took us practically a month before we were settled in camp and bedded down. We trained then for perhaps a month and a half or 2 months before we received our first selectee. Then, instead of getting our selectees within a week, which was physically impossible, we received those selectees over about 3 months. The division today is not yet trained for battle. We are just about ready to go into brigade exercises; following that, division exercises; then to the South for maneuvers. So that my division will give you the picture which exists in every other division in the Army. And, in addition to that, the Chief of Staff told you, when he was before your committee, there are certain National Guard units—two, at least—one in Hawaii and one in Alaska, and I think it would be almost a physical impossibility to make the exchanges there in time to comply with the present law.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are willing to say to this committee you think it would be an unwise move on the part of Congress if they did not continue the selectees, the National Guard, and the Reserve Corps at present for the duration of this emergency?

**General RECKORD.** I make that statement, Mr. Chairman, without any mental reservation whatsoever. And although I am not clothed with authority to speak for the other officers of the National Guard Association and the Adjutants General Association, I was present with the representatives of those associations last week at the Senate hearing and I know that the National Guard, as an institution, desires the Congress to take the action necessary in order to permit this—not only the National Guard, but the selectees, to be retained in the service as long as the War Department or the administration feels there is an emergency.

**The CHAIRMAN.** In what capacity General, did you enter the United States Army or the National Guard, as the case may be?

**General RECKORD.** I went in the National Guard as a private.

**The CHAIRMAN.** How long ago?

**General RECKORD.** In 1901.

**The CHAIRMAN.** And you have been in military service, actively engaged in time of war, and interested in time of peace in the development of an army, ever since that time?

**General RECKORD.** Yes, sir; that is true. I served in the World War as a colonel of infantry. When I returned I was named by former Governor Ritchie as the Adjutant General of Maryland and have been active in military matters, with special reference to the position of the National Guard in the great plan of national defense, ever since.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, in the one-army idea, the three components, and I am strongly of the opinion—and I know I voice the sentiment of 95 percent, maybe 100 percent, of the officers of the entire National Guard of the country, and I would add, further, 90 percent of the enlisted men—I do not believe there is any doubt about the fact that the officers and enlisted men of the National Guard knew, when they raised their right hands and took the oath and voluntarily identified themselves with the National Guard, that they volunteered for service to the State in a minor State emergency, and for service to the Nation in any emergency needing troops in excess of those of the Regular Army. That is our position, we have maintained it steadily, and we certainly are not going to shirk now.

**Mr. THOMASON.** General, you have answered the question I was going to ask. We know how the most of the generals and high-ranking officers feel about this situation, but, as I understand you, the rank and file of the enlisted men now in the service would not especially object to longer service if the Commander in Chief and the heads of the War Department and Congress say that the national interest is imperiled?

**General RECKORD.** I think that is absolutely correct. But I qualified my statement with respect to the enlisted men by saying 90 percent. I think there are certain individuals, perhaps, in the National Guard among the enlisted men, who have families, who would like to get home. In fact, I would like to get home myself if I could. But I believe each one of those individuals, Mr. Thomason, knows he has taken an obligation to serve, and is ready and willing to serve, for such period of time as the Congress determines is necessary.

**Mr. THOMASON.** What is the morale of the rank and file of the Army at this time?

**General RECKORD.** I think it is splendid.  
**Mr. THOMASON.** How is it in your outfit?

General RECKORD. Splendid. I would say it is superior. I do not like to throw bouquets at my own outfit, but I honestly believe that is the situation.

Mr. THOMASON. You say that with due modesty. I have some very fine ideas about that unit myself.

General RECKORD. I have addressed myself, as you have noted, primarily to the National Guard in this picture, but I believe the selectees should go side by side and step by step with the guard.

Mr. THOMASON. How do you feel about this promise, I should say, of the President in his message a few days ago and later most emphatically repeated by General Marshall, Chief of Staff, before this committee, that men over 28 were going to be let out, permitted to return home as rapidly as possible, and that all hardship cases would be permitted to return? General Marshall testified that at this very time they are permitting about 2,000 men a month to go home because their families or their business needs them, or for some other meritorious reason. Now, are you doing that with your organization?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir, we are; we are doing that right along.

Mr. THOMASON. You are doing that right along?

General RECKORD. Yes; but I think I should go further than that, and I believe the War Department will go further than that. And when I say "further," I mean as soon as the selectees have completed sufficient training to justify the Government for the time and money spent on them, all over 28 should be released.

Mr. THOMASON. And that is now being done?

General RECKORD. No, sir; that is not now being done.

Mr. THOMASON. Not in the case of men over 28, but hardship cases?

General RECKORD. The hardship cases are being released now. Any man who has a changed family condition subsequent to his induction is having that case reviewed and, in my own division, I have discharged a number of men.

Mr. SHORT. General Reckord, the tribute you pay the National Guard is well deserved, because I do not believe anyone who is acquainted with it and its activities would question its patriotism. But it occurs to me if such an overwhelming majority of the men in the guard are anxious to remain in service, they would volunteer. And if 95 percent of your officer personnel and more than 90 percent of the enlisted men are so anxious to remain in service during the emergency, why is it necessary for Congress to make it compulsory?

General RECKORD. Mr. Short, you misunderstood me. I did not say anybody is anxious to stay in. I am the major general commanding the division and I am not anxious to stay in. I would like to get home. But I believe it is my duty to stay in and I believe every other officer and man in the National Guard feels it is his duty to do so.

Mr. SHORT. If they felt it their duty, they would remain, and you would not reject them if they wanted to remain, would you?

General RECKORD. I do not quite get the thought.

Mr. SHORT. Of course, when we called the men to active service, we told them it was to be for 1 year. Now, then, if a majority of them feel it is their duty to remain and they wish to remain, you would not refuse to take them, would you?

General RECKORD. No. But I do not think that is the way to approach the question. I think it is too serious for that. I will say this, very frankly; I believe if I made a survey of the officers of the Twenty-ninth Division, I doubt if half a dozen of them would go home. I think, out of practically a thousand officers there, we would not lose 10.

Mr. SHORR. Can you tell us, General, how many National Guard men have been sent to insular or territorial possessions outside of the continental United States?

General RECKORD. No, Mr. Short; I do not have access to those figures. But I did hear the Chief of Staff make the statement before the Senate committee with respect to certain troops in Alaska and Hawaii. I do not know anything other than that.

Mr. SHORR. What type of division is the Twenty-ninth?

General RECKORD. It is an infantry square division.

Mr. SHORR. What equipment have you over at Fort Meade to train your division?

General RECKORD. We have sufficient.

Mr. SHORR. Do you have a rifle for every man?

General RECKORD. Oh, yes; yes, sir. We have sufficient equipment for training.

Mr. SHORR. Do you have any armored equipment?

General RECKORD. We have no armored equipment in the Infantry division; we do not have it in that division.

Mr. SHORR. Do you have sufficient rifle practice?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir; even up to combat practice with ball ammunition. We have had that. But even now we are not ready for battle. I stated a moment ago we are just about reaching the brigade phases of training.

Mr. SHORR. Of course the first few months of training in any army is necessarily required to harden and toughen the men, and ordinary discipline.

General RECKORD. That is right.

Mr. SHORR. They are not ready for combat service until they are broken in.

General RECKORD. That is correct.

Mr. SHORR. And it requires several months to do that?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir. At first, we went in with a certain number of National Guard men. Then we had all of these selectees superimposed upon us, and they came in brand new, so that we had to begin again at the bottom and carry that entire group forward. Now, we have just returned from the Virginia training area in Caroline County, known as the A. P. Hill Reservation, where we have carried all of the units through the regimental combat training, and now about to take on the brigade phases.

Mr. SHORR. And in the interest of efficiency and esprit de corps, it is quite necessary that you mix many of those selectees with National Guard men who have had some military training and service?

General RECKORD. It is the best way to train them.

Mr. SHORR. You have to have some experienced men to break in the raw rookies and recruits?

General RECKORD. That is right.

Mr. HARTER. General Reckord, the members or enlisted men in the National Guard are volunteers, are they not?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARTER. And they take an oath of allegiance, when they enlist in the Guard?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARTER. Do they volunteer for a definite period?

General RECKORD. They volunteer usually for 3 years, Mr. Harter; but, in an emergency, that period is extended for the duration of the emergency and perhaps for 6 months after the close of the emergency.

Mr. HARTER. And, of course, those men who enlisted came in at different times; the enlistments are dated at different times; many of them have not been in for 3 years, I suspect.

General RECKORD. That is correct.

Mr. HARTER. So that their terms of enlistment expire at different times?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARTER. Now, do the selectees that you have in your division come from the same States and Territory that the Guardsmen come from?

General RECKORD. We have been fortunate in that we have been been able to draw practically 100 percent of our selectees from the area from which our units come.

Mr. HARTER. You have told us you feel there is a very high morale in your division. Do you believe that morale has suffered in the last 2 weeks, or during this period when there has been discussion of the continuance of the period of training?

General RECKORD. Mr. Harter, I do not think the morale has suffered. I think there are certain of the older individuals who have discussed this matter—in fact I know that to be the case; men who are 28 to 36. In fact, I know one man who is almost 36 years old. These men are fine, high type men, and they have been discussing this matter among themselves and how it would affect them and whether the older men would be kept in indefinitely, or would be relegated to the Reserve and make room for younger men. But, so far as injury to the morale is concerned, I do not believe the morale has been hurt at all.

I think there are some of those individuals who would like to be relieved and I believe they should be relieved; but I do not believe that the Congress should tie the hands of the War Department in order, perhaps, to release a few of the older men. I know General Marshall will work out a plan by which to relieve these older men if for no other reason than the Congress would not give him the money with which to maintain an army which is bigger than he needs.

If you realize that many of these older men could be released and younger men who are now being drafted or have been drafted, who are in the training centers, could be sent to the division to fill the places, new men, having had the 13 weeks basic training, would fit right into the places made vacant by the older men who would return to their homes. I am confident that is what General Marshall has in mind.

MR. HARTER. I think we are all satisfied General Marshall is going to take care of that situation and eliminate the older men, and particularly the hardship cases, at the earliest possible moment.

I just want to ask you one or two more questions. Do you know whether any public officials in high places, or officials, have circularized your division or any of the men in it, asking that certain propaganda information be conveyed to the President or others?

General RECKORD. I know only what I have read in the papers on that, sir.

MR. HARTER. Do you know whether anyone in your division has received communications of that kind?

General RECKORD. I have no personal knowledge of it. I may be speaking out of turn here, but I do not believe any of the men in the Twenty-ninth Division are going to write letters such as you have been reading about. I may be wrong; there is no way to control it. If a man does receive a letter from anyone in high authority, he might, in a weak moment, act on the suggestion; but, so far, none of them have done so.

MR. HARTER. General, has your division yet had an opportunity in its training to be part of what we might call a combat team and have exercises in conjunction with motorized units and aircraft protection?

General RECKORD. Not yet, sir.

MR. HARTER. Do you expect to undergo such exercises?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir; we do. We will begin work with the air in Virginia in the latter part of September. Then we go to the southern part of North Carolina for corps maneuvers for the month of October. And we remain down in that general area for the month of November for Army maneuvers, during which time all of those forces and arms will work together.

MR. HARTER. No troops could be considered adequately trained for modern-day warfare unless they have had the advantage of such exercises and maneuvers, could they, General?

General RECKORD. Positively not, today.

MR. ARENDS. I am wondering, in connection with the present inductees and selectees that have already gone in, if it is not possible, with the situation that now faces us, and in view of the statement General Marshall made the other day that we need only approximately 150,000 to 200,000 more men to defend the United States, if we are not going to see many of those selectees retained in the Army if all this emergency exists?

General RECKORD. I do not think so, Mr. Arends. I think this is what will happen; I think in the situation which confronts us in Alaska and in Hawaii that the selectees may have to remain a few months longer than some of the selectees in the United States; but I confidently believe that all of those men will gradually, and as the War Department can administratively work it out, be replaced. I say that for this reason: The Chief of Staff has stated upon a number of occasions that he needed only a certain number of officers and men in the Army to defend the Western Hemisphere. If we have that number, then, as new men are coming in all the time, it stands to reason that he will then want to give his attention to building up the Reserve. And if you are familiar with the terms of the Selective Service Act, which I know you are, it

was designed specifically to build up a large Reserve. So that these excess men will not be the now men who come in, but they will be the men who had their year's training, or maybe less in the case of the older group, pushed into the Reserve to make room for the new selectees who come in. I would respectfully urge the Congress not to tie the hands of the War Department as to how this whole problem is to be administered.

I frankly and honestly think the Congress should leave the administration to the War Department. I am confident this committee has absolute confidence in the integrity of the present Chief of Staff, and I know the National Guard has such confidence.

**Mr. ARENDs.** You spoke awhile ago about morale and how these National Guard and Reserve officers felt about remaining in for an indefinite length of time: What about the 60 percent of selectees who happen to be under your command? Do you have any idea how they feel about it?

**General RECKORD.** Yes, sir; I do. The 60 percent are living right in with the National Guard. They are right in as part of the companies of the division. As I stated a moment ago, some of the older ones have been sitting around discussing this very feature as to what may happen to them—will they have to stay in longer than a year, or will they not? I have stated to them, frankly, I think that the older men will be released; I think the other men will be released as the War Department builds up a sufficient number of trained new men to take their places. And it is not going to be hard to administer, except in a few cases where we find selectees overseas.

**Mr. SHORR.** General, do you think it is wise for us to increase the number of men in our Army until we catch up with equipment? There are many places where there is a woeful lack of equipment.

**General RECKORD.** That is true.

**Mr. SHORR.** And practically the only training those men have had is to march in the dust.

**General RECKORD.** I would not say that; do not say that, because that is not true. Back of all that marching in the dust is training. The point is that we do have sufficient equipment with which to train.

**Mr. SHORR.** I am wondering where in the world you are hiding it. I want to say to you very frankly, General, what you are saying here does not coincide or is not in agreement with some other generals with whom I have talked privately.

**General RECKORD.** I did not say we had enough for battle.

**Mr. SHORR.** Of course, generals can differ, the same as Members of Congress.

**General RECKORD.** That is true. We do have equipment for training. I invite you to come over and visit us.

**Mr. SHORR.** I think one of the most important things this committee could do, and that we should do, and I am going to ask the chairman to insist on it, is that we visit, as a committee, the different arms and posts and see the equipment they have.

**General RECKORD.** I will take this opportunity to invite you to come over to Meade on the 11th and 12th of August, when I am going to have what we call a division inspection, and I would be glad to have as many of you come over and observe as will come. But the point is that we do have sufficient equipment with which to carry

on the training. And answering the question specifically, therefore, I would say that every individual who is going into the Army as a soldier needs certain basic training and education and we should have enough men trained basically and have them for a period of time before they need the special weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. And that to release the selectees at this particular time, or at the expiration of the year, would be a tragic mistake as you see it?

General RECKORD. I think it is something Congress cannot do.

Mr. SMITH. General, you are familiar with the language of the Selective Service Act?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Which provides that the selectees shall stay for 12 months unless Congress shall declare the national interest is imperiled?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Is it your opinion the situation is such that the Congress should make such a declaration at this time?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir; that is my opinion.

Mr. SMITH. What would be the effect on your planning as an officer in command of the division, or the planning of the higher officers on duty with that division, if you knew the law required 60 percent of your division to be released, no matter where the division was, say in the first 1 or 2 months of next year?

General RECKORD. I take it now that you are assuming that the National Guard law would be amended and the Guard would stay in?

Mr. SMITH. I am merely speaking of the selectees; I assume the rest would stay in.

General RECKORD. Yes, sir; then we would have completed our training with large units and would be back in our training camp at Meade. But by taking these 60 percent away, you would totally disrupt the division and next spring we would have to start all over again and repeat just what we have done. It would totally disrupt the division as a fighting organization.

Mr. SMITH. But you do think it is possible over a period of months, say 6 months, or starting the first of the year, as men with basic training come from the replacement centers, in an orderly fashion to replace the selectees without seriously impairing the efficiency of the division?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Wherever the division may be?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir; and the reason I say that is because the new men would then come through a different system. The system now used, is that we get all of our selectees from a reception center, where every one of those men has received no basic training whatever. However, in the future our replacements will come from training centers. The men will have had 13 weeks basic training when they report to us. Each man will therefore quickly fit into his company or battery. That is the reason I say it will be easy to administer from now on.

Mr. SMITH. So long as you have some flexibility and are not required automatically to put out the men exactly on the 12 months' date?

General RECKORD. That is right. And if we put those men out a year from the date on which they came in, in my division they will be going out every day for 8 months. We will be losing a few men here, a few men there, all over the division for a 8-month period of time.

Mr. HARNES. General, I know what you say about some of the troops being good soldiers and having good morale is true, because I spent the last week-end visiting two divisions in one of the air camps. I think they are making splendid soldiers, and I think the program is doing a wonderful job.

Some reference has been made to some shortage of equipment, particularly our antitank units, but that is going to be remedied within the next 60 days to some extent, I think. That is true, is it not?

General RECKORD. I am not in a position to answer that question. However, we do have sufficient antitank guns with which to train.

Mr. HARNES. I think that situation will be helped greatly shortly.

Now, I was interested in your statement, however, that 90 percent of these men, including the draftees, are not concerned about this extension of service.

General RECKORD. I did not say that, Mr. Harness; I did not say they were not concerned. I think every man is concerned about it. But I said 90 percent——

Mr. HARNES. Do you anticipate any trouble with morale, should this legislation be enacted, with the draftees?

General RECKORD. No, sir; I do not anticipate any trouble with morale, either with the draftees or the National Guard men. I think if people will stop writing foolish letters and will let us go on and attend to our business, and if Congress will enact legislation that will give the War Department what they have asked for in these resolutions, just stop stirring this thing up and get it out of the way and behind us, that the divisions will go ahead and, in a short period of time, we will have actual working, fighting machines.

Mr. HARNES. General, you do not mean to say that the letters that may be written in opposition to keeping the draftees in are foolish letters, do you?

General RECKORD. I think it is foolish, I think it is an absurd situation, when a group spreads propaganda like that at this time when the Nation is facing an emergency.

Mr. HARNES. That was not what I had reference to there.

General RECKORD. No.

Mr. HARNES. Now, it is one thing to agree with this program that the National Guard and the Reserves should be kept in service. They are semiprofessional soldiers.

General RECKORD. The National Guard are what we like to call "citizen soldiers," "civilian soldiers."

Mr. HARNES. You are in it as a profession, as part of the Guard, and you need them around for the training of the new men as they come in.

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARNES. Now, there is one thing about this thing I cannot understand. We have about 600,000 draftees in the service now.

General RECKORD. I think that is about right.

Mr. HARNES. We are authorized to take in about 900,000!

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. Instead of enacting a law here to keep the draftees in the service beyond a year, in order to handle these foreign possessions, why cannot we enlist 300,000 new men right now?

General RECKORD. I think they are coming in now.

Mr. HARNESS (continuing). And use them to supplant these men in Hawaii and Alaska without extending their period of training beyond a year?

General RECKORD. Of course, I have had no contact with the Planning Branch in the War Department and I do not want to speak out of turn; but, just speaking as I think about your question and trying to answer it, I would say there are certain additional organizations that have to be activated in order to make this large army workable, and they are not all completed yet. Therefore the first men should go to complete those units.

Mr. HARNESS. Right there: Let us take, for example, Hawaii. If we have draftees, National Guard men and Regular Army men over there, the draftees will, at the end of their period, unless the time is extended, be released and sent back to the United States?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. In the meantime, we could call in these additional 300,000 draftees and have them sufficiently trained to take their places at the end of the year?

General RECKORD. I know, but I do not think the Congressman has the correct picture. Let us stick to Hawaii. You have a National Guard unit in Hawaii. The organization is due, under the present law, to be mustered out of service on the 15th of September. That is, the officers and men, who went in from the National Guard, are due to go out. The framework of that organization is destroyed, leaving a lot of selectees hanging there in the air belonging to nothing.

Mr. HARNESS. I say I am in favor and I think we should keep the Reserves and National Guard in.

General RECKORD. I did not understand you to say that.

Mr. HARNESS. I am questioning the advisability of keeping all of these trainees in beyond the period of their year.

General RECKORD. Here is what I think should be done in that case: The amendment should be enacted and the War Department, as soon as they get trained men—men trained to serve in that particular unit—could then send those men over and release the men who are now serving in Hawaii.

Mr. HARNESS. That is exactly what I had in mind.

General RECKORD. That is right.

Mr. HARNESS. And I believe you would not need this legislation to keep the draftees beyond the year.

General RECKORD. I do not agree.

Mr. HARNESS. I say you would not need legislation, then, to extend the period of service of the draftees beyond a year, if you called in all of the draftees they could bring in now, or in the next 8 months?

General RECKORD. I really do not agree with you there. I think you do need it, because, as I indicated; the War Department needs trained men, we could not take those men out of that regiment in

Hawaii at the end of a year. What we should do is to give the War Department the opportunity to train a group of new men and send them over, releasing that entire group on some specific date.

Mr. HARNESS. Now, that calls to my attention an experience that we had in France in the World War. You know as well as I do that while we were in the line in France we had replacements sent up of men who had had 3 months' training.

General RECKORD. Some of them had had less than that.

Mr. HARNESS. That is right; some of them had never fired a rifle.

General RECKORD. That is correct.

Mr. HARNESS. We do not want that thing ever to happen again.

General RECKORD. You are arguing now for what I have just contended.

Mr. HARNESS. This is the point. We are not at war now. We are at peace. We were at war then, and we had to do it. But we can bring it down so that in the next 6 months we will have 800,000 men, draftees, to supplant these other men when their period of training is up and still have your National Guard and your Regulars and your Reserves as a nucleus to train these new 800,000 men. And you are not going to disrupt your organization in Hawaii or Alaska or the Philippines, or anywhere else.

General RECKORD. I differ with you there, because you used the term "6 months." If we had 6 months longer to carry those men in Hawaii, I think the problem could be solved.

Mr. HARNESS. Most of them were there in January, February, and March of this year, and have about 6 months yet to serve.

General RECKORD. Yes; but you have got to train a man basically before he is any good. We should not send a trained man home until we have another trained man ready to take his place.

Mr. HARNESS. Here is another thing I cannot understand. This law was passed with the understanding—we all understood, and the War Department, and the Congress, and the people—that at the end of 1 year these men would be sent back home as reserves.

General RECKORD. That is right, unless—

Mr. HARNESS (interposing). Why, then, knowing that, did the War Department send draftees to Hawaii and Alaska, which brought this problem up; if they know now that it would disrupt the Army, certainly they knew it then.

General RECKORD. I must say that I think you are a bit inclined to be unjust there, because the thing to do when that regiment was sent to Hawaii was to send a regiment to Hawaii. They had to send a regiment that was available, and they had to fill it to strength. And the only way to fill it to strength was to fill it with selectees.

Mr. SHORT. I am amazed to find out that they have sent selectees and draftees to Hawaii and Alaska when they never had any military training.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further, Mr. Harness.

Mr. HARNESS. Just one more question. The General says that he thinks—and I have a great deal of respect for his opinion—you say that you think this Congress should declare a national emergency now that would give power and authority to the Chief Executive to keep these men in service.

General RECKORD. I did not say that this morning. I have said it, and since you give me the opportunity to say it, I will repeat it. I do think that. I think the best way to solve this problem is to solve it, and if I were sitting where you gentlemen are, frankly and honestly, after very serious consideration on my part, I say that I would vote, if I had the right to vote, a national emergency and give the President the right to act.

Mr. HARNESS. If we are going to keep the draftees in beyond the year, I think that is the only honorable way to do it.

General RECKORD. That is what I think you should do.

Mr. HARNESS. We promised them that unless the national security was endangered or in peril they would be released at the end of a year. I think every man in the Army would be pleased to stay if he thought that this country's security was in peril.

General RECKORD. Congressman, maybe that is where I am not quite in step with you, because I do not know how you feel, but I honestly feel the security of the Nation is in peril, and for that reason I think that we should declare a national emergency.

Mr. HARNESS. I think so, too, if we think it, if we believe it, if the facts warrant it, that is the only solution; that is the only honorable way to keep these men in the service. And I think they would be glad to stay. But for my part I am not yet convinced that the situation is so grave that we should declare a national emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Merritt, have you any questions?

Mr. MERRITT. I was very happy, General, to hear your frank and candid statement, and I think the committee will benefit a whole lot by it. I have been very much interested in compulsory military training, as you know, since I first came to Congress. And I hope and trust we will always have compulsory military training in this country. But I am concerned about the ages. I was wondering whether or not you had any opinion as to the maximum age we should have for compulsory military training.

General RECKORD. I think the action that the Congress has taken, reducing it to 28, should be very satisfactory.

Mr. MERRITT. You think the lower age could be worked out to be just as well, having the future in mind?

General RECKORD. Personally, I do.

Mr. MERRITT. I do, too.

General RECKORD. That is another question, but since you ask it, I think we could take the men at a much younger period, with just as much profit.

Mr. MERRITT. I am glad to hear your opinion on that, General.

General RECKORD. Some of the best soldiers we had in the World War were boys only 18 years of age.

Mr. MERRITT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clason—

Mr. CLASON. Do you not think it would be fair to pass legislation that would allow every man over 28 years of age that is in the Army now, who is a selectee, to return home?

General RECKORD. I would say that it would not be unfair, but I believe a better way to handle it would be to make the law broad and to rely upon the War Department to do that very thing.

Mr. CLASON. Why do that? These men are there. They are 28 years of age. They are not going to take any more men who are over that age. You say, yourself, that younger men are preferable. How is it going to injure the Army if, when these men become 28, they are allowed to return home; especially in view of the fact that it is possible to bring other men in to take their places?

General RECKORD. I do not think it will injure the Army, but I am not in a position to talk specifically about any unit except my own.

Mr. CLASON. You do not believe, based upon your knowledge of conditions in your particular command that it would have a bad effect upon the Army?

General RECKORD. I do not think it would; no, sir. But I do not believe that that is the way to do it.

Mr. CLASON. At any rate, you would not think it would have a bad effect in any way?

General RECKORD. As far as I know, it would not. But I do not have the broad picture that the War Department has.

Mr. SMITH. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLASON. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. If there are over 200,000 men above the age of 28 in the Army, the mandatory discharge of those men might disrupt many units, is that correct?

General RECKORD. If there is any number that will approximate 200,000 that would disrupt the Army very materially.

Mr. CLASON. On the other hand, there is nowhere near 200,000 over the age of 28 out of the 600,000 draftees that were brought in.

General RECKORD. I do not think so, but I do not know.

Mr. CLASON. As a matter of fact, it would not be 50,000.

Mr. SMITH. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLASON. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. The evidence was that there were 120,000 among the 600,000 draftees, involuntarily inducted, over 28 years of age.

General RECKORD. I really think, Mr. Congressman, the thing to do is to leave that administrative feature to the War Department.

Mr. CLASON. Suppose that they decided that they do not want them to go out and the Congress felt that it was unfair to these boys to keep them in if they are over 28 years of age? I received letters from two of them today asking that they be returned home. Why should not the Congress decide what the situation is inasmuch as they represent the country?

General RECKORD. Congress does represent the country, Mr. Congressman, but certainly the Chief of Staff has the responsibility of defending the country, and I think you ought to give him that much help.

The CHAIRMAN. A free hand.

General RECKORD. Yes, sir. I would not want any one to come in and try to tell me what I should do administratively in the conduct of the Twenty-ninth Division. I believe you can rely upon General Marshall to do just what you have outlined.

Mr. CLASON. How long would you say it would take to prepare a man properly, before he should be sent to an outlying possession like Hawaii?

**General RECKORD.** Well, I think that in an emergency, we might send men who had no training whatever, expecting to give them training upon arrival. Answering your question specifically, I believe 6 months' training would be the minimum.

**Mr. CLASON.** On that basis then, General, if a man ought to be trained 6 months in continental United States, in camps such as yours—

**General RECKORD** (interposing). Pardon me, I did not say that. I did not say he had to be trained in continental United States. He can be trained in Hawaii as well as in continental United States, if you have the 6 months.

I should not be here defending the action of the War Department. I think they should defend their own action. But this is what I believe happened. I think there was a necessity to have a regiment out there in a hurry; at least, the War Department thought so. They filled the regiment to war strength and sent it out there figuring that they would have time to do that training, and they were correct, because they have had the 6 months.

**Mr. CLASON.** There is no reason then why those inductees should not be sent home if at the present time it is possible to bring others in to fill up their positions.

**General RECKORD.** But I think we are circumscribing our thought now and dealing in terms of one unit only. What we must deal with in this legislation is the broader picture.

**Mr. CLASON.** You are always going to be faced with the picture. Somebody has got to step out of a regiment and somebody else has got to step in.

**General RECKORD.** When we get to total strength—and that can always be controlled by funds through the Appropriations Committee; and therefore my honest opinion here is that this legislation should be broad. The control would always rest with the Appropriations Committee. And if General Marshall or the Secretary of War asked for another million men, Congress could refuse to give them a million men by failing to appropriate for them.

**Mr. CLASON.** Just to follow this reasoning out, though, you have at the present time 600,000 inductees in service, roughly?

**General RECKORD.** I think that is the number.

**Mr. CLASON.** And it is possible to bring in 300,000 more. These young men come into centers and they get their basic training in about how many weeks?

**General RECKORD.** Thirteen weeks.

**Mr. CLASON.** At the training center—basic training?

**General RECKORD.** They do now; yes, sir.

**Mr. CLASON.** What about the reception centers?

**General RECKORD.** The reception center is a different set-up. The reception center takes the men from the different boards in the States and sends the men to the training center. There are many training centers throughout the country, different arms, branches, that train them for 13 weeks. Then a division commander requests the number of men that he needs, infantry, artillery, and so forth, that request goes to the training center and it is filled by men who have had 13 weeks training.

Mr. CLASON. 300,000 of these inductees can be brought in from now on.

General RECKORD. I do not know the exact number.

Mr. CLASON. The Army is in a position to do it, and they have from now until next January to give them the 6 months' training that is necessary, taking them in in increments monthly sufficient to replace those that will be going out monthly in the future.

General RECKORD. That is being done.

Mr. CLASON. That is the program you outlined, anyhow.

General RECKORD. Except for this. If you take the men in and out on the basis of the day that each man is inducted, it is very similar to the old plan of recruiting a National Guard company. The companies were never properly trained, because every Monday night some new recruit could come in. The company, therefore, always had a lot of poorly trained men in it.

In the same way, these men would go out a year from the day they came in and you would have units all over the country disrupted all the time, instead of a situation which would be brought about if you had broader legislation, where you could keep some men maybe 13 months, some maybe 14 months, instead of 12 months. But they would be released in groups at the end of certain training periods.

Mr. CLASON. That would not take more than 1 or 2 months additional in all fairness to these individuals.

General RECKORD. I think 3 months, probably at the outside.

Mr. CLASON. Then if the legislation provided that the men should limit their service to 12 months, but that in the discretion of the Chief of Staff or the President, or anybody else, if it were deemed advisable that any individual or group should remain in for a period not exceeding 3 months longer, that might be done, that would cover the difficulty, would it not?

General RECKORD. I would have to know the whole picture before I could say yes. But some such arrangement as that is what I believe the Chief of Staff has in his mind.

Mr. CLASON. If that is so, then there is no reason why the public should not have the true picture and all doubt could be erased, and we could have legislation basing it on either 3 months or, if the General Staff say so, 4 months longer.

General RECKORD. That would not be my approach to it. I would make the legislation broad.

Mr. CLASON. Yes; but it would take care of the situation as you see it—

General RECKORD. I cannot say that unless I know the whole picture.

Mr. CLASON. So far as you know the picture?

General RECKORD. So far as I know the picture, some such administrative arrangement as that could be worked out.

Mr. CLASON. Then do I understand that at Camp Mead you have all the weapons necessary for proper training?

General RECKORD. For proper training; yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Is every infantryman armed with a Garand rifle?

General RECKORD. No, sir.

Mr. CLASON. What percentage?

General RECKORD. What percentage?

Mr. CLASON. Yes.

General RECKORD. Probably 30 percent, 35 percent.

Mr. CLASON. And the others have suitable rifles?

General RECKORD. The others have the Springfield.

Mr. CLASON. Now, with regard to antiaircraft guns, do you people have any there?

General RECKORD. No, sir; we do not have antiaircraft in the infantry division.

Mr. CLASON. How about antitank guns? Do you have any of those?

General RECKORD. We have some; yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Do you have sufficient for training purposes?

General RECKORD. Sufficient for training; yes.

Mr. CLASON. But not sufficient—

General RECKORD. Not full equipment.

Mr. CLASON. In other words, you are not sufficiently supplied at the present time to carry on the training as you would like to carry it on.

General RECKORD. I do not say that, Mr. Congressman. I said we had sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, General. Mr. Clason, we have General Devers waiting to be heard—

Mr. CLASON. I cannot help it. I have got to ask these questions in my own way. I have had only 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. If you want me to rule that all of the testimony you are bringing out is incompetent, I can do that.

Mr. CLASON. Go ahead, rule any way you want.

The CHAIRMAN. But, I do not want to do that.

Mr. CLASON. Go ahead and rule. You made a lot of remarks here containing personal opinions which certainly are not in line.

The CHAIRMAN. The question we have before us is not whether the Army is equipped.

Mr. CLASON. Yes, it is, too. If they are not properly equipped, not sufficiently equipped to train these men, then I do not think we ought to bring them in at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to confine this testimony to the particular issue that is before the committee.

Mr. CLASON. I have got to go along as I see the situation, and if you want to rule my questions out of order, you may do so.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to rule that way, but I should like to get ahead as fast as we can.

Mr. CLASON. I do not care if you rule my questions out; go ahead.

General RECKORD. I did not mean to create any misunderstanding, Mr. Chairman, but I do not want to be misquoted.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a right not to be misquoted.

General RECKORD. I said we had sufficient equipment with which to train, and I think you used a little different statement when you put that question to me.

Mr. CLASON. Do you not feel that in order to train the men in your command properly you would be better off if you had more equipment?

General RECKORD. Why, everybody knows that is the case; yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. In other words, you are not sufficiently supplied

with equipment at this time to carry on the training as well as it could be carried out if you were properly or fully supplied.

General RECKORD. I will not say yes to that question, as our training is progressing satisfactorily.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, General. Is it the gentleman's idea that we ought to withdraw 100,000 troops or 5,000 troops from a regiment in order to do less training because we have not got sufficient equipment?

Mr. CLASON. No; but it is my idea that if you wait until we get enough equipment, you are going to keep some of these boys in for a long, long time. That is my opinion and that is why I asked the question.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the issue here is simply this, regardless of the equipment. Should the Congress declare that there is such an emergency existing as to require these selectees to be kept in service and rely on the productive capacity of the Army and the Government to furnish them the equipment.

Mr. CLASON. I think a better way to determine that is the question whether or not the Army is in a position to take care of all of these trainees properly at the present time. I think that is the important factor.

The CHAIRMAN. All that I have in mind is to expedite the hearings.

Mr. CLASON. If the selectees of their own accord were given the opportunity to leave the Army at the end of the year, if they saw fit to do so, what percentage of the selectees would you say would leave, and what percentage would remain?

General RECKORD. That is too difficult for me. I think many of them would never have been in the Army if they had considered only their own desires. I would not have any way of making an estimate on that.

Mr. CLASON. If the opportunity were given to these men to volunteer for 3 years' service, or for 1 year's service in the Regular Army, at the end of their 12 months' period, based upon your knowledge of these men and your experience with them, what percentage of them would you say would remain?

General RECKORD. I think that is an unfair question. I could take any percentage. No one could contradict me. And yet I might be far, far off.

Mr. CLASON. I would only ask for your honest opinion.

General RECKORD. I really do not have an opinion on it. But I will say frankly that I do not think that is the way the question should be approached. I think we are facing an emergency and the Congress has got to act.

Mr. CLASON. You say that it is facing an emergency. Do you think the emergency facing the United States at the present time is worse than it was September 16, 1940?

General RECKORD. I do.

Mr. CLASON. Will you state the reasons for that opinion?

General RECKORD. Well, I think the whole world practically, is aflame. And here we sit with everything that everybody else would like to have, with a higher standard of living than any other country in the world, and if we want to continue to live as—to use an

expression that we see in the papers and everywhere else—to live in the American way, we have got to protect it. And I think we have got to prepare to protect them; that is my only thought.

And the only reason I am in the Army is because I have played soldier all these years, and now when the emergency confronts us I could not back away, just because I would rather be home.

Mr. CLASON. I appreciate your position, and I respect your opinion. But I would like to know if you have in your own mind any thought of any specific eventualities which are likely to occur in the next year which you feel places the national interest of the United States in graver peril than it was on September 16, 1940.

General RECKORD. I felt it was in peril then, and I stood here before this committee and respectfully urged the committee to make it possible to hold the National Guard more than a year if it became necessary. And I am repeating today only what I said a year ago.

Mr. CLASON. That does not answer my question. You were asked point blank, do you think the national interest is in peril and your answer was yes. You have an opinion on the subject, and I am asking what your reasons are. You are giving general reasons.

General RECKORD. I do not evade the question. I do not know that I am qualified to answer specifically to your satisfaction, but I can answer the question in my own mind, to my satisfaction.

Mr. CLASON. You have an opinion, and I am asking you to state the basis of your opinion.

General RECKORD. My opinion is, with Europe and Asia—I certainly can include Asia now, when we see what Japan did only yesterday—with Europe and Asia in flames, America and America's interests are in much greater peril now than they were a year ago.

The CHAIRMAN. And with open revolution in Ecuador and in Argentina, and Peru.

General RECKORD. I do not know how a thinking individual can feel otherwise.

Mr. CLASON. You do not know of a single eventuality that would occur in the next 12 months which forms the basis for your opinion?

General RECKORD. It may occur in the next 30 days.

Mr. CLASON. What eventuality have you in mind that might occur in the next 12 months.

General RECKORD. I do not care to answer that specific question.

Mr. CLASON. That is all.

Mr. BROOKS. I want to say to General Reckord that I have listened to everything that has been said here, and I have pretty well made up my mind on the facts. But I wanted to ask you this. These men were taken in with the thought of training them in 12 months. I think you said that you thought 12 months was an adequate period of training.

General RECKORD. No, sir; I do not say that.

Mr. BROOKS. What is your belief? Do you think it should be longer than 12 months or less than 12 months in order to train them properly.

General RECKORD. I think you can do a pretty good job in 12 months, Mr. Congressman. But we must learn to cope with certain difficulties. We must learn how to cooperate with the armored

forces and with the air, and work as a team with all of the different arms and branches. For that I should say 18 months probably would be the minimum.

Mr. BROOKS. You think it should be 18 months; in other words, that would represent the additional period?

General RECKORD. I think so.

Mr. BROOKS. That being the case, is it your thought that if we extend the time in which the selectees should be kept in service, it should be extended with the idea of further training them?

General RECKORD. Further training and service.

Mr. BROOKS. That is the point that I am getting at. Do you think we should do it under a resolution which says the national interest is imperiled, which would not be perhaps for the purpose of training, but for the purpose of service?

General RECKORD. Mr. Brooks, I do not know whether you were here when I made the statement—

Mr. BROOKS. I have been here all along.

General RECKORD. I think a correct approach to the solution of this problem is for the Congress to declare a national emergency. That is my honest opinion.

Mr. BROOKS. In spite of the fact that you think they need further training?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir. If you go back to the Selective Service Act, the term training and service is used in that act. It was designed by Congress when they passed that act, in my opinion—it was certainly designed by those who prepared the bill and Congress passed it—that they be prepared to train and if necessary to serve.

Mr. BROOKS. The thought was then that if you had trained them in less than 12 months, the balance of the time would be in service.

General RECKORD. I do not believe that was the thought. I think the thought behind it was that something might happen during the 12 months period and they would have, in addition to being trained, to serve.

Mr. BROOKS. Suppose this emergency lasts, we will say, for 8 or 10 years. Do you think the future trainee, selectee, brought into the service for 12 months, would be adequate?

General RECKORD. I think so; yes, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. And therefore your fundamental idea at the present time is that the emergency, not the training, makes it necessary to keep these men in service.

General RECKORD. I agree with that thought absolutely. I think the situation confronting the country warrants the Congress in permitting the War Department to continue these trainees in service.

Mr. BROOKS. And that would definitely, according to your idea, as a means of working it out, refer to the resolution declaring the country in peril, rather than any kind of a bill which would extend the time for training purposes.

General RECKORD. That is right.

Mr. BROOKS. There is one other point I want to ask you about. I have often wondered about this. These men are in service as selectees for 1 year currently. Have any of those men been given an opportunity to be transferred to a 3-year basis?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. Or would it be practical to suggest that if certain men wanted to transfer to a 3-year basis they would be in a position to be sent out to the insular possessions, whereas those who were on a 12-month basis might not be in that position.

General RECKORD. That is correct. They have that privilege and some have already accepted.

Mr. BROOKS. Could you say about how many have accepted?

General RECKORD. In my own division, we released, or discharged, about 450 men, many of whom were selectees. I do not know the percentage exactly. It is probably 50 percent. And they have enlisted in the Air Corps.

Mr. BROOKS. Do you discharge them before the 12-month period is up?

General RECKORD. Yes, sir; we discharge them for the purpose of enlisting in the Regular Army.

Mr. BROOKS. And then they become 3-year volunteers.

General RECKORD. They become 3-year volunteers. And that goes on all the time.

Mr. MARTIN. General Reckord, you testified here that you would like to have us declare an all-out national emergency. Would you have any objection to our confining the grant of power to specific powers pertaining to the management of the armed forces?

General RECKORD. Will you restate your question, Mr. Congressman. I do not get your thought.

Mr. MARTIN. Would you have any objection to our confining the grant of specific powers to those powers affecting the management of the armed forces?

General RECKORD. I do not think I would have any right to object to that.

Mr. MARTIN. You see, when you ask us to declare a national emergency, there come into the picture a great scope of power, such as those outlined in Senate Document 133, the compilation by the Attorney General, affecting a whole lot of things in the executive branch of the Government, that have not a whole lot to do with the armed forces. I do not know whether you want us to swallow the whole thing in the name of a national emergency, or whether you would be satisfied with our confining such grants of power to those powers affecting the management of the armed forces.

General RECKORD. As far as I am concerned, I would be satisfied.

Mr. MARTIN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kilday.

Mr. KILDAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. I think I have sufficient information, no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, General. Thank you very much. I should like to say to you that the committee is always glad to hear you.

General RECKORD. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is General Devers.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JACOB L. DEVERS, FORT BRAGG, N. C.**

The CHAIRMAN. General Devers, will you tell us something about your rank, where you are stationed, and make such statement as you wish with respect to the resolution that is before the committee, as to what you think ought to be done, and why?

General DEVERS. I am Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I command the Ninth Triangular Division of the United States Army, stationed at Fort Bragg, N. C.

That division was organized almost 1 year ago, on August 1 of last year. It was the last of the nine triangular divisions to get started.

It was low on priorities, in equipment, men, and everything. It got away to a slow start. Building had not started at Fort Bragg. They only had about 10,000 troops there at the time that I was sent to the division and the post of Fort Bragg—November 4.

When I arrived there, I could not get to the post. The roads were jammed. In fact, there were practically no roads. There were 18,000 workmen and they were getting off to a start which was not as fast as the War Department expected.

We got roads in there within the next 10 or 15 days, stepped the construction work up to 30,000 workmen, and built that post so that today we can take care of 70,000 soldiers at Fort Bragg, if we want to. We actually have 55,000 and will have 65,000 as soon as the present selectees come in.

We have every arm of the service there except tanks. We are well but not fully equipped, and I speak not only of my division but of the whole post.

I am here primarily to tell this committee the effect of letting the selectees go after 1 year.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General DEVERS. When I arrived at Fort Bragg, the Ninth Division was in camp. It had 6,000 3-year men. That we stepped up to 8,000 by December. Then we began to send out cadres until we got back again to 6,000. In February, we received 4,000 selectees. In the next 2 months we received 2,000 more.

At this particular time, 79 percent of my officers are what you gentlemen call Reserve officers. I call them officers of less experience than the others, because we are all one army at Fort Bragg. We have no divisions down there. We have National Guard troops, but, as far as I am concerned, they are all the same. We have selectees in all of the units in my division.

And that is one thing that I am equipped to talk about more than anything else—my division. My division has 79 percent officers of less experience than the others. In other words, they have come in during the past year.

I have exactly 50 percent 3-year men and 50 percent selectees. Now I want to correct one thing. We have an induction center, a reception center, and a replacement training center at Fort Bragg. We have everything.

Our training at the replacement center is not 6 months. I want to correct that statement. It is 18 weeks. The basic training is 18 weeks. I am sure that is understood.

During all this period, before these replacement centers got going, we were going through the 13 weeks' training within the units themselves and we were getting smallpox and chicken pox and every other kind of pox. At the end of 4 weeks we still had 13 weeks' training to go through. However, we finally set a date and that was our 13 weeks' basic training.

I am just giving you this because these are some of the administrative difficulties that we are up against. Therefore, we do not like to have a lot of rules and regulations, and laws, tied to us so that we cannot operate. We would like to be free so that we can go forward and do the job.

Some of the men did not get 13 weeks' training. They were out for 10 or 12 days in a hospital and we had to pick them up later, and complete their training.

That brings me up to January, when we received the selectees. We carried through their training and worked them into the division, and after the 13 weeks were up, we had 14,000. I managed to get an extra thousand as an overstrength, because we had the buildings and I pushed and pulled to get more men, because I knew I was losing about 200 men a month out of my division; emergency cases, cases of men having to meet emergencies at home, or who had gotten in there through some mistake, because when they got there, they had something wrong with them and we had to send them back.

All this time we were building what we called training aids such as known-distance target ranges, combat ranges, artillery ranges, moving target ranges, and so forth.

That takes time. We had to get our buildings up and our roads in.

Now, at the end of this 13 weeks of training—that would be February, March, and April—we started what I call my team play. This individual training, this training that they get during the basic training period, has to do with men taking care of themselves as individuals; getting over the environment of their homes; living in one big room and being thrown in with a lot of other men; learning how to handle a gas mask; learning how to handle their hands and feet. You would be surprised how long it takes to train men, to harden them. A farmer boy can do it, but the city boy has a hard time with some of those things. On the other hand, the city boy has the advantage over the farmer boy because sometimes he thinks a little differently and maybe meets people easier and adjusts himself more quickly.

When we got into our team play, this man has to adjust himself within the organization. I am talking now about the squad. He has to know John on his right and George on his left. He has got to realize that those two are his buddies. Some officer called it the buddy system.

In any case, he must know that he cannot fall out of there, because he has sore feet, or a scratch over his eye which hurts him, or he has a pain in here [indicating the old stomach], because if he does, John and George are going to lose their lives. And that is the training. We have got to get across the idea of team play.

Now, I get the squad going and then I have got to go to the company. And in the company that means that each squad must do

the same with the squads on their right and with the squads on their left. They must know the sergeant here and they must know the sergeant there, and the company must know the company on their right and the company on their left.

All of this takes time, gentlemen. I am trying to give you the picture, because this takes you on from the 3 months and gives you your 6 months' training, that I think General Reckord was talking about. That is just getting his teams together. And still he has not gotten to his combat teams.

The next step is to take the regiment, with its supporting arms. Some of you spoke about air. We are getting planes. We have an observation squadron at Fort Bragg, but we only have 12 planes in it. It is an Ohio outfit, from Cleveland, a splendid outfit, well commanded and very willing.

We get as many of those planes out over us as we can. My complaint has been that we will do better when we get more planes over us, and General Arnold is pushing that. He told me just today what he was going to do for me, when I get to the armored force.

We are getting teamwork in my division. We can operate with motors in the field as a combat team, if you want to call it that. I have got to weld these combat teams into the division team, because we have three regiments, two regiments generally in the line and one in reserve, with the artillery back there, too. And that takes team play of the highest order. You have got to know these fellows. You have got to be able to call them by their first name. We are not quite as formal in the Army as you may think.

We have got to know that fellow and we have got to have confidence in him. We do not want to give him a lot of rules and regulations to go on, but we want to be able to say to him "Plan A, operate;" that is all that is necessary, and he knows what to do. But in order to do that, he must know me, and I must know him. And he must know that I am not going to be picayunish about the little things, just so he gets results. That is all that I demand—results. How to get them I do not care, as long as he does it, and it does not cost too much life and just so that it is done properly.

Now, to carry on: My division is ready to go. I just came from the field, and I received this radiogram while I was talking to Congressman Fish, at my command post which was in the field about 80 miles west of our home station at Fort Bragg. We had been fighting, too, for the last three nights with what the soldiers and I call the brass hats. I suppose the soldiers call me that, too. But we are all trying to do our best. The men are fighting.

The selectees are wonderful. They were wet and muddy, they had gone through the grass in the morning. They have a rifle. Each one of them has a rifle. We are getting a lot of these M-1 rifles, which is the new rifle. They have been coming in in the past 2 weeks. We have pretty nearly all of them that we need.

I have not gotten the 105 howitzers, but I have the 75 gun. I have my 155 howitzers. I have all of my 60 mm. guns. I am short on the 81 mm. Each day we get a few more.

I have gotten practically all of my trucks, and my radios are flowing in very fast.

Now, the selectee is fine. He knows what he is doing. He is fitting into this team. And with one or two more of these maneuvers, which will take us the rest of this month and part of August, I would say that the division had gotten its team together. But we are just starting. We have got a corps of three divisions with all of the classes of artillery that go behind it. And at the end of December, when they have been through the corps maneuvers, and the Army maneuvers, we ought to be trained. December comes along, and the Christmas holidays. Then we are back in January and we will have to discharge these selectees. That brings me up to my story of what is going to happen.

I will say frankly, than when I have to discharge those selectees, after I have this high-class football team together, that can lick any team that any enemy puts against us—then I have to discharge them, and I have nothing. Fifty percent are gone and I have no team. I have no reserve to throw in there. Somebody says "You are going to have them in these replacement centers." But that is only the basic training again, and I have got to get teamplay. All over again, they have got to learn to know John and George and work all the way up to what I have described. We have got to depend on these individuals. This is not the kind of war that we had in the last war at all.

I have more trouble with these truckdrivers, getting them to keep their speed and keep their proper distances correct, so that they do not jam. They are afraid that they will get lost. They have got to think for themselves. We have got to develop some thinking on the part of the individual.

I simply say, gentlemen, if you ask me, that in the next 6 months I am sunk if some powerful enemy is going to strike and we are not preparing for any second-rate nation. We are preparing for the best in the world, one that has already defeated other nations who were too late, and they are going to keep on doing it, because they are keyed up to it.

We owe to the selectee, leadership. I think he is going to get it. Our officers that came in, in January, looked hopeless. But they have developed and we have built confidence into them. They have got to have confidence in themselves.

We are getting the weapons. I think this country can outdo any nation in the world, and we are going to do it. I might not be fully equipped, 100 percent at this time, but we are getting these weapons, and by the end of December, we are going to have them.

But on top of all of this, we need this teamplay that I have talked about, and we are getting that, too.

You are going to ask me, how long would you keep these men in and you are going to ask me about their ages. General Marshall answered those questions. I am for having young men. But I believe in doing something to cut the red tape. I do not believe in giving a man—whether he is running a corporation or an army, or whatever kind of a job he is given—I do not believe in giving a man that job and tying him down with a lot of red tape.

I have been cutting it in the War Department and they have given me that reputation. But I do it, and I get results. Then I go

and tell the man above, and there is not much that he can say. But if I fail, or use poor judgment, I will go by the wayside. But I would just as soon go that way, because at least I shall know that I have done my best.

Gentlemen, you have got to keep this team together. You cannot take a football team and pull out your key men. You cannot do it, gentlemen, and win your top games. You might one or two of these "breathers" that they talk about, but you are not going to win that big game. And that is what we are playing for. We do not want to take any chances when we get to the big game.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if you disorganize your team, the other fellow will get the ball.

General DEVERS. The other fellow will get the ball. He will take it away from you. I know, because I am an Army man and I have been in this athletic game. I have been trying to beat Notre Dame for 10 years on spirit alone, because they prepared away ahead of us.

Mr. HANNESS. And I should like to say that you are never going to do it, either.

General DEVERS. You would be surprised. We can come awfully close just on spirit. But I do not think we ought to take that chance in war, with human life at stake.

I believe that is my story, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a mighty fine story, General.

What do you think about the idea of what it would do to your organization, if you took these men out right now? What kind of a predicament would you be in between now and next April?

General DEVERS. I would not have any team. I would lose all my big battles. That is what I said. I have got to keep those men during this period.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, gentlemen?

Mr. KILDAY. You made a statement a moment ago, General, that I saw the newspaper boys pay some attention to, and I think you might want to explain it. You said something about 6 months from now when you were going to meet that big enemy. You were not referring to any one specifically and you did not mean to have these boys publish it in that way.

General DEVERS. I know nothing about any war, gentlemen, anywhere. I am just trying to get ready, and I think I will be ready at the end of December. But I have got to stay ready. I cannot throw that all away, if an emergency exists. I have no inside information, and do not ask me any questions about it, because I do not have any of that information.

Mr. KILDAY. I just wanted to give you a chance to get that story straight.

General DEVERS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. You have a triangular division. What is your strength?

General DEVERS. Fourteen thousand five hundred.

Mr. KILDAY. As compared with the square division strength of how much?

General Devers. About 18,000.

Mr. KILDAY. What is your artillery complement on your streamlined division?

General Devers. In the streamlined division, we have three battalions of 105 mm. howitzers—one for each infantry regiment.

Mr. Kilday. You do not have the 105's now.

General Devers. No, we have 75's now. We also have 1 battalion of 105 howitzers.

Mr. Kilday. Do you have any 75's at all?

General Devers. You, we have we have antitank 75's.

Mr. Kilday. But your 75's will be all antitank?

General Devers. That is correct.

Mr. Kilday. Do you have that equipment now?

General Devers. We have just four antitank guns at present. But they are coming off the line, I am informed.

Mr. Kilday. They are modernized?

General Devers. Modernized 75's for antitank work.

Mr. Kilday. As to your 105's, you do not have any?

General Devers. We have not a single one.

Mr. Kilday. But you have a 75 for every place you are supposed hereafter to have a 105?

General Devers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kilday. How about your 155's?

General Devers. I have all 12 of them.

Mr. Kilday. You have a full complement of 155's?

General Devers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kilday. And your mortars?

General Devers. The 82-millimeter guns we have all of them; I forgot the exact number, some 60, I believe.

Mr. Kilday. But you have your full complement?

General Devers. We have our full complement. We have about 30 percent of our 37-millimeter guns and we are getting more all the time. That is the antitank gun.

Mr. Kilday. Any antiaircraft?

General Devers. We have no antiaircraft in the division.

Mr. Kilday. Did you say you have all of your 37's?

General Devers. No. We have about 30 percent of them; enough to train with, and we are getting those slowly, but they are coming.

Mr. Kilday. Then in the artillery you are only short your 105's and some of your antitanks?

General Devers. Yes.

Mr. Kilday. That is all.

Mr. Shore. The General has painted a very vivid and interesting picture so that he almost makes me want to join his outfit. I hope we can come down to see you.

General Devers. I hope so, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Harness. General, I was impressed by your story of your football team, and I go along with you all the way up to one point. That is, if we are getting ready to go to war, if war is imminent, then we ought to do just what you say, keep your football team intact. But if we are merely training a reserve, and war is not inevitable, then I do not know why it would not be all right to train a new football team.

General Devers. I agree with you, if there is no emergency, and you are willing to take the chance that somebody will not come in and hit you. But people say that there is an emergency.

You know, there is a story that we used to tell, that we would always like to go after the British on week ends because they all go to the country. Maybe that ought not to be quoted, but that is an old story. But it gets my point across. And I joke with my Navy friends, that if I were going after the Navy I would always get after them on Saturday and Sunday, because that is when they were ashore.

Mr. HARNESS. And the British are at war, too, are they not?

General DEVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. As I understand it, your argument for keeping the selectees in with your division is on the basis that you want to keep your division up to first-class fighting strength so long as somebody else tells you there is an emergency.

General DEVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. And you are not basing it upon any opinion that you have formed as to the emergency. You are leaving that to somebody else.

General DEVERS. None whatever.

Mr. CLASON. Do I understand that all of your selectees came into your division at the same time?

General DEVERS. Four thousand of them came in from Upton and Dix in January, and then we got 2,000 more in the next group, from Dix and Devens. Most of my selectees—I guess I have 6,800 altogether, because I was able to pick up some two or three hundred that were at these training centers where housing was incomplete and I had the place for them—came from New York, the New England States, and Pennsylvania. They came from Upton, Dix, and Devens.

Mr. CLASON. Is it your idea that these selectees should be sent home at different times or as a group, or at the end of 12 months or 18 months or 15 months? Are they all going to go out at once?

General DEVERS. If you do not set this hidebound "box" as I call it—and I am in there and I can not get out—if you will give us some leeway, this thing will take care of itself. No one in this Army is going to keep these men in when there is no necessity for keeping them in—at least, I feel that way about it. I have a great deal of confidence in the people over me—my leaders. I feel that if you will just give them the rein, you people—after all, you are the leaders in it, and if we do not do something about it, we are going to breed something I do not like. I am afraid we are going to get too much like Soviet Russia. You do not want to breed that idea into our young men. I have no opinion as to whether these men want to stay 1 year or 2 years, and I have never asked them, but I do know that when they came they knew they probably would have to stay more than a year. I do know that because we have all said that right along. I have heard it mentioned many times.

Mr. SHAW. But, General, you do want to rotate these men? I think the success of Notre Dame's team is that you always had about 2 or 3 teams, and you always had a reserve that you could throw in there.

General DEVERS. As long as you do not take 50 percent of them. If I have 50 percent to pull me out, I can get along.

Mr. CLASON. You have an induction center, General?

General DEVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Men are coming in there right along?

General DEVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. And then after that they go into this replacement center?

General DEVERS. Yes, sir, the replacement training center.

Mr. CLASON. You have got men in there?

General DEVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Where are those men going?

General DEVERS. Those men all come in as one, because the training is set up that way. We have 16,500 of them, 1,500 of them are colored. Mine is an artillery replacement center, as large as any in the United States, one of the three in the artillery. I believe the infantry have five, and each of the other arms have one. They all come in there together. There are trained specialists in these centers and we try to carry on the things that the men are equipped for, such as radio, telephone, etc. That training is very intensive. That is a 44-hour week for 18 weeks, and they all start from scratch. So we try to get them all in there in trainloads and start them off on the same day or the same week.

Mr. CLASON. Now, one general comes in here and tells us he does not want his selectees to go out daily, 1 today and 2 or 3 tomorrow and 15 the next day, and so on, because if he has to let them out daily, that breaks up his division or his regiment. You say that if all of them come in the same month they could all go out, say, 4,000 in January, 2,000 in February, and if they could be taken out from your replacement center 4,000 at a time, 2,000 at a time, which would you say would be the best way to replace them, daily or a lot of them in one fell swoop?

General DEVERS. I would want them all in one fell swoop, so I can start off with all of them. Remember, this individual thing you are talking about means nothing to me. It is the team that I want. I can not do anything with these individuals. If you are going to bring in a few today and a few tomorrow, you would have every one of my unit commanders on my neck—"Give me all of them today." We have got to start from scratch. We do not do anything as inefficiently as that.

Mr. CLASON. Your idea of training them is to put them in either with Regular Army men or with National Guardsmen who have had sufficient training?

General DEVERS. Or with other selectees that have had a year's training.

Mr. CLASON. In other words, you keep some of the selectees in for the purpose of building up further divisions or regiments in order to train further selectees coming in?

General DEVERS. Yes, sir; because we have a turn-over on somebody's family conditions that may have to be investigated, and we do that very carefully because we should not put this up to the individual. It is not fair to the individual. He may be a patriotic boy who may want one thing and somebody else may want another. We investigate the situation, not just on paper or on what somebody writes, but we actually have a way of going into the home and finding out the conditions. Some boy may have flat feet or he may have something internally wrong that did not develop until the pressure

was put on him. Remember, the only soldier is the man that can take it when the heat is turned on. That is the reason I mentioned the football team.

Mr. CLASON. That is all right for individuals, but how long ought the selectees to remain in the service before they should be used as trainers for other selectees?

General DEVERS. I told the Senate that if they asked me I would say another 8 months, if you are going to pin me down. But I do not believe in being pinned down, because during that 8 months there will be some turnover, a small percentage, so the team would not be ruined.

Mr. CLASON. I understood from General Marshall that he expected these inductees to go back for a month or 2 months, a very short time after their 12 months are up, if it was possible to do it, but your opinion is that instead of doing that we ought to understand that they are going to stay 8 months longer if we are going to have an army?

General DEVERS. General Marshall is right, but General Marshall is speaking about the whole army. He can take one unit and turn that over, and that unit is fixed you see, for another year. Then he can take another unit—take the Eighth Division or the Sixth Division. But he has got something to fight with, at least, in this turnover. He has some teams all the time. He has not broken up all the teams at once. That is the point, I think, General Marshall had in mind. I do not want to quote him. I believe everything he said 100 percent.

Mr. CLASON. How long do you think selectees ought to stay in the service in order to become properly trained men?

General DEVERS. To become properly trained men I think they ought to be in 1 year and 8 months, and I add 2 months extra over the 6 months as most people say, because we waste a month getting them in and we waste a month getting them out.

Mr. CLASON. If we could increase the period of 12 months by 8 months additional, making it 20 months, would you say we were taking care of the situation?

General DEVERS. No, I think as soon as you tie a box like that around it you make it so nobody can operate. Something else will come up. You have got to have confidence in your people that you put in charge of this job. I would not want to limit them in any way at all.

Mr. CLASON. If you leave out the emergency feature altogether, do you still think that the United States Government ought to bring boys in and keep them in the Service?

General DEVERS. No, if you take the emergency out and want to turn them off, I will go along with what I think General Marshall told you. I think you can do it at the end of one year if you are willing to take that period in there when you do not care whether you are tops or not. If you are willing to take a chance that something will not hit you. Take the emergency away, and the whole picture changes.

Mr. CLASON. That is the point then, that if there is not an actual emergency at the present time sufficient to require this staying in the Service, there is no reason why they should not go out?

The CHAIRMAN. Is not that the question asked of Congress?

Mr. CLASON. That is the question I am asking him.

The CHAIRMAN. You are asking him whether there is a national emergency.

General DEVERS. I do not know whether or not there is a national emergency.

Mr. CLASON. That is the first question everybody asks.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I think that is a question for Congress. Is there anything further of this witness?

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, General Devers is stationed in North Carolina but he is going to the State of Kentucky, and I want to congratulate the State of Kentucky.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very glad to have him. I have been down to his camp in North Carolina, and I am very proud of what he is doing down there. I did not know quite as much about it until he testified here, but he has the same idea that is set forth in a lengthy article in the last month's Reader's Digest about Germany's teamwork. I hope he has read it. If he has not, I recommend it to him, because it is right along that line.

Mr. THOMPSON. General Devers has certainly made a very good record, so far as that is concerned.

Mr. MARTIN. General, you are training large divisions, as I understand it, so they will be ready to go forth into combat on short notice?

General DEVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. If you had the job assigned to you to take in a large body, several thousand boys, who had had at some time in the past a year of training, how long would you estimate it would take you to develop the teamwork necessary in building into your present division?

General DEVERS. Well, you ask me to put a time limit on it. It depends on where they were trained, who trained them, how far along they went, what kind of boys they were, and where they came from.

Mr. MARTIN. Suppose they are a fair type of boys, and at some time in the recent past they have had a year of training and have completed that and have gone home, and then they are recalled to the service; how long would it take to develop the necessary teamwork with that basic training in the background?

General DEVERS. In my own opinion, if those boys came back to the same locality and the same kind of work they had before, that would be one thing. I would say that in case these boys are brought back and they have not gotten married in the meantime and cannot come back—in 3 months lots of things change, attitudes and everything else—I would say that I could work them in, if you did not give me too many of them—say, give me 10 percent—in 3 months I would have them moving along. Probably in an emergency I could do it in less than that—if they were really skilled when they went out, well trained, could handle a particular weapon and went back to that particular weapon.

Mr. MARTIN. I am trying to divide the matter into individual training and teamwork. Which takes the longer?

General DEVERS. I think the teamwork takes longer than individual training. Individual training takes about 13 weeks. That is what we go on. From that time on a great deal depends on the personality

of your leaders and on the personality of your noncommissioned officers. There are a number of things that make one outfit a little better than another.

**Mr. MARTIN.** The longest time then is in the building of the team, rather than individual soldier training?

**General DEVERS.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. MARTIN.** Now, while you are developing this team training, team organization, you are also carrying on a great many training points that cannot be covered in that 13 weeks?

**General DEVERS.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. MARTIN.** What has been the situation in your division as to the supply of ammunition? Have you had enough ammunition to carry out your fire problems through your own troops?

**General DEVERS.** My answer to that would be yes, I have. We had a lot of ammunition before they cut down our allowance. We have always had at Fort Bragg, 37 millimeter and 75 ammunition for artillery, and I told my officers, "You do not need to worry about the ammunition. Throw a rifle at these selectees"—to use a slang expression that we use down there—the second day after he comes in he has a rifle, and the third day he is out shooting—and you will be surprised how well they do it. We put them on the known distance range, and that gives them confidence. Then we try to get a small group on the combat range, to get the team play, and count the results of the group handling. By the time we got through with our known distance firing, with the 9,000 or 10,000 men that we had to put through on those ranges, we got more ammunition.

I would say that in the Ninth Division there is no one single item that has slowed us up in all our training. We have always had plenty of equipment. We have had to pass it around, you understand, but by handling our schedules properly—and we worked the full 44 hours a week too, particularly during the 13 weeks training—we have cut it to 40 hours now, because we like to give them an afternoon off in the middle of the week to attend to personal business. We have arranged it so that all are not off at once. There is always someone there to attend to business.

**Mr. MARTIN.** How far have you gone in the matter of combat firing? Have you gotten up to division combat firing?

**General DEVERS.** We have carried it through the battalion. We have never fired the whole division with service ammunition, if that is what you mean. We have not tried that. We have not tried to throw artillery shells over infantry as yet. We are getting to the point where we are going to do it, but we have not quite reached that point.

**Mr. MARTIN.** You have enough ammunition to carry out your defensive combat program?

**General DEVERS.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. MARTIN.** That is all.

**The CHAIRMAN.** General, we thank you very much. You have made a very impressive statement and have enlightened the committee a great deal. I am sorry to have had to bring you up here, but I hope you will return and do some more teamwork.

General DEVERS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. One question, Mr. Chairman. How long have you been in the Army, General?

General DEVERS. I went to West Point in 1905 from York Pennsylvania High School, and I have been in it ever since.

Mr. KILDAY. What is your rank now?

General DEVERS. My permanent rank is Brigadier General of the line. I was given that rank about a year ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Devers.

Is Brigadier General Hershey in the room. Will you come forward General, and give us, if you can, a very brief statement of what the selective service organization thinks about this proposed resolution?

#### STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHY, DIRECTOR, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

General HERSHY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am appearing here as the person responsible for the operation of the Selective Service System. Anything I say has nothing to do with the War Department or the Army, although I happen to be a member of that organization.

We, in the Selective Service System, have a very distinct interest, not only in the selectees but in the National Guardsmen, because we have responsibilities of procurement of selectees and reemployment responsibilities to both.

I would like to very briefly discuss the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, to the extent of calling the attention of the committee to the things they already know about it with respect to its dual function. The very title of the act sets out training, and it cites service, because I think Congress was attempting last year to do two things.

First, it declared that it was imperative to increase and train the personnel of the armed forces of the United States, which means make an army and train them.

Secondly, it also stated, to accomplish that same purpose, that it was the intent of Congress to use the National Guard for national security at any time troops were needed beyond the Regular Army.

And third, it provided for the building up of a Reserve, because it set the limit of service at 11 years, 10 years in the Reserve, unless something should happen to lengthen the period of the 1 year.

That the purpose was to establish something besides the training system, I think is quite plain. Men were made available up to 36. If it had been intended as a training system solely, I am quite sure the Congress would have stopped in the early twenties. This act specifically provided not only for the extending of service beyond the year—that is, to take more of the 11 years in an active status—but it specifically set up the way and time—that is, a time in the sense of describing a condition which indicated, I believe, that Congress at that time realized that the necessity that called the act forth in the first place, if it became more acute, would necessitate the keeping of the men.

As we have studied the congressional debates we find some differences of opinion as to whether or not the joint resolution of August 27, 1940, had not already placed in the Executive the power to order these individuals out for another year as Reservists, but we find little evidence of anyone talking about the absolute definiteness of a year's limitation. We find no individuals pointing out that this was definitely only a year's training. There was anxiety, and there was discussion of the possibility of a longer period, and there were many statements to indicate that, of course, the period would be increased if the necessity called for it.

Mr. SHOTT. General, do you not think that not a few but several members of Congress voted for the original act on the basis that is called for only 1 year's service?

General HERSHER. Of course, I think probably there were people that might have voted for the act because Congress reserved to itself the right to say when more than 1 year should be required, but I do not believe—and I have great faith in Congress—that there was anyone who voted for the bill believing that the 1 year was definite, because the 11 years was made the obligation of the man so selected and so trained, with the provision that unless Congress—Congress should see fit to extend it, whether he would train only 1 year or not. The restriction, though, was reserved to Congress.

Mr. SHOTT. The members of this committee, I think, had a thorough understanding of those provisions, but the general public did not.

General HERSHER. Well, I do not want to argue that point, but I have found during the last 10 months that the one thing, as I have gone from forum to forum and school to school—the one thing that the young men have asked me is "Do you think we will get out in a year?" which showed that there was no great certainty that they would, and I have repeatedly told young men who have asked my personal advice on whether to enlist or not, whether to volunteer for induction, I have said very candidly: "You are volunteering for 1 year, but remember, if you volunteer to be inducted, you waive your rights to get out at the end of the year if other people are held in." Not only that, but I have known many a man to enlist in the Regular Army with this background in his thought: "If this emergency is over, they will let me out of the Regular Army, even though I signed up for 3 years. If it is not, I wouldn't get out even if I was inducted under the Selective Service Act, so I might as well enlist and get in the unit I want to get into, because my obligations are going to be no greater."

Mr. SHOTT. I agree with you on that. I have had them say the same thing to me.

Mr. KILDAY. You advised them the same thing? [Laughter.]

Mr. SHOTT. I will not say what I advised them. I will say that I always tell the truth. [Laughter.]

General HERSHER. I would like to point out in a passing way that the Congress did set up two methods to be used in procurement. I read:

In a free society, the obligations and privileges of military training and service should be shared generally, in accordance with a fair and just system of selective, compulsory training and service.

That is policy No. 1.

**Policy No. 2:**

No bonus shall be paid to induce any person to enlist in or be inducted into the land or naval forces of the United States.

I submit these principles were enunciated by Congress after most careful consideration of the personnel procurement history of the United States, especially in times when large numbers of men were needed. I submit that Congress saw in their mind's eye George Washington as he looked at his army melt time after time because the bounty was not high enough, even though it was going up and up. I believe Congress remembered that it was untrained men who fled at Bladensburg because they had found it impossible to encourage men to volunteer for long periods of time. I believe that Scott, half way between Vera Cruz and Mexico City, immobilized for months in a foreign country because 40 percent of his men had left him because their year was up, and it was not extended. I believe they thought of the days of 1861, when Patterson, up in the Shenandoah, was not able to hold the forces opposite him because men went home at the end of their period of time, as time expired men, as Kipling would say, while to the east the guns of Manassas roared in their ears.

I believe those things were in the mind of Congress when they set up these principles. I believe that the experience of the World War, when, for the first time, suitable sufficient men were available at the time they were desired, made them turn to the system of the World War and away from the system of volunteering and bonuses of the years that have gone before. This was a Selective Service Act in 1940. I believe it shunned the systems that had failed in our personnel procurement history. I believe it provided for the system that had succeeded.

Now, Congress reserved the right to judge the situation after a year and act accordingly. That year is past. Are we in peril or will we be if we demobilize the National Guard and selective forces? That is one question we ask ourselves. If we answer "No; we are not in peril," then we say "Are we doubtful of our safety or will we be doubtful if we let go home these National Guardsmen and these selectees?" If you answer "No," then you should answer "Yes" to this question: "Will we feel secure if we demobilize our National Guard and our selectees?" If you say "Yes," then there is no point in worrying about keeping the people. I shall not argue that question at all, if you can say that we are safe. But if we are in peril or in doubt, what is the conservative action? Who shall judge our peril? That is the question that I will not attempt to answer. The Commander in Chief and responsible officer of the United States is the one upon whom the responsibility lies if we are in peril, and if we do get into tragedy has stated other things than have been stated from other sources. I am not the possessor of information that cannot be gleaned from the newspapers, and I make no attempt at a judgment. If I were in a responsible position I probably would tend to accept the information from responsible sources.

If we must have trained men—and I think we must, if the first two conditions apply—as a personnel procurer I must tell you that there are no other sources of trained and seasoned men—and I emphasize "seasoned men" because there are several weeks' difference

between trained men and seasoned men—outside the Regular Army there are no sources except the present National Guard and selectees from which to secure such men.

Now, if you want them to stay, there are two methods that you can use to get them. You can ask for volunteers. This involves a recruiting campaign in each unit, a name-calling process, a disorderly method of compelling each man to make a decision as to what his duty is, and to be called a slacker or something else if he does not. Selective Service, of course, feels that that is not fair to the organization, that it is not fair to the individual, and it is not fair to the Nation. However, that is one method of trying to keep in the organization the man who is trained and seasoned—if you feel you must keep him.

There is one other method. I might say, however, that to get this volunteering done, in addition to name-calling, you can go a little farther and add bounties of one kind or another, regardless of whether they are paid now or when he leaves the service, or to his family if he never does. If you do that, you must face the necessity of setting up within each of these companies that General Devers has told you about, some men who are going to get \$60 a month and some that are going to get \$30 a month, and some that are going to get some other figure.

I have been an enlisted man. I have lived most of my life as a battery commander. No one thinks more highly of soldiers than I do, real, genuine admiration—whatever I may be, they have made me, and I say it very freely, and I would like to see them get every nickel that the Federal Government can pay them—but in the outfit that I command I say pay the same amount for the same service. Make them alike, because I do not believe you can have morale, training, and efficiency in a unit that has one man drawing \$60 a month and another one drawing \$30 for being a private.

Now, I offer as a solution of this problem, the retention of these units intact by the use of the law which you gentlemen in your wisdom passed last year, I believe, to meet the situation with which you are now faced. I believe the operation of that law will give you efficiency, security, and will be in accord with what was planned, at least by not a few of you last year, to meet an emergency, should it come, if you believe that the national interest is imperiled.

I would like to say in conclusion that the Selective Service System has lasting interest in the selectee as an individual, and I am not claiming anything except the selfishness of an organization, if you want to express it that way. We select him for induction. We receive him on discharge and attempt to have him reemployed. His well-being during his service is reflected in at least one of our 6,500 local board areas. The public reaction to selective service creates a public opinion which permits or prohibits our operation. The long range best interest of the soldier, and of all soldiers, is of vital importance to the Selective Service System, but the long-range interest of the soldier is likewise the long range best interest of the Nation.

I appreciate the desires of some, perhaps many, to terminate their service.

I lived as a small farmer, as a small farmer lives in that great Midwest. From my own experience I know something of the public

school-teacher's life, and how college students think, and of their aims and their homes. I know something of what an enlisted man of the National Guard thinks, and an officer of the National Guard, and the problems that come to them. I have lived through one situation quite similar to this one. I was on the border in 1916 in a National Guard unit, wondering from day to day when we were going to go home—and I wanted to go home, and all the rest of them in the unit wanted to go home, especially when Purdue—not Notre Dame but Purdue—had a college unit next door to mine, and they came home because they let the college people come home. My unit was two-thirds college, but we came from town and we were known as a town unit. The result was we did not come home until December. We got out in the snow on December 29, 1916, and I went back to Angola.

Now, what did getting out at that time do for me? Another fellow had my school, the school that I had been teaching.

Mr. THOMASON. Where was this, North Carolina?

General HERSHHEY. Indiana. Angola, Ind.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you never hear of Angola, Ind.? [Laughter.]

Mr. THOMASON. No.

General HERSHHEY. I did not get my school back. A great many of the other boys did not get their jobs back, because in less than a month we broke diplomatic relations with Germany, and then what was the use of putting me back in the school? I was going away in the summer anyway. What was the use putting these other men back in their jobs? The employer would say: "I want somebody that is going to at least be with me a little while." Not only that, but I had this question of uncertainty: first, we were going to be mobilized in April, then in May, then in June, and finally in the latter part of June we found that the date was August 5, and that date stuck, and we were mobilized on August 5. But I did not engage in anything gainful—perhaps it may take a stretch of the imagination for anyone to believe that I had before, but I had. I engaged in nothing gainful, and the great majority of my fellow soldiers did not either, because some of them could not get jobs. Some of them said, "It is only going to be a month or so, and I am going to sort of ease out of town. I am not going to work these last 2 or 3 weeks." And a great many people said, "Well, I am sorry, but I can't use you. If I teach you how to do the job I want to keep you."

Mr. SHURT. The very thing that is likely to occur now.

General HERSHHEY. I was working up, emotionally or otherwise, to a situation where you would see where I am sitting with 800,000 people coming at me in the next few months wanting me to find them a job, telling their to-be employer that they are members of the Guard and will be likely to be called out any time, or that they are in the Reserves and are subject to recall at a moment's notice to join their forces.

I remember that when I left the border my company was not a very large company, but it was a very well seasoned company. We could march three or three and a quarter miles an hour, a good many hours a day, if we had to. When we next came together in August, it was in May or June 1918, before my unit approached

what they were in December 1916. I may not have had too good an experience, because in the first place a lot of our boys went to training camp and became officers—and I am very glad they did. We did expand into an artillery unit and take on more men, but we were not seasoned when again we met in August 1917.

In conclusion I want to say one sentence and I will be finished. Congress has provided an efficient method, which they provided after long thought, to meet a condition where there is a peril to the Nation. The Selective Service System recommends that that policy be employed.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you have been before the committee so often and have been so helpful to us that it seems as though perhaps no one on the committee will want to ask you any further questions. Your statement has been so excellent that I am going to thank you on behalf of the committee, and if there are no questions we will proceed with the next witness.

Mr. CLASON. General, have you any documents, any printed documents, in which you carry the enlistments or the inductions of selectees by months?

General HERSHHEY. Are you speaking of inductions into the 1 year, into the training period, or enlistments in the Army?

Mr. CLASON. I am referring to the Selective Service Act.

General HERSHHEY. Oh, yes, I can furnish you that. I will be glad to do so.

Mr. CLASON. I wish you would furnish that.

General HERSHHEY. Yes, I will.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Now, we have two more very brief witnesses, and then I want the committee to remain, because I have an announcement to make.

Our next witness is Mr. Frank Murray, president, National Parents of Selectees, Inc. Let me ask you a few questions, and then you can present your statement. Where do you live?

#### STATEMENT OF FRANK MURRAY, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL PARENTS OF SELECTEES, INC.

Mr. MURRAY. I live in South Bend, Ind.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your connection? Whom do you represent?

Mr. MURRAY. I represent the National Parents of Selectees, Inc. That is an Indiana corporation.

The CHAIRMAN. When was it organized?

Mr. MURRAY. May 21, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. What character of corporation is it? Is it a non-profit organization?

Mr. MURRAY. It is a nonprofit corporation.

The CHAIRMAN. How is it supported in its activities?

Mr. MURRAY. By the contributions of its members, contributions of parents who are not members, and regular membership dues.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you obtain contributions from the parents?

Mr. MURRAY. By sending letters to them asking them either to attend a meeting, take part in the volunteer work, or send in some money.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you obtain your finances other than that, if you have any?

Mr. MURRAY. We do not have any.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you on a salary?

Mr. MURRAY. Not with the National Parents of Selectees. That is a purely voluntary organization, and all work is volunteered by the parents themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the duties of yourself and your assistants? What activities do you engage in?

Mr. MURRAY. You mean other than the National Parents of Selectees?

The CHAIRMAN. What is your work?

Mr. MURRAY. My work is head of a taxpayers organization.

The CHAIRMAN. A taxpayers organization set up as a branch of your parents of selectees?

Mr. MURRAY. No, sir; that is a local organization that has been in existence for some time.

Mr. HARNESS. This is an organization of the parents of these boys who have been drafted in Indiana.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am simply trying to find out about it. How do you get your finances with which to operate this particular organization?

Mr. MURRAY. Just in the manner which I have stated, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. What is your position with respect to this resolution? Are you for it or against it?

Mr. MURRAY. I am opposed to it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Proceed with your statement.

Mr. MURRAY. First, I am from South Bend, Ind., where the Notre Dame team is located. We know when the Notre Dame team is going good, and it is going good when its morale is high. It goes good when it has trust and confidence in its coach and the officers of the team. And we know that when it is going bad, is when its morale is low and confidence is lacking. This is the main point that I want to present to your gentlemen today, the attitude of mind of the parents and the boys in the ranks. It is a question of our morale and the morale of the boys that is the greatest question before you. It is not what may be the attitude of the Congress today or what you thought you were doing, that affects the morale, it is what has been communicated to the parents and our boys that are in camp, and what they and we understand.

I have been here only a few hours, but in that few hours I find an atmosphere that is entirely different than the atmosphere back home. The understanding is different than our understanding at home. I could not help but note, as the generals talked here today, that everything they had to say in support of this resolution should have been existent on paper or in their minds at the time the act was passed by Congress. There has been absolutely no change whatever in the needs of the Army.

It so happens that I served better than 4 years in the United States Marine Corps. About 2 years of that time was spent in recruiting service, and I have some idea of bringing men into the service. I know that part of it. I know what it is to enlist men and have them dropping out of the ranks over a period of time.

Records will show that each recruiting sergeant would take in three or four men a week. Those men had to be dropped out from day to day as their enlistments expired. That problem has always faced the Army, the Marine Corps, the Navy, and when the Selective Service Act was passed, the men in charge of the Army knew of that condition. Therefore, as far as we are concerned as parents, what you have in the act as to the period of 12 months of training was just exactly what we expected, and that is precisely what our boys expected, and not more than 12 months unless there was a war. In interpreting the act to the parents or to the boys who asked questions about time limit or what the words national emergency, or the Nation is in peril, it was understood that "in peril" meant war. And that was what was in our minds—not that the time would be extended by declaring an emergency while conditions were not changed. I want to get to that point now, this emergency it is said we have before us.

It is true that I come from a State where most everybody is in politics; where we take an interest in our Government. We perhaps have more means and methods of making democracy work in our State than any other State in the Union. That is more or less its record, and most all States, especially their citizen organizations, are continuously attempting to follow the Indiana plan to give the people the right to operate their government.

Based on this background, we took an interest in the emergency at the time of the passage of the 1940 Selective Service Act. What were we thinking was the emergency at the time this act was passed? I will tell you what we were thinking in Indiana, that the British Government would move to Canada. Our newspapers were carrying it. That was our understanding, that the English could not last on the island, and it was only a matter of just a short time until they would have to leave. It was our understanding at that time that Germany, Italy, Russia, and Japan were in a combination against the democracies. We considered that the emergency was of such character that our boys should go into training and get ready for it.

We also considered that Spain, Germany, and Italy were active in South America. It was our general understanding that they had entire colonies down there where the people were trained to fight; that there was a sufficient number of Spaniards, Italians, and Germans in South America, that they could control what the South American countries were doing; that they could actually vote and had sufficient numbers in the various legislative bodies so that they controlled the government itself. That was our understanding of the emergency at the time our boys went in. There is absolutely no difference in the emergency today, as presented by the leaders of our Government, and what we understood the emergency to be at that time.

**Mr. SHORT.** Will you suffer an interruption, Mr. Murray? Do you not think the emergency should be less now because Russia was not fighting Germany then, but they are in a death struggle now.

**Mr. MURRAY.** Well, thank you, I have covered that point right in my notes.

**The CHAIRMAN.** What about the revolutions that are going on in South American countries now?

**Mr. MURRAY.** The one between Peru and Ecuador is a matter of very long standing. I think that in South America we were having a war or a fight between a couple of other countries right at the time that this Selective Service Act was passed.

**Mr. HARTR.** Is it not a fact that various other countries have fallen under the domination of Hitler since a year ago?

**Mr. MURRAY.** Is it your thought that they have people in South America who now are added to their forces?

**Mr. HARTR.** I am not talking about South America. How about the whole Balkan Peninsula?

**Mr. MURRAY.** My attitude toward that has been the same as if Mexico would be invaded, and that is that the United States would go in there immediately as I personally would be ready to go in there if Germany landed troops. I thought that the Balkans were as good as in the orbit of Germany at the time the Selective Service Act was passed.

**Mr. HARTR.** You know that the war is going on continuously and relentlessly and that more countries are becoming involved all the time, and yet you say that this country is in no greater danger than it was last September?

**Mr. MURRAY.** I would say it is in less danger now, because there are more Germans being killed and more of their ammunition and more of their tanks and equipment are being destroyed than were destroyed before. So that the emergency today is less than it was before.

**Mr. HARTR.** And you would be willing to take the chance on releasing these selectees and Reserve officers that no harm could come to this country?

**Mr. MURRAY.** Sir, I would like to go through my statement and handle that in its due order, if I may.

**Mr. HARTR.** Will you answer that question?

**Mr. MURRAY.** I can answer it by just following through. That is not the proposal that I intend to present here today.

**Mr. HARTR.** I think we should hear the gentleman, Mr. Chairman.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Go ahead, Mr. Murray.

**Mr. MURRAY.** What I am trying to get across to you gentlemen is what is in the minds of the parents out in the States. You understand that as president of this organization—incidentally I had no thought of being president, I was just drafted because I had had organization experience, and placed at the head of the organization, immediately telephone calls, telegrams and letters started to coming in from all over the country. People stopped me on the street and asked me about it. At this time let me say that the reason you do not receive more letters is because the parents and the boys live in a state of fear of what will happen to them if they write to you or if they write to the newspapers, and the boys are fearful of what they write to their parents. I have had them while home come into the office and say, "I wouldn't dare write that, because it is our understanding that our letters are opened, and therefore I would not dare." And the parents in open meeting will not commit themselves as to what they understand is the true condition of their son's mind or what is going

on in the camp, without the specific understanding that their names will not be used or remembered.

So we have out through this country of ours a great fear among the people to express themselves as to what their understanding was of what the President of the United States promised them and that Congress enacted in regard to this subject matter. So, if I do not use names or anything identifying persons, it is because of that, and if you do not get more letters it is because of that fear.

We have an officer of our organization, who, when it came time to consider coming down here said, "No, don't go. It is in the bag. Our boys are lost. They are done for, and there is no use going down there, no use wasting the money." And then she had a telephone call, and was told her boy and many others in camp had made up their minds to a slow-down strike, an attempt to band themselves together so that when their year of service was over they would just simply sit down and say that's all there was to it, or they would just disappear. She called my wife—I was not at home—and said, "I am going to change my mind. I don't want my boy or any other boy to do anything that is dishonorable. I want him to stay there as long as the Congress of the United States or the President says he should stay there. I don't want him to do these things. Do what you can to see that this thing is handled in such a way that our boys will not feel toward their Government as they feel today"—and as my boy expressed himself to me. I have listened to these gentlemen tell about what the selectees think. I was in the service, gentlemen, I know what you can think and I know what you cannot think. I have told my boy: "Son, you have lost the power over your body and your soul. You are in the Army, and don't write letters and don't do things against the rules. Do what the Army tells you to do, and be honorable." My last statement to him was: "You are in a vice. Don't jerk loose so as to tear your future to pieces. Stay there and do the right thing. Trust your father, your mother, and the other parents of the United States to do everything they can for you to see that you get a square deal."

I do not want to fight with General Marshall. He knows more than I do about this whole thing, but I do remember a little story about the King or Sultan who reigned in the Far East who would go out on Saturday night disguised and find out what the people were thinking, and came back and rule very wisely the following week. General Marshall should disguise himself and go out and learn what the people and boys are thinking. There are no outside forces that are influencing the men in the service to write these letters. The happenstance of a postcard coming to my son from Senator Wheeler—I did not send it to him; I opened it and read it through, but I did not send it to him. It is the boys in the service themselves; it is their parents outside, who feel that they have had a commitment made to them of 1 year's service, and 1 year's service is what they want, and that there is no greater emergency today than there was at the time of the enactment of this act.

Now, I want to say something else to you about what is in the back of the minds of the boys. It is not exactly the time that they are giving now. It is not this year. It is the years to follow. It is their future. That is what they are worried about. They would

not mind--I mean do not believe they would mind if their future were taken care of. But here they are, taken out of their regular life into the Army for example--my son was taken away while the boys on both sides of him were left behind. All were drawing \$160 a month. Since that time these boys with others threatened to strike, and they have had an increase. They are working 8 hours a day. My son is working around 12 to 14 hours a day and getting \$5 a week. That is all. And he knows of the condition back home. He knows these boys are paying for their homes, paying for their automobiles, getting married. They are doing all the things that he wanted to do, while he is in camp, and you are paying him \$5 a week, and deducting costs of compensation insurance. The businessmen around the camps are charging higher prices than they charged ordinarily, because of the influx of the boys and the shortage of things, and even then they are not getting the things that they were getting before. These boys are in a total defense program. That is what they are in, and I cannot for the life of me, and neither can any of the other parents, see any difference between a man in the industrial branch of the defense program and the man in the military branch.

In the old days in the world that was, when soldiers were hired as professionals and went away to fight, it was different, but today you have got to have every man, women, and child behind this effort, and I say to you that it is unfair and unjust for you to distinguish between my boy if he were to stay at a machine, and my boy if he goes to a military camp. And so if you will provide—I think General Hershey made the statement that he did not think it made any difference about providing for the future and paying them after they went home, but I find fault with that statement for if you would provide for their future, gentlemen, that I believe would make them more satisfied to stay in, because they would know that when they came out they would not be in the same position that General Hershey was, when he came back from the border, but they would be taken care of. And it is that future that they are worrying about. And it is the duty of Congress, as the parents see it, to take care of that situation.

Now, I have got one other thought that I would like to leave with you on this matter before I go into my recommendations, and that is this: The generals say: "Keep them as long as we want to keep them."

**The CHAIRMAN.** No; as long as they need to keep them.

**Mr. MURRAY.** Well, that is the same thing, because I know the generals. They say: "Let's keep them." Take yourself, suppose you were in the service at the present time and it looked like 12 months or 3 years, according to whether you enlisted for 3 years or whether you were selected for 12 months, you would probably do as the boys do now, they mark off the days on the calendar just like they were in jail. I tell you that because it is true—just the same as if they were in jail—another day gone, so many more days to go. When my son writes a letter he says: "Well, that's another month behind me. Only 8 more to go."

**Mr. EDMISTON.** Does not every American boy in school do the same thing?

**Mr. MURRAY.** I am just saying that is the way it is.

Mr. EDMISTON. I used to do that all my life when I was going to school.

Mr. MURRAY. This is what is going to happen. The emergency is no greater today than it was at the time the boys went in, yet we are going to take away from them any idea of a time when they will get out as far as staying 12 months, 3 years, or 4 years or any other time is concerned. Each man's life is to be the Government's.

I notice that the Generals talk very impersonally about the Army. They cannot get impersonal with us. When they talk about the Army, the parent thinks of the son that he has in the Army. And let me say to you that only day before yesterday I took a deed to a farm with the express thought that if my son comes back like so many of them came back, he will have that farm. I wrote him a letter to that effect, so that he at least could feel that if he came back injured, incapable of work, if he could work the farm he could have it, or could live on it. And I am saying to you that every time somebody says anything about this war business we cannot feel impersonal about it. Every one of those boys belongs to a set of parents. Every time you talk about keeping them indefinitely, those parents are set to wondering if you are not going to break down the morale of the boys, if you are not also breaking down the morale of the parents. I would just like to ask you if it is not the truth that throughout the world today propaganda is being used to break down the morale of the people back home, to break down the parents back home, to cause them to write letters to their sons saying "Quit! Give up! Surrender! Don't fight!"? Yet, what are we doing in the United States? You made a mistake, perhaps, when you set up this program, but it is the program that was sold to 600,000 boys, and their parents and the United States should stand by its word. There is nothing to fight for if the honor of this Nation is just thrown away—and the honor rests in the word of this Congress and that of the President of the United States.

Now, then, to answer your problem, I say to you that after you give this to the Army, if you give them what they are asking, what Secretary Stimson is asking, they still have not got an Army. I do not know what the generals call "morale," but I have some idea what morale is, and I think that the majority of you men who served in the World War have some idea what morale is. I say to you that you must do something so that this group of men in the Army will want to stay in the Army. You must so treat them that they are willing to stay in the Army. You must do two things:

1. You must bring them up with your other defense workers, and you must equalize the sacrifice. There is only one group of men in the United States that makes any sacrifice today in the defense program, the boys in the Army. The balance of them are making a profit out of it—and the defense program is a wonderful thing to them. In our own home town many men that belong to the C. I. O. union are happy to hear you say that you are going to keep the boys you now have indefinitely, because they know you only have a certain amount of facilities, and that means less chance for them to go, and that they can stay at home. That is a condition that is helping you in this thing right here. We parents realize that. We know we are

a minority. We know you have 600,000 of our boys. We know that, multiplied by 2, that only makes actually 1,200,000 parents, and if we add in an extra son or so, we are a very small minority, as far as we are concerned, but we are asking that you do a job and protect our sons.

Now, I say that to meet this situation, the Congress of the United States should equalize the pay. Let them treat a soldier as he should be treated today, as a member of the total defense program. Pay him in accordance with what you, the Congress of the United States, are voting to be paid to industrial workers in this defense program.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would you get the money?

Mr. MURRAY. Where did you get the money to pay the others?

The CHAIRMAN. But where would you get the money?

Mr. MURRAY. Right out of the people, same as you did the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. If you take 600,000 men in the Army and pay them average industrial wages, do you know how much that would amount to?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I would say that, equalizing them with clothing and what you are now paying it would be about \$100 a month.

The CHAIRMAN. How much would that be a month?

Mr. MURRAY. You mean the total?

Mr. CLARSON. \$60,000,000 a month.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Now, take 1,400,000 men, what would you pay them?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I should get an adding machine. What we had in mind was that it would take between a billion and a quarter and two billion dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. A month?

Mr. MURRAY. No, not a month, a year. Let me say this to you: you have a \$52,000,000,000 program, and the average, we will say, of the profit is 10 percent that you are allowing those who are handling it. In our community you are building defense houses, and the contractor on that is making 10 percent net. I say to you if you want to take half of the 10 percent and cut it down to 5 percent you will have enough money to pay the boys. Members of the American Legion remember the universal draft thing that we agreed upon when we came home, if we ever had war again we were to have a universal draft—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Just a moment. We understand all about the draft matter and all that. You had some recommendations, you said, that you wanted to make. Will you give us those?

Mr. HARNESS. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to hear Mr. Murray's statement on any saving which we might make on some of these expenditures. Our committee knows how much we are spending on these projects.

The CHAIRMAN. So we do, and we do not need to be told about it.

Mr. CLARSON. Mr. Chairman, he has a program that he wants to offer. He is the only witness for the opposition so far. Why not give him a few minutes?

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to give him a few minutes, but there are others here. There is a man here from New York who has been waiting ever since early this morning.

Mr. CLASON. Let him wait. This man is from Indiana.

Mr. MURRAY. We are neighbors, you know, Mr. Chairman. You are right across the river from us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understand, and I know all about what you are talking about, but we want to get through here.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, my idea of where to get the money based on my experience as head of a taxpayers' association, what I know about governmental costs about what you can do, and the amount of money that it will take to put the boys right where they should, says it need not make any difference in the total taxes of this country. This country would be much better off if throughout the country we were to establish economy and rebuild character, and I say that if you will put these boys where they belong and put governmental expenses where they belong—and I am a Democrat, remember that—and place your governmental expenses—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Let me ask you a question. As a Democrat do you believe that it will make a soldier any better soldier than he is, depending altogether on the amount of money he gets? Is that your idea of what constitutes a soldier?

Mr. MURRAY. I will answer that by asking you this: if because you can get a man for less than what you should pay him, should you pay him that because you have the advantage over him? I think it is not a question of patriotism, or amount that is being paid him. It is a question of absolute justice. That is what it is.

Mr. HARNESS. Just a minute. Every drafted man especially those from our State, Indiana, and every parent would be willing for the men to stay in the Army if they believed the security of this Nation was imperiled.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody questions that.

Mr. HARNESS. Isn't that right?

Mr. MURRAY. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, nobody questions it.

Mr. KILDAY. Let me ask you this. From patriotic motives do you think these boys would be any more willing to stay in if you gave them \$100 a month?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. You think that that would satisfy them, just to give them \$100 a month?

Mr. MURRAY. I think their patriotism remains the same, but they are human beings. They worked alongside of men and they receive letters from those men, they get the home town newspaper, they know what they are back there. You are now going to make it, we will say, indefinite and they do not know when they are going to get out so some assurance should be given them for their future.

Mr. KILDAY. Do you not think that even at \$100 a month they would be making a big sacrifice?

Mr. MURRAY. They will be making a sufficient sacrifice even at that rate. I would recommend that of this amount of money, \$100 a month, you pay them approximately \$40 a month in cash—I understand Canada pays \$40.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you are getting down to what I asked you.

Mr. MURRAY. Take the balance of the money and place it in defense bonds credited to their account. When they are discharged

from the service, pay those accumulations to them at the rate of \$100 a month until they are exhausted, whatever the total credit may be, so that in a way you will take care of them during the time the men are picking up somewhere near where they left off, and he knows while in the service he is being taken care of. I was in the service, and we do not want to go through that bonus thing again. You all remember that.

I am not asking much more than just what the difference is between the way we do things now and back in 1917, and what was paid to us as adjusted compensation. The Government should say to the men: "Yes, we will take you away from home, you have got to do all this sacrificing, but we are going to provide for you when we discharge you. We are not going to dump you out on the world."

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me for interrupting, but you said you had some recommendations, and I will ask you to read them. I believe you said you had five of them. Will you read them?

Mr. MURRAY. I believe I have given the majority of them, but I will go on and finish.

Mr. EDMISTON. I think we should let him alone and let him make his statement.

Mr. MARTIN. I am very much interested in what he says, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MURRAY. I would like to say this to the chairman, that this is my first time to appear before a Congressional committee.

Mr. CLASON. He has only had half an hour. He has been the only witness against, and most of them who are for stay on 2 or 3 hours.

The CHAIRMAN. I will keep you here till 4 o'clock then.

Mr. CLASON. All right.

Mr. THOMASON. May I ask one question? I understand you are testifying to what you consider a solution of the problem. Are we to understand that you do not think this country is in peril at this time?

Mr. MURRAY. Not any more than it was at the time of the passage of the act.

Mr. THOMASON. Well, regardless of that, whether it was 1 year or 2 years ago, do you think the United States of America today is in peril?

Mr. MURRAY. No, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. You do not?

Mr. MURRAY. No, sir; not any more than it was at that time.

Mr. THOMASON. I did not ask you that.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, that is the point. I am going on the basis of the time of enactment of this act and what we understood the danger to be then, and I think it is less today than it was at the time the act was passed.

Mr. HARNESS. If this country was in peril then the same as it is now, then there is no justification for this legislation?

Mr. THOMASON. He says the country is not in peril.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let him make his statement.

Mr. MURRAY. Beginning at the point of compensation, which I have asked to have balanced, to have just one defense program, and that total defense; that the industrial defense and the military defense shall be considered as one and the same thing in their importance to the country, and that the workers in both shall be paid in a fair

and equal manner, having in mind paydays, clothing, food, lodging, and so on, that are given to the military man by the Government as part of his compensation.

Mr. SMITH of Connecticut. Is it your idea that they should have an increase in pay or a uniform separation allowance, depending on length of service? I mean would you increase the pay of each grade proportionately, or would you say that for each man enlisted we will set aside so much money per month during his service, which shall be paid to him as separation allowance?

Mr. MURRAY. I am not sure whether you should increase the upper grades above the point that you set as the base. To get the right kind of discipline you probably would have to take care of the noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers in some relationship to the increased pay for privates.

Mr. SMITH. It could be reached by an alternative method of leaving the pay grades as they are and providing for a uniform separation allowance depending on length of service.

Mr. MURRAY. That would be another way of saying the same thing I have said, except that I want it understood that I am not talking for the selectees alone, but the Regular Army, the Navy and Marine Corps, the Coast Guard and the selectees, the National Guard—the whole group. I am thinking of them all, as far as that part of it be concerned.

Now the next thing. Instead of discharging men who happen to have dependents—and I want to say to you that I was married while I was in the Marine Corps. One of my children was born, the boy now in the service, was born while I was in the Marine Corps, and another one was born almost immediately after I was discharged—I think the thing to do, is to pay these increased amounts, and do not be worried if a man happens to get a couple of dependents—that may give him a little more to fight for. There is only one reason why you cannot have dependents in the Army, and that is because the Army will not pay you enough to keep them, but if the Army will pay, there is no reason why they should not marry and have dependents.

The CHAIRMAN. Congress is responsible for that. The Army cannot pay anything except what they are given.

Mr. MURRAY. That is right. I believe the men should be entitled to marry. I believe that it would be a good thing for the country, a good thing for the morals of the Army, in fact it would be a good thing all the way around.

The CHAIRMAN. I do too.

Mr. MURRAY. Then we are together on that.

Now the next thing. In our industrial plants we give them what we call "workmen's compensation insurance." The employee does not pay for that. If he is hurt, he gets certain amounts that have been set by law to be paid him. I say that as far as we are concerned, instead of having insurance agents bothering these boys and having them write them insurance and take the balance of their pay that is not already deducted, let us give them a certain amount of insurance, the same as if they were industrial workers in a plant, so that if anything happens to them in line of service their insurance will be paid to them. Why the military man out of his \$21 a month should be

forced to pay insurance, while the industrial worker out of his high pay has his insurance paid, does not make sense to me.

**Mr. HARRIS.** Let me ask you a question there. Those men who are inducted, however, under our present law are entitled within 90 days to make application for this \$10,000 Insurance policy that the Government supplies.

**Mr. MURRAY.** But they pay for it, at a lower rate, but they pay.

**Mr. MARTIN.** It costs \$6.60 a month out of their pay, for a boy of 20. That is what my boy is paying.

**Mr. MURRAY.** That is correct.

**Mr. KNUDSEN.** The same thing happened in the World War, did it not?

**Mr. MURRAY.** But it was wrong.

**Mr. KNUDSEN.** I say about the same thing.

**Mr. MURRAY.** I was in the World War, as most of you were, and you know it was wrong. My net pay was about \$6.67 after deducting for my children and wife.

Next thing, I think the age limit ought to be dropped. I was 18 when I enlisted, and I think the age limit ought to be dropped, and give the men between 18 and 21 the option to come into the armed forces for a year of training, or whatever time limit you set anytime during this 8-year period. This is based on talking to parents and talking to the boys, and I think it would be better for you and better for the country if we would drop the age limit. I am not against setting 28 years at the top, but I do think the bottom should go down and that those boys between 18 and 21, as soon as they come out of high school, or the first year in college if you will, and before they get adjusted, and before they get jobs, before they are set, before they have all this seniority and the rest of it that goes with the set-up today, those boys should be given the right to take training, and if necessary to be inducted into the service if they want to. Take any one of those 8 years in there up to 21, allow them to make their choice, but certainly drop the age limit and bring these boys in, because, as the general said to you, some of the best soldiers you have got are down in those age limits, all of us who have children who are now in the service were probably of quite young age when we went in.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Will the gentlemen pardon me there? I do not want to limit you on time, but there are at least 25 different suggestions for amendments pending before this committee on this bill, and what we are trying to determine here is whether or not these selectees that are now in shall be kept in. That is the issue.

**Mr. MURRAY.** And what I am trying to point out to you—

**The CHAIRMAN** (interposing). We have all these questions to settle here hereafter.

**Mr. CLASON.** I think the witness should be allowed to finish his statement, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. MURRAY.** What I am trying to get in front of you is that I am not asking you to drop one thing without having something put in its place. I say to you that I think the majority of the young men that I know would be willing if you were fair and square with them in the Army as you are fair and square with the fellows outside, you would be willing to serve in the Army and would have no trouble

with enlistment. I think you would get enlistments. I believe that under this set-up I am offering here, if you place it in effect, you would hardly need selective service at all, except to just classify these fellows, so they would know where they are. Like the taxpayer, if he does not pay his taxes, he knows his property will be sold. If they do not go in, they will know they will be inducted, but I think you will have all the enlistments needed.

What I am trying to get in front of you is that what you need is enlisted men, to have it so set up that you will have the highest morale, and while you are making these changes you will make them in an orderly fashion thus building up a fine young army.

As far as these boys that are in are concerned, I say keep your word to them. If you feel that you want to extend the period for draftees do not make it retroactive. I was sitting back here where I could not see your faces, and I do not know who was talking, but somebody said you can go ahead and induct immediately sufficient men to take the places of the men that are moving out of the service. Keep your contract with the boys, just like we have to keep our contracts under these various laws that you pass, that are not made retroactive. Keep your contract with those boys. Set this army up in the manner in which it should be set up. Allow them to enlist, and I think you will get a great number of them. Then make the new Selective Service Act correct, not a hodge-podge thing, but make it so that it will give the Army the thing it wants, and have it so that it moves on from this point.

I thank you gentlemen.

**Mr. HARNESS.** Just one question, Mr. Chairman. In other words, you think that inasmuch as the peril to this country is not any greater than it was when this act was passed, we owe to the men and to the parents an obligation to keep faith with them and let them go home after the end of this year's training, but we can now amend the act so that those new inductees will understand that they are taken in for the duration of whatever emergency may develop? That is what you want us to understand?

**Mr. MURRAY.** Yes, sir. With this added thought: If you do fix up the other things, you will have no trouble as to their enlisting.

**Mr. HARNESS.** And your thought about the pay is, coming from South Bend, Ind., for example, men working in the Studebaker plant making high wages—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). How much?

**Mr. HARNESS.** Well, I do not know how much they make—\$150 to \$200 a month?

**Mr. MURRAY.** I would say they will average \$150 a month.

**Mr. HARNESS.** And the boy who is taken away from his job and put in the Army is dissatisfied because he knows that others of his age, just as qualified to be in the Army as he is, are making that \$150 a month, while he is serving in the Army at \$21 a month?

**Mr. MURRAY.** That is right.

**Mr. HARNESS.** Therefore he is not satisfied with his lot. He feels that he would be discriminated against by the Government if forced him to serve beyond the year, when our country is not any more imperiled than it was when the act was adopted by Congress.

**Mr. MURRAY.** I would like to make this remark on that, Mr. Chairman. The lady that cleans up our place where we have our offices and rooms was speaking the other day and said: "My nephew is working in Kingsburg"—that is the shell-loading plant in LaPorte County—"and he made \$127.50." My wife says, "Well, my goodness, how long does he work?" She said, "Ten hours a day." "Well, my boy works 14 hours a day." "But," she said, "he is a steam-fitter. He is trained." And my wife says, "Yes, so is our boy trained and they are college students and they are in the army working for \$21 a month." Your nephew is loading a shell, or is indirectly responsible for loading a shell that my boy must fire. Now, why should your nephew get \$127.50 a week while my boy gets \$5 a week?

**Mr. HARNES.** Mr. Chairman, I have known Mr. Murray for a long time, and I know he is reliable, one of our outstanding citizens. He represents one of the finest groups of people in the country.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Nobody is questioning that, Mr. Harness. I would like to get through with the hearing, however.

**Mr. CLASON.** I would like to know some more about this proposition of yours. You feel that this act should be amended so as to provide some financial arrangement which would take care of the inequality or injustice which you feel is being perpetrated on these boys that are in the service?

**Mr. MURRAY.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. CLASON.** Now, you would have this money available not only for the inductees but for everybody who is serving in the Army?

**Mr. MURRAY.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. HARTR.** Will the gentleman from Massachusetts permit an interruption?

**Mr. CLASON.** Yes.

**Mr. HARTR.** This sort of a balancing plan, I believe you are familiar with it?

**Mr. CLASON.** Yes, it is over in the Senate now. If the gentleman from Ohio classes the soldiers in that situation, of course, I disagree with him. I feel that these boys ought to be treated fairly; that they ought to get more money, and I think that the parents have reason in their position. If the gentleman from Ohio does not, of course, he and I disagree.

**Mr. HARTR.** We raised their pay, you know, Mr. Clason.

**Mr. CLASON.** Well, that is a point. Do you think the soldiers are overpaid at the present time?

**Mr. MURRAY.** I think they are underpaid.

**Mr. CLASON.** And your idea would be to give them what would amount to \$100 a month, in addition to their present pay, setting aside that sum of money to be given to them in monthly installments after they left the service?

**Mr. MURRAY.** Unless they had dependents, and if they had dependents, take care of the dependents out of the additional pay.

**Mr. MARTIN.** Is it your idea that that \$100 would be in addition to the present pay or would that be the total?

**Mr. MURRAY.** My notes indicate that I said \$40 a month, and then \$60 to be deposited, which would make a total of \$100, and then their

clothing and other things would be in addition, which I think would run out to a total of \$150 a month.

Mr. CLASON. That \$10 payment you say will amount to \$150 a month per man?

Mr. MURRAY. With clothing and everything, yes.

Mr. CLASON. And so far as inductees are concerned, that would be \$110 a month, and with 600,000 of them that would be about \$60,000,000 a month, and for 12 months service it would be around \$720,000,000 a year?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. And that is, in view of the bills which we are considering at present, around 8 billion, and the one that is coming up a couple of weeks from now, 8 or 10 billion more, that would be comparatively small on the most important phase of our Army, would it not?

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Clason, I will say this, that if you do not have the soldiers you do not have anything. The soldier is the mainstay of it all, yet he is the fellow that is down here at the bottom, carrying this entire load that you are building up and up, and you are even going so far as to issue bonds which, when he comes out of the service, he must help to pay off, pay this terrible cost that has been built up while he was at the bottom, the main support of the whole thing, and getting nothing, you might say.

Mr. DURHAM. What is the position of your tax association on this?

Mr. MURRAY. Our tax association feels that we want a good army. Naturally, these people being property people, are interested in having a good army to defend us. They are willing to pay the freight. They believe there are billions of dollars that are being spent throughout the United States in the various activities of government that can be saved, give us better government and take care of these boys.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Murray.

Mr. EDMISTON. Just one question, Mr. Chairman. I think you have contributed a good many thoughts to the committee, although I disagree with some of the things you have said. Have you visited any of the camps that these boys are in?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. EDMISTON. Did I understand you to say that the morale was very low in these camps? Is that your impression from visiting the camps?

Mr. MURRAY. No. What I meant to say was that since this thing has come up, where it looks like they are going to be kept additional time, the morale has been lowered, very materially lowered. I have newspapers here from camps, printed in the camps, which I will be willing to give you, which indicate that the men in the camp understood they were going to be discharged in a year, and they are trying to say what they think about it in their newspaper, hoping that the paper will get into your hands, and maybe you will see it and understand.

Mr. EDMISTON. There is a regiment of our National Guard at Fort Benjamin Harrison, and I was out there a few weeks ago and visited them. I thought the morale was high, as high as any group of soldiers I had ever seen.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I am speaking of what is coming home to the mothers and fathers when you get them together. What these boys

say when they come home, as to their general attitude. Boldly they say this: "If the Government will not keep its word with us, what is our word worth? If great, big men like that won't keep their word, why should a boy like me worry?" I think that is a breaking down of morale when you hear men talk like that.

Mr. EDMISTON. I think you have got a very good thought on obviating another bonus campaign, but another thought that occurs to me is that the bonus came way too late to do us any good. It should have come in 1919, when we were discharged. The man ought to have had the money when he got out of the Army and was going back into civilian life. In that reorganization of his life he needs the money then and not 16 years later.

Mr. MURRAY. May I amplify your remarks by a personal experience? When I was discharged from the Marine Corps I had only \$75. I had a wife and one child, and another one in September. That was all I had when I was discharged. Civilian suits were selling for \$75 each. I wanted to go into selling, and I had to dress rather well, so if I had paid cash I would have been broke, but I talked to the store man about and he says "Keep your money to eat with," and I never will forget that. We tried to figure out a menu of things so we could stock up and last till my first sale was made and my first commission came in, and we only had \$10 left when we got around to thinking about that, and on the way to the store I lost the \$10. I am just telling you that because when I think of my experience coming home from the service it places me in the position of saying "Take care of the boy while he is in the service. Build up his morale. Give us a good army, a fine army and they will be good citizens after they are discharged."

Mr. EDMISTON. \$80 bonus would not even buy him a suit of clothes in 1919.

Mr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. STORE. I think that, regardless of what provision we might make now, they will ask for the bonus and pension later anyway.

Mr. MARTIN. One question, Mr. Chairman. Have you any idea what percentage of these draftees would voluntarily enlist for extended service if their pay were adjusted along the lines that you have suggested?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know, and I do not know whether the witness does or not.

Mr. MURRAY. In talking to the men, about 50 percent seem willing to take increased pay and stay in the service, and about 50 percent of them say "No."

(Mr. Murray submitted the following clippings from the Camp Shelby Reveille:)

{From the Camp Shelby Reveille}

We have been kept somewhat in a dither in recent weeks by the news reports that emanate from Washington and such places where the powers that be hang out. One week, the word comes that it's practically in the bag that we will be out of the Army in a year.

No sooner had we worked up to a good case of wishful thinking than the man who runs this army recommended that we continue to impose on Uncle Sam's hospitality for more than the expected year. Oh, well. We must remember to shop around for that book about Pollyanna that our mother used to read to us.

**THAT EXTRA YEAR**

(From the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Cavalry News, Fort Bliss, Tex.)

"All I want to do is serve my year and get out of the Army."

A good many of us are saying that nowadays. It isn't an admission of maladjustment to the Army, it's just a natural statement from a man taken out of a good job, separated from family, friends, and personal freedom and placed in military service.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Merwin K. Hart of New York. He has asked for 20 minutes. That is all the time we can give you, Mr. Hart.

**STATEMENT OF MERWIN K. HART, OF NEW YORK**

Mr. HART. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I have some formal remarks which I will file with the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be printed in the record.

Mr. HART. And I would like to make a few comments on that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us who you are and what your business is, whom you represent?

Mr. HART. My name is Merwin K. Hart. I appear as a private citizen at my own expense, incidentally, and on my own time. I will be glad to answer any questions in connection with myself, if you would like to ask them.

The CHAIRMAN. You may go ahead.

Mr. HART. I was in the last war for some 18 months, and am not entirely without military experience, though it was not much.

I agree with a great deal of what the three generals have said. I realize perfectly that if there is an emergency as great as is claimed, then we certainly have got to have these outfits of ours efficient. It may be that the emergency is as great as has been stated, though I personally doubt it. If it is as great as is stated, I think it is an emergency manufactured in this country and not one that is forced on us from abroad.

Since preparing this statement I have filed, Mr. Chairman, I have seen the resolution that I understand was yesterday sent by the War Department to the Congress, and I want to say that in the form that it now is I am entirely against it. The language declaring that a national emergency exists is one that I feel perfectly confident would be taken full advantage of by those influential in the administration who seem bent at all hazards on involving this country in war.

I would like to remind the committee of a few of the events of the last 2 years. We had our Neutrality Act 2 years ago at this time, and the proposal was put up to the American people that we must aid Britain by selling arms for cash, never anything more, and that was voted by this Congress. Then it was put up to us that we must aid them more, but "short of war." And we passed onto that stage.

As is well known, in the political campaign last fall both candidates for the Presidency made it perfectly clear that we would never send our boys to foreign wars. If anything was made clear in the campaign, it was that.

Then the lease-lend bill was brought forward, and about that time the phrase "short of war" passed out of currency and we were then told that we must give full aid to Britain, with no reference whatever to "short of war."

Then, although nothing that I can find in the lease-lend law provides for it, or requires it, we were told that it is not enough to furnish the goods and lay them down on the barrel head or at the dock, or wherever you please, but we must deliver them to her, even if convoy is required.

More recently the Secretary of the Navy has come out openly in favor of a "shooting war" in the Atlantic, and now this proposal is brought forward, this resolution, which is in the papers this morning, and which would clearly, it seems to me, take down the bars, following which I have no questions whatever that the administration would take us further toward war, if not over the brink into war. And the next thing will be that the Congress will be formally asked, and with that same statement we always have, that it must be done quickly because of the emergency—it will be asked to authorize the sending of our Army outside the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. CLARON. Will you pause there for a question? Would you say that the first provision in this resolution as now introduced gives the President the power to do that if he sees fit? It says "use the land armed forces of the Regular Army of the United States in the national defense." No limitation whatever.

Mr. HARR. It is not expressly there, Congressman.

Mr. CLARON. But it is there by inference.

Mr. HARR. I would not be a bit surprised if it was there by inference. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that there can be spelled out of the events of the last 18 months to 2 years nothing less than a conspiracy on the part of persons influential with the administration to drag this country into war. We have been egged on by theses of what I think are deceit, and those theses are such as I have mentioned to you.

Let me say in passing, Mr. Chairman, I do not have exact confidence in polls. If there had been only one poll taken of public opinion in the United States about this country going to war, and if that had shown, even by a large majority, that the people were opposed to going to war, I do not think it would be necessarily conclusive, but there have been not one poll but many polls. There have been the Gallup polls, which have shown consistently time after time that the people are about 4 to 1 against the United States getting into the war. The Daily News, operating in New York City—incidentally, with the largest circulation, I understand, of any newspaper in any town—and I have no contact with it—limiting its poll to the state of New York, reached 174,000 persons, more than 70 percent of whom said "No" to the question "Shall the United States enter the war to help Great Britain defeat Hitler?"

Now, in that area certainly propaganda has been about as fast and hard as anywhere in the United States, and yet only 30 percent of the people are willing to see the United States enter the war to help Britain defeat Hitler.

It has been said by some people—I heard it intimated by someone before the Senate committee a week ago—last Monday, I think it was—that many of the people did not know, they were not familiar enough with what was going on. Well, in connection with that, the Gallup poll conducted a poll with those listed in Who's Who, or a cross section of them, and come to find out, 55 percent of those were against our going into the war, and 45 percent were for it. Showing that even in that selected list, a very large part of whom, no doubt, are college professors, most of whom are interested in our getting into the war, nevertheless, only 45 percent were for it.

What would we go to war for? Mr. Chairman, we are told it is because of the menace of totalitarianism. Now, totalitarianism is nothing in the world but the concentration of power in the executive, and with that definition, with which I think no one can quarrel, I maintain that we in the United States in the past 8 years have built up one of the most powerful, strongest totalitarian governments there is in the world today, and the claim that we should go to war to defend democracy becomes simply a hollow pretense.

I might mention, Mr. Chairman, two things that Mr. David Lawrence has called attention to in his recent week's issue. I will just enumerate them:

1. Usurpation of legislative power by F. C. C. over radio stations. I need not go further into that. You recall what I referred to.

The other thing: Danger to private utility industry by national policy.

The CHAIRMAN. He has an article in this week's Star on that subject, and I read it and I agree with everything he said. What is the use taking up our time with that?

Mr. HART. I just called your attention to that. I am not going to read them.

Now, as I said before, we are told that in many of these matters that come up there is need for haste. In this case here the message of the President, and I think certain other remarks made by General Marshall, were to the effect that two-thirds of the members of the troops would have to be replaced, and the implication was that that would have to be done fairly soon unless this bill were immediately passed, and of course, the figures have been published since then showing that it will be November before the term of service of any of these troops expires, then something less than 14,000 less than 6,000 in December, and then the number mounts through the following winter months. So it would seem certain that plenty of time could be taken to discuss the thing thoroughly in the light of the situation today.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the whole picture is changed by the coming of Soviet Russia into the war in the first place, as has been hinted here already, Russia coming in is certainly occupying Germany and is going to weaken Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, did not Hitler go in to Russia instead of Russia coming in?

Mr. HART. Well, I did not mean to imply that Russia was the aggressor.

Mr. SHORT. Your idea, Mr. Hart, is that they are growing weaker over there as we are growing stronger over here?

MR. HARR. They are growing weaker as we grow stronger. But any situation that would ally this country on the side of Soviet Russia would be, in the light of our experience here with the Communist activities in the United States, nothing short of grotesque. We have had four or five—in fact, I have got six investigations here listed in the past 20 years, of which the latest is the Dies committee, all of them bipartisan, four national and two State, and every one of them making a unanimous report finding great activity here on the part of representatives of the Soviet Government seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States. So that if we were going to go into war now on the side of Great Britain we would be an ally of Russia, and I think without doubt the result would be that if we won, which we might not do—that is always possible—we would find ourselves, probably, under the influence of the philosophy of communism, as would Britain also, and I think that would not be entirely to the dislike of a good many of those who at the present time are trying to get us into the war.

MR. CHAIRMAN, that is the substance of what I want to say. General Reckord said the object of the American Army and preparing ourselves for war was to protect the American way of life. I believe the way to protect the American way of life is to withdraw from the constant further penetration into the foreign affairs of other nations.

We hear many stories, much gossip about the extent to which the equipment of the United States Government has been sent to other countries, notably to Britain.

THE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hart, I do not want to interrupt you, except for the fact that are 27 members of this committee and 26 of them are opposed to the war, and we have all of those facts, and if you would like, we will be glad to print whatever manuscript you have in the record, but unless you have something else outside of your written document, I suggest that you let that go into the record and we will print it.

MR. HART. Mr. Chairman, in view of the lateness of the hour I will just stop right here.

THE CHAIRMAN. No; I do not want you to do that, if you have something further to present.

MR. HART. No; I have concluded what I had to say. I will be very glad to answer any questions.

THE CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions by the committee? Thank you very much, Mr. Hart. Your statement has been very interesting and we appreciate it.

(Mr. Hart submitted the following paper:)

**REMARKS BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS ON THE PROPOSAL TO EXTEND BEYOND ONE YEAR THE PERIOD OF SERVICE OF DRAFTEES AND NATIONAL GUARDSMEN**

(By Merwin K. Hart of New York, appearing as a private citizen, July 25, 1941)

I am in favor of taking all necessary steps for the defense of our country. Hence, solely for the purpose of defense, I favor retention in the Army of those men, whether draftees or National Guardsmen, whom the responsible Army authorities believe absolutely necessary for defense.

It is my understanding of General Marshall's statement before this committee that he favors returning to civil life such of the present draftees or National

Guardsmen as can possibly be spared. And I believe, because of what I consider to be the state of public opinion, that in line with the above thought, as many as possible should be returned.

The Army is up against a difficult problem, in view of the implied, if not expressed promise to the men that the period of service was to be 1 year. But even this promise must yield to the necessities of national defense.

But I am wholly opposed to any action by this Congress with respect to this matter that will encourage the administration to get us into war. I believe, therefore, that whatever the form of bill or resolution to be adopted by this Congress authorizing the retention of these men, or some of them, beyond 1 year, it should contain a clear statement that none of the troops of the United States shall for any purpose be sent outside the Western Hemisphere unless and until this Congress has declared war.

I urge this provision because I believe that unless the Congress speaks in unmistakable terms, the war party in the administration will take advantage of the act or resolution and construe it in such a way as to inch this country even further, and possibly over the brink, into war.

The existing provisions of law limiting the service of draftees and National Guardsmen to 1 year unless Congress declare "that the national interest is imperiled" was included presumably because without that provision Congress would have refused to pass the bill. This was a piece of deceit toward the people. And this is only one of many pieces of deceit of which the war party has been guilty, and by which members of this Congress have undoubtedly been misled.

The people are overwhelmingly for national defense. This Congress has appropriated many billions of dollars for the purpose of national defense. But if the polls, national and otherwise, which have been taken since the war broke out, now nearly 2 years ago, mean anything, the people remain overwhelmingly opposed to our country entering the war.

All members of this committee are familiar with these polls, which show the American people as opposed to entrance into the war, by anywhere from 2 to 1 to 9 to 1. The most recent poll by a committee of educators and others, headed by President Hutchins of the University of Chicago, showed the people standing 4 to 1 in opposition.

The poll of the Daily News of New York City, published in its issue of July 15, shows that of more than 174,000 persons polled within the State of New York, more than 70 percent said "No" in answer to the question, "Shall the United States enter the war to help Britain defeat Hitler?" This from New York, perhaps the greatest hotbed of war propaganda in the United States, certainly should give us pause. Is Congress going to let this country be dragged into Europe's war in the face of such evidence?

This bill of necessity raises vital questions, including even the question of the continued existence of our present form of government. Spokesmen for the administration say the people of the United States are threatened by totalitarianism, the threats being represented by Germany and her allies. I am, and always have been, utterly opposed to the totalitarianism of Germany. But totalitarianism is merely the concentration of power in the executive. It stands in contrast to the distribution of power laid down by the Federal Constitution between the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches.

And while the administration and its spokesmen have preached constantly of democracy, the administration has actually been building up a totalitarianism here in the United States. The President really admitted this when he said in his message to the Congress as far back as January 3, 1936:

"They realize (he was apparently speaking of the business leaders of the country) that in 34 months we have built up new instruments of public power. In the hands of a people's government this power is wholesome and proper. But in the hand of political puppets of an economic autocracy such power would provide shackles for the liberties of the people."

In my opinion, and that of a multitude of people, this administration has, through these "new instruments of public power," provided the very "shackles for the liberties of the people" that the President said would result if these powers were in other hands.

No better illustration of this can be mentioned than the recent case of one Doyle, who, because he favored a resolution to investigate Communist activities in the National Maritime Union, was fired out of his union, thereby losing his

job with his employer, which happened to be the Government of the United States. For it appears there was an agreement of some sort (said to be entirely unlawful) between the National Maritime Union and this particular part of the Government, that the Government would hire none but members of the National Maritime Union.

We have come a long way toward totalitarianism since Mr. Roosevelt uttered his words of January 1930. And it is characteristic that much of this has been done furtively. It has been slipped over on us, as it were. This has happened again and again. Some such attempts have been made and frustrated because the plans leaked out and became public. But much new law of a tyrannical kind has been put through. Within recent weeks, by a short amendment so phrased that it was not understandable by the general public, and whose true meaning, I am advised, was not understood by most members of the Congress, additional powers were granted by this Congress to the Government with respect to agriculture, as a result of which agriculture, the largest single industry in the nation, will be brought under complete government control.

I believe, and I understand many others believe, that there is not the remotest chance that this control will be abandoned after the war.

There is only one inference to draw from the events of recent years, namely, that there exists among those most powerful with the administration, a conspiracy to do away with the American form of government and to set up a totalitarian form in its stead. In the light of this, the incessant preachments about democracy are the hollowest sham.

And, just as I believe there is a conspiracy to take us over into a totalitarian form of government, so likewise I believe there is a conspiracy to get us into this war. I am forced to the conclusion that our entrance into the war is, in the minds of those in the administration who are molding the policy, secondary to the objective of setting up a totalitarian government of their own brand. The war powers of the Constitution, so eagerly invoked by these men, are welcome to them who in the name of democracy are converting this country to a despotism.

I note the feverish effort to extend Government control over the people. This control is being extended at the instance of men who are supremely confident they know what is good for the people better than the people themselves. To borrow a phrase from this very group, they no doubt consider the people are "too damn dumb" to understand what is good for them. Perhaps this eagerness to rush us into rigid controls is merely a childish desire to set up in America bigger and better fetters than those employed in Britain herself. But, more likely, it is part of the concerted movement designed and carried out by these men for the purpose of securing control over the people, utterly contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution.

These considerations were deserving of serious thought by the American people and by this Congress down to June 21, 1941, on which date Germany suddenly attacked Russia. Immediately Mr. Winston Churchill announced that Britain would extend all aid to Russia. President Roosevelt has since announced that in effect we would do likewise.

Now, therefore, since we have announced that the purpose of aid to Britain is to destroy the totalitarian menace in Europe, we would, if we actually backed Soviet Russia, convict ourselves of one of the greatest stupidities of all history. For if anything has been demonstrated in recent years, it is the fact that Soviet Russia, utterly contrary to her treaty engagement of 1933, has been plotting to overthrow the Government of the United States, if necessary by force.

While Germany is suspected, through the rather stupidly conducted German Bund and through her consular agents, to have stirred up interest in the United States in the cause of the Nazis, yet, compared with Russian activities over a period of many years, anything that the Germans have attempted—certainly anything they have accomplished—in the United States fades into insignificance.

These Russian activities have been the subject of many legislative investigations, including that of the Overman committee of the Senate of the United States in 1919; the Lusk committee of the New York State Legislature in 1919 and 1920; the Fish committee of the House of Representatives in 1930; the McCormick committee of the House in 1934; and, more recently, the Dies

committee. Each of these committees was bipartisan. Each of them made a unanimous report, and each of them found the facts to be precisely the same—namely, that the Communist Party of the United States, acting under direct instructions from the Communist International at Moscow, and supported by that latter organization, has continuously exerted itself to the overthrowing of the Government of the United States by force and violence (or, more specifically, by the use of the general strike and armed uprising—see the Communist International of February 1, 1934, p. 87), in violation of the penal laws thereof and of the rule of comity between supposedly friendly nations. That, in furtherance of that program its agents have penetrated our public school systems, as revealed by the findings of the Rapp-Coudert committee of New York; into many of our churches, as revealed by the reports of the committees mentioned; and into our various labor organizations. None of this is hearsay. All of it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt by documentary evidence.

From this thoroughly established record, it must be apparent to anyone that the proposed policy of the administration, in giving aid and comfort to the Soviet Union, is a policy which gives aid and comfort to an actual enemy of the United States and as such makes all the claims of defense of democracy an utter sham.

In sum, then, national defense being the greatest need of the day, for the sole purpose of national defense the period of service of draftees and guardsmen should be extended, with such proper classes of exceptions as General Marshall and the appropriate committees of Congress may agree upon.

But, in my opinion, our national existence is threatened not only by forces from overseas, but from within. The House of Representatives has told what it thought of Communist activities in the United States by its constant majorities in favor of a continuance of the activities of the Dies committee. I take it that the Senate would not greatly differ from the views of the House. I believe, if this country should now ally itself with Soviet Russia, that when the war ended, even if Britain, Russia, and the United States should win, we would find both Britain and the United States dominated by Marxism. Communism would have conquered the world, even sooner than it expected. I have little confidence in the thought, uttered by Winston Churchill and by some in the United States, that we can be for Russia but against communism. Communist influence with someone in the administration is today so strong that the Seaman Doyle, of whom I spoke before, was discharged by the Government because a Communist-controlled union threw him out. Can it be supposed that communism's influence in the United States would be any less after we and Soviet Russia had as allies fought a successful war?

In my opinion, the key to the situation is for Congress to renew its complete control of the power to declare war, including in that the power to commit this nation to policies that are certain, or even likely, to involve us in war. For, if the power to declare war means anything, it includes the power to prevent our getting into war. If there exists a hiatus between the sole power of Congress to declare war, and the sole power of the President to be Commander-in-Chief, that twilight zone should be under the control of Congress rather than the President.

Partly, to that end, I urge the Congress, in legislating to permit the retention of men really needed for our defense, to state clearly that no American troops will be sent overseas. This would but put into law the promise made by the President to the people when he was a candidate for reelection last fall.

The people, through many unofficial polls, have unmistakably said they are opposed to our country entering the war. It is the duty of this Congress, if it does not accept the trend of these polls, to poll the people officially itself before it permits this country to involvement in this war.

Can you gentlemen, who believe in democracy, do anything else?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomas J. Reardon, of Hartford, Conn., wishes to make a statement. Have you a written document you would like to file, Mr. Reardon?

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. REARDON, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION DEFENSE FOUNDATION, HARTFORD, CONN.**

**MR. REARDON.** I have some figures here that I would like to give the committee that I picked up as the generals from the army testified. I think they are important.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Very well. We will give you a few minutes. It is very late.

**MR. REARDON.** I realize that, but the time was given and I respect the knowledge of the men who know how to conduct war as an army. Now, I want to give you the figures so you will understand those figures:

Amount as of July 25, 1940, on hand: Army, none at all, to speak of. That was the date in 1940 that we were talking of an army that we needed. Now, the condition and emergency that existed at that time left us without any of the men that we have acquired in the past year under the act we passed at that time. So that as of July 25, 1941, we have improved that situation very much. By July 2, 1942, we will have improved it considerably more, because we will have those that we let out at the end of the year's service in reserve, and we will have followed through with supplies, and you have your 300,000 uncalled for.

So in the mathematical figures that are furnished to you by the Army there is no discrepancy in the necessary men, but the discrepancy is in the shortage of material on that side of the ledger.

**The CHAIRMAN.** You mean fighting equipment, munitions and things of that kind?

**MR. REARDON.** That is admitted, that the production of arms has not been equal to the men that you have called to arms. In the meantime, the figures that were furnished you by those men, an analysis of that, and a keen analysis of the facts and the figures before you, will give you this answer: There is no need of any additional time being taken from the men who are to leave at the end of their year's service, because they came in at periods and they leave at periods and in amount and in number that, when you examine it, all dovetails in together.

Now, one point that General Hershey made, I believe—he spent some little time reading about the act that we passed a year ago, and he explained the law of the act. Now, here is the point in this whole act that brings up a question that has not been answered, and it is a question of the duty of a citizen of the United States of America to his country. It is under that duty and that is the only allegiance that you are demanding his service, and you demand that he serve a year, and you said it would be that unless the emergency increased, or the peril. The danger was accepted at that time without any background that you have acquired in the year, and the danger has not increased, and you certainly have further implemented your defense, as far as your men go, and you have not equaled it with your equipment.

Now, the point that is important all through this whole matter is the procedure of Congress in suspending the provisions of the Constitution, and by so doing you have legalized the unconstitutional use of the men and material of our country, because on page 3, article

III, section E, you say "The Western Hemisphere." Now, you get into the question of the legality of the use of our troops. The Western Hemisphere was included in that paragraph, based on the theory that the Monroe Doctrine was a law of the land. The Monroe Doctrine is no more a law of this Government to be respected than the third term was a law of this land for us to respect in the last convention and election.

To properly implement that statement, and just as General Davis covered it very thoroughly in his prepared statement, I enter for you, and I will only read part of it to you and leave the rest of it with the clerk—the founders of our Government were familiar with the history of the struggle for liberty and they made secure in a written constitution every right which the people had wrested from power during a contest of ages. Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril unless established by irrepealable law.

The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln. Our fathers knew that unlimited power was especially hazardous to free men.

That is a citation from Justice David Davis of the United States Supreme Court. That explains the wording and intent of the Constitution. The implementing of that Constitution and the things that we have taken advantage of with that implementation shows the wisdom of our forefathers. They foresaw the condition we are in today, and if we speak of our way of life, then we come to the principles that they involve. Article V of the Constitution provides for departure from our way of life. It is the process of adding additional territory or additional flags as an obligation of the citizens of the United States, and you know Congress has provided in that manner, and then Congress has legalized the unconstitutional use, when you say, in fact, you are going to use it to defend countries in the Western Hemisphere, and there is not a country in the Western Hemisphere that is qualified to or obliged to give you that in return.

On the 4th day of July of each year we celebrate the Declaration of Independence. There are those among us today who would have us declare a Declaration of Independence to support and implement their doctrine of international defense. We have national unity for national defense. The doctrine of international defense has created the controversy and confusion that is in this country of ours today. Our duty as citizens of the United States is to defend the United States and its Territorial possessions. This does not allow the defense of any other country, its possessions or its flag.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. The Committee will meet next Monday morning at 10:30 for the purpose of disposing of this matter. (Whereupon, at 1:45 p. m., the Committee adjourned until 10:30 a. m. Monday, July 28, 1941.)

# PROVIDING FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE BY REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON NUMBERS AND LENGTH OF SERVICE OF DRAFTEES

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MONDAY, JULY 28, 1941

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The committee met at 10:30 a. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

The Chair would like to make a statement to the ladies who have come here this morning for the purpose of being heard on this legislation that the committee is extremely rushed for time. We have more than we can do in the time within which we have to do it, and this is very urgent legislation.

I have been submitted a list of seven names of ladies representing various committees and organizations throughout the country and the committee has consented to hear either one lady who will represent all in the group, or some four or five ladies a lesser time to discuss the bill.

I have on this list Miss Cathrine Curtis, national chairman of the Woman's National Committee to Keep the United States Out of War and of the Mothers' National Executive Committee, of New York City.

Also Mrs. Rosa M. Farber, acting national chairman of the Mothers of the United States of America, Detroit, Mich.

Mrs. Ethel Groen, president of the Mothers of Sons Forum of Cincinnati, Ohio, and others.

The Chair would like very much to have you ladies, if you have written statements, submit those statements for printing in the record.

How many of you have written statements? All of you who have statements written will you please stand? Eight.

I think probably the best way is to have the statements submitted so they can be printed in the record and they will appear as your testimony given before the committee. That will save your time and save the time of the committee, because if you start out to testify and read your statements it will consume 2 or 3 hours of our time and we just do not have that time.

Will that meet with your approval?

Mrs. FARBER. It is not satisfactory, as far as I am concerned, because I made a long trip here and I want to acquaint you with the fact that all of these people represent boys who by war regulations are not permitted to speak for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. We all know that.

**Mrs. FARBER.** We represent those boys who have not been heard. You have perhaps heard some people, and we would like the courtesy that is accorded everyone else before this committee, which I believe a gentleman from Kentucky will not deny to a lady.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Just a moment. There is not a committee in the Congress but what has a very large percentage of its printed hearings made up of written statements that are handed in and made a part of the record in order to save the time of the committee. And there are 435 Members of the House waiting for this legislation and we have got to get it out.

**Mr. SHORT.** I wonder if we cannot hear them all if they will finish by 12.

**The CHAIRMAN.** No. I will recognize Miss Cathrine Curtis for 5 minutes. You may be seated, if you wish, Miss Curtis.

**Miss CURTIS.** I have a prepared statement which is a document of some length. I have only come here from New York City so my trip is not so far. However these other people have come from Cincinnati, Detroit, and other distant points.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Who do you represent?

**Miss CURTIS.** I am speaking officially for the Woman's National Committee to Keep the United States Out of War and for the Mothers National Executive Committee.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Of 535 Fifth Avenue, New York?

**Miss CURTIS.** Yes.

**The CHAIRMAN.** You have a statement in writing?

**Miss CURTIS.** Yes, may I finish my preliminary statement first?

**The CHAIRMAN.** Well, you may finish but do not speak for the others; speak for yourself.

**Miss CURTIS.** I am perfectly willing to file my statement with the committee.

I would like to use a part of the 5 minutes you have given me to tell you that you have given ample time to the military; they have not been limited to any 5 minutes or to any 15 minutes or any half hour. They have come before you and said what they wanted to say without any hesitation or limitation as to time. I want to tell you that it is the public that supplies the Army and pays for the maintenance of that Army and the maintenance of the Government. I think you are doing the people of this country a great injustice if you do not give them ample opportunity to be heard, as much time as you have given the members of the military staff.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Now, Miss Curtis—

**Miss CURTIS** (interposing). Just a minute. I have not finished.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Well just a moment, Miss Curtis.

**Miss CURTIS.** I have not finished with this statement. I want to complete this statement and then I am through.

I do not think the men on this committee realize the conditions as they exist in the camps throughout this country. The mothers and fathers of these boys are in position—and one father is here today—to give the committee some valuable information and you ought not to shut them off with just a printed statement, because possibly they have not put in these printed statements much of the material that you ought to know about.

I am not going to say anything more, Mr. Chairman. I am going to file my statement and give the balance of my time to other people, and to urge you, Mr. Chairman, that you give them the same consideration and the same opportunity to voice their opposition that you have given the military to voice their endorsement.

Mr. SHAFFER. I want to know if you will include in your testimony the name of Mr. Clark who represented some organization in favor of the resolution.

Mr. THOMASON. And there were others representing fathers and mothers of the selectees who came here and testified at great length and voiced their opposition without interruption, I should say, for an hour or more.

Mr. SHORR. They were not given the full time—

Mr. SHAFFER. And are you going to include them in your list?

Miss CURTIS. No; we are not including him, because we have nothing to do with the organization that he represents.

Mr. SHORR. Why not give her time to present her statement?

The CHAIRMAN. I am simply trying to save time.

Mr. SHORR. I would like the record to show that time has not been given to members of some of these organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman had been present at the hearings all the time, he would understand that they have.

Mr. SHORR. I was here with the exception of 1 day, and I read every word of the testimony on General Marshall given at that time.

Miss CURTIS. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that the public is not informed that hearings have been going on; the newspapers have carried practically no information about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Curtis, I announced on the floor of the House that hearings were to start and expressed the wish that the public be informed, and that they appear and express their opinion. One gentleman appeared and made a speech on foreign affairs.

Miss CURTIS. Mr. Chairman, I am sure you realize that making a statement on the floor of the House does not mean the public will be informed of it or the newspapers will carry it.

The CHAIRMAN. They usually do carry such information.

Mr. SHORR. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would not meet with the approval of the committee to go ahead until, say, 12 o'clock.

Mr. SHAFFER. I do not understand the rush in getting this out; we have the tax bill first.

The CHAIRMAN. You wish to file your statement?

Miss CURTIS. Yes. My statement follows:

Mr. Chairman and members of the House Military Affairs Committee, my name is Cathrine Curtis. My address is 535 Fifth Avenue, New York City. I am speaking today as national chairman of the Women's National Committee to Keep U. S. Out of War and of the Mother's National Executive Committee. These organizations—through direct membership and that of affiliated groups—represent several million women in this country. These women are vitally interested in keeping our country out of this present European war—keeping it free of all European entanglements, power politics, and intrigue. These women want to preserve our constitutional representative form of government, which is our greatest heritage handed down to us by the founding fathers of this Republic.

Our membership includes women in all walks of life and comes mostly from that great middle class, which constitutes the backbone of our nation.

The Women's National Committee to Keep The U. S. Out of War was formed in 1930 and is a revival of that famous group of women who led the fight against the Supreme Court packing plan under the name of the Women's National Committee for Hands Off the Supreme Court, which was formed early in 1937. I served as chairman of that committee.

It is a great privilege and honor for me to be able to speak in behalf of those hundreds of thousands of women who are unable to come to Washington at this time, but who are worried and almost beside themselves in their distress over what is going on here in Washington, what is being done to our country, to our people, and what you men are apparently planning to do to our boys who believed they were going to camp for only 1 year and to see service only in defense of these United States of America and in the Western Hemisphere.

I have testified before many committees on Capitol Hill, always in an effort to present Members of Congress the viewpoint of American women. For many years my work and activities have been in connection with women's organizations. I do a great deal of speaking at women's conventions—both national, State, and local. I receive a tremendous mail from women in all parts of the country, and I can tell you gentlemen their present state of minds is far from temperate.

During the last 10 years much of my effort has been expended in the defense of American traditions—representative constitutional government and the free-enterprise system in which our women have such a tremendous stake.

It is not surprising that much of my time is spent in defense of American traditions; that is a natural heritage. My ancestors helped found this country. I intend to do all I can to preserve it. They fled England because of her perpetual wars, oppressive government, and continual poverty.

They came to this country seeking liberty and independence, and they fought in the wars of the Revolution and of 1812 to free this country for all time from the domination of English rule.

My great-greatgrandfather, Eliphalet Curtis, organized the first group of men to go from Connecticut into Massachusetts to fight in the War of the Revolution in 1776. There were many others on both sides of my family who did equally outstanding service in those wars—and many who gave their lives in battle.

They gave their all to free this country from English rule. I intend to do all I can to keep it free of English rule.

It seems to me most unfortunate that representatives of the public have not had the opportunity of presenting their views to this committee, at least accorded equal opportunity and time as that given the military. It also is unfortunate that countless people throughout the length and breadth of this land—whose sole interest at the moment is in this particular piece of draft legislation—do not even know there have been open hearings held by this committee because of the appar-

ent silence of the press on this matter, both in metropolitan dailies and in smaller local papers.

Surely these families who provide the manpower for the Army and the money to pay for and support government—not only the less than a dollar-a-day stipends for the men in camp but the more munificent salaries for those working on the so-called lend-lease program—surely they are entitled to consideration; surely their views are quite as important at this time as those of the military.

First of all, I am astounded that this Military Affairs Committee of the House is even seriously considering legislation which is supposedly for the purpose of increasing the size of our Army. This is the committee that spent months in a secret investigation of the condition of our national-defense program and just 1 month ago today released to the public an amazing statement of the deplorable lack of defense the committee had uncovered.

What little your committee did reveal in that public report was amazing. But what of the added information which you apparently did not release? What of the shortage of primary equipment, such as rifles and ammunition, clothing, blankets, housing facilities, hospital facilities, tanks, antiaircraft and antitank guns, of which you unquestionably learned during the course of that investigation? Are we supposed to believe that all of those shortages have been corrected within the short period of 30 days?

It is evident this committee obtained enough evidence in the course of that secret investigation to cause it to devote its time to an investigation of the apparent inefficiency or lack of ability on the part of the General Staff and others in charge of the defense program—in place of considering legislation to provide more men—when you know the Army hasn't even enough equipment with which to train the men now in service.

This legislation is termed "emergency" legislation. Again your committee knows—or you should know—there is nothing in the way of an emergency about it. Consider the words of Congressman Woodrum, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, spoken on the floor of the House last Thursday when it was considering the first supplemental national defense appropriation bill for 1942.

Here is what he said in explaining to the House why its Members should vote an additional \$7,000,000,000 for the Army:

\* \* \* For instance, we have in this bill funds for critical items for an Army of 3,000,000 men. Our present enlisted strength—or at least that which the bill contemplates, is 1,727,000. We have in this bill essential items for that size army. In addition, we have critical items, that is, necessary items which cannot be purchased quickly but which have to be projected into the future, for an army of 3,000,000 men.

An examination of the pages of the Congressional Record for last Thursday reveals considerable discussion about the new offices to be constructed for the Army in Virginia—but did anyone ask who has authorized an army of 3,000,000 men in this country? Did anyone ask where those 3,000,000 men are to be used?

It is apparent this talk about an emergency in connection with consideration of this bill is only window-dressing staged by those in power to fool the public and to fool the boys who are being asked to

remain indefinitely in the service for unknown reasons and objectives.

It is claimed this legislation to hold these men in service indefinitely is necessary to prevent complete break-down of the Army—that, unless it is passed at once—it will be necessary to stop our garrisons in outlying possessions such as Hawaii and Alaska.

I listened to every word of General Marshall's testimony—and in addition—read the transcript. I admit that—for a time—I was convinced unless this draft legislation was rushed through—our Army would be torn asunder.

However, upon further investigation, the facts that I learned did not support these statements.

For instance, I find we now have on duty with the Army 1,540,351 men—but only 19,327 draftees are due to be released from service between now and January 1, 1942. In fact, none of these will be eligible to be released from service before November 18 of this year. That is 14 weeks away. Can it be possible the release of 19,000 men between now and the end of the year will disrupt the Army?

The Chief of Staff's testimony stressed imperative need for having this legislation passed by August 1 because of the problem of the release of draftees stationed in Alaska and Hawaii.

The fact is that only about 5,000 draftees are stationed at those two points.

Undoubtedly, it will now be claimed that we cannot spare men from those points because of the present situation in the Pacific.

The news of the last few days is no surprise to me, gentlemen. During last April, when I was on the west coast, I learned from the representative of a neutral country friendly with and close to Great Britain, that peace negotiations between Britain and Germany had been in progress since the end of February.

These peace negotiations were claimed to be founded upon trade agreements between England and Germany whereby they would divide Latin American business between them.

This, of course, sounded like that famous Dusseldorf conference which was suspended, not terminated, in March of 1939.

That was a conference between representatives of England and Germany at which they were planning the use of English money to subsidize German world trade against all other countries, including these United States.

My enquiry as to what the position of this country would be in connection with any such peace terms brought forth the information that it was the plan to involve us in war with Japan and—while we were busy in the Pacific—England and Germany would take over Latin American trade.

Can it be that the present situation in the Orient indicates the possibility of an early armistice in Europe?

And if that plot should eventually develop—how can you gentlemen expect this country to fight a war in the Pacific and at the same time protect our Latin American good-neighbor trade when we have given most of our military equipment and our ships to England and other foreign countries?

I have not come before you today with any intention of opposing the development of an adequate, well-organized, well-equipped, and modernized army for the defense of these United States of America.

The American people want—and are entitled to—the finest, most efficient military establishment that the inventive genius, organization, and resources of this country can provide.

However, the American people do not want to see their country become a military dictatorship. They do not want to live in a country where the military is all powerful and tells them how they can live their lives as has been the custom for centuries in the Old World.

I repeat the people want a well-organized, well-equipped Army—thoroughly trained in modern warfare. But what equipment is the Army getting? Your committee learned all about that in the course of your investigation. What training is it getting?

From available information, it is evident that the only observers we have in this war are with the so-called allied forces—that is—with British troops. Britain's technique is best described by Kipling's famous line: “\* \* \* And Tommy—you are noted for your orderly retreat.”

Britain declared war on Germany—Poland did the first fighting—and was conquered. Then land war came almost to a stand-still until the troops of the low countries took up the fight. They fell, and Belgium's troops stood between the Tommies and the Germans. They went down to defeat, and the French Poilus carried on, while Britain retreated to Dunkirk, and home.

We find very little land fighting until the Yugoslavs and Greeks went into the trenches. As they went down—the Tommies again retreated in orderly fashion—for home—with the troops of Australia and New Zealand covering that retreat.

Again the land fighting came to a halt until the Russian forces were brought into line to receive the brunt of it. Britain promised Russia aid—and sent her a propaganda officer!

It would now seem the Russian defense is ended. Therefore, the land fighting apparently will cease—until, Britain finds another ally to carry that portion of the war on for her.

Is that the purpose of these proposals before you? Will these—together with the recent resolution introduced in both Houses of Congress to declare a national emergency—provide the next front-line army to carry the land fighting in this war? If so, why learn only the technique of retreat?

It is admitted by all recognized military experts—that Europe cannot be invaded except by an army of about 10,000,000 men. Who is to provide that invading army? Certainly not the British Empire—unless it changes its existing draft laws.

Analysis of those laws reveals that only 15 percent of the entire population of that Empire is subject today to draft for any type of military service—and only three-tenths of 1 percent is subject to draft for military service outside its own country!

Even the manpower of the United Kingdom—England, Scotland, North Ireland, and Wales—cannot be drafted for service outside that kingdom without its consent, under existing laws.

Despite this disparity in the draft laws of the nations now at war and that of our own—supposedly at peace—Congress now is asked not only to break its agreement with men drafted into our armed services—but also to grant the power to send them anywhere in the world and such a move is supposed to raise the morale of our Army!

What was the basis of action proposed by the present Selective Service and Training Act?

The remarks made by proponents of that law when it was being discussed on the floors of both Houses of Congress establish the intent of the Congress was to set up a training system that—over a period of 5 years—would give your country a reservoir of between four and five million trained men who—on completing their 1-year term of duty—would be placed in the Enlisted Reserve of the Army of the United States—subject to call for active duty at any time during a 10-year period after completing that term of duty.

We are now told—by the wording of the bills before your committee—this 5-year training plan is to be scrapped. Why?

The Chief of Staff in his testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee complained of the fact that in some regiments there are draftees soon due for discharge while others will remain on for several months.

The implication might be that such a continual changing of personnel tends toward a break-down of training program. But the system of our Army always has been one of a continual flow of new blood.

In fact, General Devers—who followed the Chief of Staff in testimony—told that committee that the continual changing of personnel has always been the standard program of our Army.

Will these proposals before your committee change that system?

If they become law will this infiltration be abolished? If that be the case does it imply Congress is being asked to draft the available manpower of this country from the time they reach 21 until death parts them from the service?

Such a system, of course, implies an intent to create in this country a huge military force of millions of men. Why? Again I refer to the statements of the various military experts that a force of at least 10,000,000 men will be needed to invade Europe. Is the United States to provide these 10,000,000 men through this system now proposed?

Undoubtedly, proponents of these measures will contend the only purpose is to provide the armed forces we need to protect this country from totalitarianism.

How did Lenin and Trotsky rise to power in Russia? Through the power of their army—and communism has maintained its regimented rule of Russian peasants for 2 decades through its control of the armed forces of that country.

How did Mussolini rise to power? Through his control of the military and the use of that military to regiment his people.

How did Hitler gain control in Germany? By abolishing the rights and powers of the elected representatives of the German people and their Reichstag—through “the Law To Combat the Crisis of People and State” forced through the Reichstag March 24, 1933.

Of course, the operation of that law was limited to 4 years but before the 4-year limit expired Hitler had replaced the German constitution with the articles of war of the German high command.

Is it possible that among other motives contained in proposals before you is the desire of someone in this country to emulate that example?

Listening to the witness and reading transcript of their testimony before the Senate committee would make one think one is in Germany—not the United States. In Germany the army high command makes up the minds of the people and the Reichstag. In this instance we have the army high command laying down the opening propaganda barrage to push through in a hurry these proposals for military regimentation of our country.

Several points stand out in that testimony:

1. The urgent request for an immediate declaration by Congress of a national emergency.

2. That an Army of unlimited size is anticipated.

3. That this national emergency is essential to retain some of our troops in Alaska and Honolulu; and

4. That 90 percent of the draftees want to remain in active service.

The plea for this legislation seem to belie that statement. If it be true—then all that is necessary is to amend the National Defense Act authorizing an increase in the number of Enlisted Reserve to be called to duty—and the Army's problem is solved. Then—instead of holding men in service against their will—you will have that 90 percent which the general claims wishes to remain in service.

Why is there such a concerted, well organized demand by administration officials for a declaration by Congress of a national emergency? Will this declaration—allegedly for the purpose of holding the draftees in service on a compulsory basis—improve the morale of these men? Will it reduce or eliminate the desertions—the suicides in camp? Will it give them confidence in their Government?

Will it inspire them with a desire to fight for that Government which only a year ago promised to release them after 1 year of service?

Will it provide more ammunition—war materials—and other sadly needed equipment for the Army?

Will it provide transport ships of which apparently we have so few to transport our Army?

General Marshall testified before the House committee that tonnage is one of the most serious problems he has to face and that he could not return our troops from Alaska and Honolulu without disrupting our South American trade.

Will it provide sufficient airplanes to at least fly our officers on official business in safety and replace the outmoded crates they are now forced to use?

Will it provide additional airplanes so that we can train American pilots?

Will it end the reported practice of allowing our best pilots "indefinite leaves home" with the understanding that "home" will be China—where they are to be paid \$250 a week and \$500 bonus for each enemy plane shot down—while flying for the Chinese Army?

Will it provide more officers and a better organized Army than we have at present?

Will it stop the desertions from the Army which are reaching such proportions as to present a genuine problem?

If it will not do any of these things then why should Congress declare a national emergency?

What powers would such a national emergency provide?

Undoubtedly such action by Congress would legalize the many acts or agreements this country is already committed to—and of which not even Congress has any knowledge—which may not have been legalized as yet.

It would undoubtedly legalize the Iceland occupation and thereby legalize occupation of other territory against the will of the American people.

The declaration of an emergency would undoubtedly deprive citizens of their right of free speech and free assemblage and make of this country a military dictatorship. Should this be done we will be actively in the war.

I am one of these individuals who believes that national defense begins at home and that we cannot defend this country if we continue a program of giving all of our defense weapons—equipment and vessels to foreign nations as we are now doing under the lend-lease program.

I believe we can only have a satisfactory national defense program that is directed, operated and executed by our own citizens—whose primary interest is the defense of this country and the continuation of this form of Government—a defense program that would never permit the humiliation of an order being given to our War Department as follows. I wish to quote from an Associated Press item appearing in the Washington Evening Star of July 25, 1941. I quote.

[From Evening Star, July 25, 1941]

FORT DEVENS, MASS., July 25.—Acting on the advice of the British censor in the Western Hemisphere, the War Department cautioned all soldiers of this fort today to refrain from mentioning military facts in personal mail to friends, especially to those in foreign countries.

In a circular to Col. William A. Smith, post commander, which was posted on the fort bulletin board, the War Department said:

"The director of British censorship, Western Hemisphere, has brought to the attention of the War Department several letters written by United States Army personnel to individuals in foreign countries in which mention was made of matters pertaining to the military establishments. While the cases reported appeared to be the result of indiscretion, measures must be taken to cause this practice to be discontinued. All personnel of your command will be directed to omit all reference to matters pertaining to the national defense in personal letters written by them, especially to foreign countries."

Why should our War Department be given orders by the British censor in the Western Hemisphere or anywhere else? Why should Britain or any other foreign power presume to tell the men in our Army what they may or may not write in their letters?

The American people are very conscious that there is too much foreign interference in this country today—not only in connection with our national-defense program—but even with our daily lives. There is too much foreign technique in operation in this country today—particularly in furthering the program of the war dancers—so much so that our people are becoming sensitive to and suspicious of incidents which otherwise might pass unnoticed.

The following newspaper story—which appeared in the Chicago Tribune last Friday, July 25—has been brought to my attention by a great many women. I quote:

PHILADELPHIA, PA., July 24 (Special).—Each of the 85 local draft boards in Philadelphia was requested today to compile a list of 20 mothers of draft

registrants for the use of national selective service headquarters in Washington. The order was not explained by local draft officials. It specified that the mothers be "loyal American citizens," and that five in each group of 20 be mothers of men already inducted into the Army.

State officials said the order for the lists came from Brig. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, National Deputy Director of Selective Service. Of several possible explanations for the order, the most common was that the information was being compiled at the request of Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York, National Director of Civilian Defense. Another was that officials planned to test sentiment among mothers on the proposed extension of the draftees term of service.

Many of these women—in calling the foregoing article to my attention—have pointed out that Communist-Nazi technique is one which exerts influence on members of the family to compel obedience to the party. These women have been quite outspoken in asking if this article means that the mothers of boys in camp are about to be marshaled to the support of the draft-extension-national-emergency war program?

I hope this committee is aware of its great responsibility. I hope the Congress in consideration of this legislation does not continue to ignore the wishes and the appeals of the American people.

Several weeks ago our committee took a Nation-wide poll in which we used the word "war." Returns disclosed that 94.9 percent of those polled were opposed to foreign war involvement. Since that time many organizations and newspapers have taken polls which show that at least 85 percent of our people do not want the United States to go to war.

Members of this committee, we urge you to find some other solution to this draft extension issue than that of compulsory extension of the draft and breaking faith with the men and their families.

We also oppose vigorously any declaration of an emergency by the Congress.

If you gentlemen—who are sent to the seat of Government to represent the wishes of our people—continue your program of ignoring them and allowing this country to get deeper and deeper into the Old World's recurrent conflicts—I greatly fear it is going to accelerate a lack of confidence in Government which, if it continues at its present rapid pace, unchecked, may lead to open revolt.

The will of the majority cannot be forever ignored.

**STATEMENT OF MRS. ROSA M. FARBER, ACTING NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, MOTHERS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DETROIT, MICH.**

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Rosa M. Farber, whom I have listed as representing as acting national chairman, the Mothers of the United States of America. Is that correct?

Mrs. FARBER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mrs. FARBER. Mr. Chairman, while I have a prepared statement I do want to add this: I sat through the hearings on Friday morning and I heard three gentlemen go over and over things that had been said a dozen times, without any limitation of time.

You are giving me 5 minutes to discuss a matter which I think is very important.

Mr. SHORT. I do not think her time should be limited, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I have asked her to read her statement. Let her proceed.

Mr. CLASON. Mr. Chairman, you suggested that three or four of those here could have 5 minutes each or that if a lesser number were heard they would have more time and I think she ought to know in advance.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if there is no limitation as to time, is that satisfactory to the gentlemen?

Mr. CLASON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I am saying to the lady to proceed.

Mrs. FARBER. Mr. Chairman and members of the Military Affairs Committee, my name is Rosa M. Farber. I am acting national chairman of the Mothers of the United States of America, with headquarters in Detroit, Mich. We are a national organization, organized October 1939 for the purpose of keeping the United States of America out of foreign wars. Members are mainly mothers, wives, sisters, of men who fought in the World War, who now have sons of military age. However, membership is open to any woman who is a citizen and who is in sympathy with our cause. There are no membership fees, and the cost of operating is met with money which comes in the form of voluntary contributions. We pay no salaries; all the work is done by voluntary help. We have never put on a membership drive nor have we ever put on a money-raising campaign.

After the first headlines appeared announcing the proposal to extend the training period of draftees our office was besieged with telephone and personal calls, insisting that we appear before the committee in opposition to this new proposal which adds to the mental and nervous turmoil of every person who has attained the age of understanding.

Some Members of Congress report their mail is light on the extension of the training period issue. This lack of interest is interpreted by many as an indication of consent or approval. This is not true. There are two reasons why mail is light. First, people have lost confidence in Congress. Secondly, the press is not carrying reports of the hearings. A general survey of the newspapers on file in the Congressional Library verifies this statement.

The first appearance of General Marshall before the Senate Military Affairs Committee and his assertion that we must keep the men in received wide publicity. Also receiving considerable publicity was his statement denouncing as sabotage of a dangerous character what he said were organized efforts to have draftees petition Congress against extending the service of selectees and National Guardsmen. Meager reports of the opposition were found.

Is this voluntary censorship on the part of the press?

We are very much alarmed about this matter because we know that people throughout the country get a picture of what is going on in Washington from their papers. We have heard much about the methods used by the governments of Russia, Germany, and Great Britain to propagandize their people. We refuse to become helpless as those people are—and to be rendered helpless by the same method.

We have no desire to say or do anything which would impede or

interfere with the maintenance and training of the Army of the United States. We realize that we must have an Army second to none. However, being mothers, we realize that the first important requisite of an Army is the morale, and mothers understand, as no other group can, the attitude of these boys. We appreciate what their viewpoint means to the morale of the Army which stands as our first line of defense and our security. Many of us have lived these past 20-odd years with men whose entire lives have been warped by their experiences in the World War. No one knows better than the wives of these men and the mothers of their sons what that tragic mistake cost.

I mention this not as an emotional appeal but to impress upon this committee and the Congress the fact that there is a very real and solid foundation upon which rests the mothers' determination to stay out of foreign wars.

It is interesting to note that testimony given before the Senate Military Affairs Committee was to the effect that 90 percent of the men want to remain in service. In contrast to this general's appearing before the House committee claim to know nothing about the attitude of the men.

Since the generals speak for the boys but the boys dare not speak for themselves, we speak for them. We are not under Army regulations.

The information that 90 percent want to remain in service was amazing news to those of us who have listened to a continuous stream of opposition. We have reason to doubt the veracity of this statement. Information received direct from camps and from parents indicates bitter resentment on the part of soldiers to this breach of contract.

We get an idea of their attitude from a letter which appeared in the Detroit News, July 21, 1941. This letter comes from a camp in the West and is signed by 18 soldiers.

We are addressing this letter to you in the hope that it may in some way help to defeat any bill calling for an extension of service by the drafted men, and because many of us are from Michigan.

Many of us volunteered for service, leaving our friends, homes, and jobs willingly. To keep us longer than a year is unfair, and from a military standpoint, unnecessary. We have learned our jobs well and even now our daily routine is merely repetition. In fact, the job of training could have been done in 6 months.

Perhaps this letter sounds a bit selfish, but if we could see any vital need for further training we would not protest. Without a doubt this letter voices the opinion of every selective service man in the regiment.

(Name of camp and names of men were deleted. However, they appear in the newspaper.)

A young man on furlough, stationed in a camp in Illinois, said to me:

A lot of funny things are going on. The fellows in camp don't say much because there is nothing we can do. But the feeling is that the people are letting us down.

Another letter in the Detroit News, July 21, from Fort Sheridan, Ill., reads as follows:

Inasmuch as this is my first letter to the News, I would like to have you publish it so the people back home may know just what we think about Marshall

and Williams' statement that the National Guard men would be willing to serve more than 1 year.

Where did he get that idea, we all would like to know?

We gave up good jobs and are willing to serve a year, but to give up more of our civilian life when our Nation is not even in a war is very foolish. Most of us up here have plans we propose to carry out when we are released from service. If this country were at war we would be glad to remain in the Army until the battle is won or lost. We believe 1 year of training is sufficient for any soldier. Why keep us longer?

In New Jersey, troops from the 44th Division dropped notes from trucks as they passed through cities, appealing to civilians to defeat the proposal to extend the training period. They too asked where did Williams get his information? Whom did he ask?

Reports from the Navy are equally disturbing. We offer the following excerpts from a letter received by a mother from her son who is a university graduate. He writes:

There should be quite a bit to write about but we are not allowed to write. We can shout what we think from the rooftops as long as we don't shout above a whisper and as long as no one hears us.

Tell Eddie [his brother] to stay out of the Army, Navy, or any other branch of the service at any cost."

We mothers, opposed the Compulsory Draft Act for several reasons, one of which was that we felt that there was no need for this drastic departure from our way of life. We feel there is no need now to further extend the act by authorizing the President to exercise the power conferred upon him by section 3 (b) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, which section gives the President the power to retain the men indefinitely if a national emergency is found to exist.

When a general testifying before this committee was asked whether the emergency is greater now than it was on September 16, 1940, he stated it is. When asked why it is greater he answered in true warmonger style, "The whole world is aflame, practically." Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee, this is not sufficient evidence on which to base an important decision—one which affects the lives, mentally, morally, and physically of millions of young men, in and out of the Army; our young women and in a different manner, but in no less degree, mothers and fathers of this Nation.

I want to say here that intelligent people favor building our national defense to such strength that we can resist any invasion but we demand that our Government stop making plans for sending the armed forces to any and all parts of the globe.

It is claimed by the generals and some members of Congress that the public understood when the Selective Training and Service Act was passed that service was for 12 months or more.

Mr. Chairman, when the Burke-Wadsworth bill was being debated in Congress the short training period—only 12 months—was played up. The possibility of a national emergency and service for the duration was played down. In fact, a song was written and became very popular—the title, "It's Only a Year, Dear."

The position of parents is a trying one. They hear from their sons who are in camp. Others, whose sons have not yet been called, live in constant suspense and mental anguish. We see the war machine moving forward, relentlessly crushing everything in its path. For national defense? Who believes that today?

We hear reports of troops sent to outposts! Requests are made for legislation to send them anywhere in the world! Speeches before luncheon clubs explaining that we must mobilize our men, young and old and prepare to fight anywhere on the globe! The President's ambition is to enthronize the four freedoms everywhere in the world. The War Department requests of Congress complete power to act.

The plan to enter the war is obvious. We oppose extension of the training period because it is another step toward war. Unless we stop taking these steps we will one day find ourselves at war.

Clearly the purpose of this proposal and the request to declare the national interest is imperiled is to circumvent the limitations of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940; to legalize holding the draftees indefinitely; to legalize sending our armed forces anywhere in the world.

They are already scattered from the Philippines to Bermuda and Trinidad, Newfoundland and Iceland. Yet, Canada, a British Dominion is only now discussing the possibility of conscription for overseas service. Canadian soldiers train for 4 months; are paid \$40 per month; overseas service is voluntary. Prime Minister Mackenzie King is opposed to conscription for overseas service and is making speeches throughout the Dominion against it.

General Marshall gives as a reason why the training period should be extended the fact that the War Department now faces the problem of returning the draftees who have been sent to outposts, and getting them back in time to muster them out when their year is up.

Surely the War Department knew they were limited by law when these men were sent away. They knew when the men were due for discharge from the Army. Why then did they wait until late in July to ask for a change in the legal machinery and urge its passage by August 1? There was ample time to foresee and plan for this.

Since we are not a military dictatorship and since the people are of the opinion that they are the government; we make this observation: Since the War Department is not infallible, and since there are unmistakable signs of incompetence, would it be asking too much if we were to suggest that they consider well before rushing into another situation from which there is no turning back.

#### STATEMENT OF MRS. ETHEL GROEN, PRESIDENT, THE MOTHERS OF SONS FORUM, CINCINNATI, OHIO

THE CHAIRMAN. The next on my list is Mrs. Ethel Groen, of Cincinnati.

Mrs. GROEN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I want you to know that I come before your committee not as a hysterical mother nor as a woman who is beside herself because I do not. And I also wish to apologize because I am not a public speaker and probably if I were I could put this over much more effectively than I will be able to do.

I represent and am president of the Mothers of Sons Forum of Cincinnati, Ohio, and wish to thank the committee for the opportunity to present their views on the proposals now before this committee, which views we make free to declare, reside in the consciousness of the vast majority of our people.

I want you to know that I have two sons, one boy 25 years of age, a Reserve officer in the Ohio State Militia; and another boy 18 years old. I have a daughter 10. I have every interest and right to appear here to represent those boys, and I also have the responsibility to speak for the Mothers of Sons Forum, mothers who belong to the organization I represent.

Like every true American organization that has the interest of its country at heart, we are definitely for national defense and hemisphere commitments, but we are as definitely opposed to measures which can be construed only as aggressive war measures and which violate the purpose of the Draft Act as stated in the act itself and in its title, namely, "An Act to Provide for Common Defense."

Last fall General Marshall estimated less than 500,000 men were needed for adequate hemisphere defense. Today he talks in terms of millions. Was General Marshall right last fall or is he right today? Or is he right in both instances as his reputation inclines us to believe him to be? If this be so, then certainly while General Marshall was talking about "defense" last fall, he is talking about something entirely different today. These contradictory figures made by the same authority seem conclusive proof that we were forever right in our contention that the draft bill was never intended as a defense measure, but was a war move, and we therefore oppose the proposal to extend the period of service for draftees and demand that the terms of the contract made by our Government with these boys, be honorably complied with and that you do not break faith with our men in order to "keep faith" with strangers.

The President's first obligation of good faith is toward the draftees, their fathers and mothers and their country generally. The 12-month service period obligation to the draftees is something that comes before any questionable "good faith" toward our neighbors.

The parents in this country as also the boys are familiar with the circumstances under which the Draft Act was framed, and by implication, the purposes of this act. They know who composed the group that met at the Harvard Club, New York City, May 22, 1940, to make plans for a conscript army for the United States of America.

They know of the quarter million dollars this same group raised to drive the conscription bill through Congress.

We have not forgotten the statement that green American troops "can be trained as well in Singapore, Palestine, Egypt, and Ireland as in Georgia" and other Southern States. In other words, it would seem our American soldiers will be policing and protecting British dope interests in Singapore; British oil interests in Palestine, British cotton interests in Egypt under the guise of training, and at our expense.

President Roosevelt expressed the feeling that Japan's imitation of his Iceland move would induce Americans to support these fresh requests made upon Congress. Fortunately, however, we have not forgotten Sidney Rogerson's warning that "To persuade (America) to take our part (in the next war) will need a definite threat to America, a threat, moreover, which will have to be brought home by propaganda to every citizen before the Republic will again take arms in an external quarrel. The position will naturally be considerably eased if Japan were involved and this might and probably would

bring America in without further ado. At any rate, it would be a natural and obvious object of our propagandists to achieve this, just as during the Great War they succeeded in embroiling the United States with Germany."

We know that many of our most ardent warmongers are empire-minded. We Americans have no desire for empire. The history of every empire from Roman to British, is a record of crimes against the common man. Though it is fabulous business for a few, it means unsuspected misery for many.

While the men in the army and their parents are definitely for defense of their own country, the men do not intend to fight for British Imperialism, for Russian Communism, nor even for American Imperialism, it would be advisable for you gentlemen to consider this fact when you vote on the resolution. If our men are going to die in war, it will be better for them to die here defending American liberties against American tyranny.

We who went to war to give the Negro freedom certainly cannot be expected to look on complacently at this attempt to rob us of ours.

Mr. CLASON. Have you talked to any of the boys in camp?

Mrs. GROEN. Yes, I have.

Mr. CLASON. Judging from those with whom you have talked can you say about what proportion of them are favorable or would desire to remain in the service beyond the one year period?

Mrs. GROEN. I have the first one to meet yet who has expressed any willingness or desire to remain in the service after the year is over.

Mr. CLASON. Is it your opinion or view that these selectees would voluntarily enlist to serve in the Regular Army after the 12-months period is over?

Mrs. GROEN. It certainly is my opinion, from what I have learned in my contacts with the selectees, that they would not.

Mr. CLASON. In that respect you find yourself considerably opposed to the statement that has been made by the members of the military?

Mrs. GROEN. There is no question about that; I certainly do feel that way.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you.

Mrs. GROEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, madam.

We have two other witnesses now, Mrs. L. S. Benge of Cincinnati, Ohio, and Mr. Stuart Benge, of Cincinnati, Ohio. May I inquire if you happen to be husband and wife, or not?

Mr. BENGE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be contented to have one of you make the statement?

Mrs. BENGE. If it be necessary, due to the shortness of time, I would rather have my husband speak for the family; otherwise I should like to speak for myself. [Laughter.]

But I will say this: I only have one thing to say, and I still would like to have my husband speak, but I still would like to have the gentlemen hear what I have to say. I maintain that I should like to be heard.

The CHAIRMAN. There is not a man on this committee but what understands that. [Laughter.]

Come around, Mr. Benge.

**STATEMENT OF STUART BENGE, CINCINNATI, OHIO**

Mr. BENGE. Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentlemen of this committee will not think that I am prejudiced, but I am saying what I think, from what information I have gained by traveling in various parts of the country and talking to men in the Army camps.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Military Affairs Committee: My name is Stuart Benge. I am appearing here on behalf of my son who is now in the draft Army. He has been deprived of his constitutional rights and cannot speak for himself. The enactment of this bill which is backed by a minority group in this country, and fostered by His Imperial Majesty's Government of Great Britain, will condemn my son to possible death or maiming.

The general public and the draftees accepted the Conscription Act in the belief that it was a defense measure, and that the Army was not to be used to defend the British Empire or invade the European continent. There is not a soldier in the American Army who would not fight to the last ditch to defend his country, but that does not mean that he is willing to die on some foreign battlefield to save the declining British Empire.

The draftees and the general public have not been duped by British propaganda as they were in the last war. Now that bloody communistic Russia has been welcomed into the fold by England and the United States, the mask is at last torn aside, and only a moron would fail to realize that the present war is a struggle for the domination of Europe.

The draftees had not been in camp a month before they started to mark the days off the calendar, checking daily the number of days they had to serve to complete their year of training--training which is almost valueless because of the lack of equipment and ammunition. I have not talked to a single draftee or even heard of one who has expressed a desire to stay beyond his year of service.

The loss of life due to accidents during maneuvers held by our new Army has been all out of proportion to the number of men engaged. I would suggest that this committee secure from the Army sworn statements as to the number of men killed in accidents during maneuvers held the last few months, also the number of suicides. If the members of this committee are really interested in knowing what the boys actually think, I would suggest that they visit some camps and, after excluding all commissioned and noncommissioned officers from the hearing to prevent coercion, ask the private soldiers what they think about the lengthening of their term of service.

In February 1940 General Marshall told a congressional committee that a regular army of 242,000, together with the National Guard, then numbering 235,000—or a total of 477,000 men—could defend the United States and its hemisphere commitments. A short time later he appeared before a congressional committee and supported an increase in the Regular Army as adequate to defense and opposed conscription. Then the administration, abetted by the warmongers, cooked up the conscription bill, and July 12, 1940, found General Marshall testifying in favor of that bill. But he told the Senate Military Affairs Committee on that occasion that he opposed a suggested increase in the Regular Army to 750,000.

The President in his recent message to Congress regarding granting him emergency powers has asked that he be given the right to call more than 900,000 men into service each year. It is now the belief of the draftees and at least 80 percent of the general public that our soldiers are to be used as reinforcements for the British Army, to be used by England wherever and whenever she sees fit. In other words, we are to do for England what her own colonies will not do and she is unwilling to do for herself.

The warmongers are composed largely of two groups, the profiteers and the ones who want to try and crush Hitler, regardless as to its effect on this country. The bodies of the warmongers will not provide food for emaciated crowds or rats. They will not come back from the war, wrecked in body and mind, blinded or with legs and arms missing.

In order to defeat Hitler, it will be necessary to invade continental Europe, and England is perfectly willing to do it with our soldiers. Any competent military authority will tell you that it would be mass suicide. It would result in the death of not less than 1,000,000 men, leaving 2,000,000 mourning parents, to say nothing of the wounded and maimed, and it would result in failure. It would make Churchill's fiasco at the Gallipoli Peninsula during the last war, which resulted in the loss of 250,000 and ended in failure, look like a Sunday-school picnic.

General Wavell and General Auchinleck have stated publicly that it would be necessary to have American manpower in order to defeat Hitler. On July 26, 1941, Sir Gerald Campbell, British propaganda chief in the United States, said in New York City that England did not want our Army now but did want our air force and Navy. Untold millions of citizens in this country are toiling and sweating to pay back the money which we loaned England during and after the last war, and money which we have given them since this last war started, toiling for the British Empire like the starving millions of India. Now they again want our blood to bolster up their declining powers. It is like taking all the blood from the veins of a vigorous young man, leaving him to die, in a futile effort to prolong the life of an old man ready to topple into his grave.

Unless our present Army Staff expects to build up a mass army according to Civil War tactics, no mass armies are needed except to send expeditionary forces all over the world in an effort to spread democracy with a Tommy gun. Competent military authorities agree that the French and British Armies in France, numbering 5,000,000 men, were cut to pieces by German panzer divisions numbering not to exceed 150,000 men, and we have not 1 fully equipped mechanized division in the United States.

Like the politicians of England and France, a group of politicians in our country have allowed their hatred of Hitler to destroy all their reason and, like the politicians of England and France, would embark on a war for which they were totally unprepared. It is also generally agreed that neither England nor France would have declared war on Germany if they had not been promised that this country would come to their aid in an all-out war.

I just want to read one excerpt from a paper which was published in Cincinnati on July 27:

ATHENS, Ohio, July 26.—"Home by October" is the slogan of members of Battery C, Ohio National Guard, now in training at Camp Shelby, Miss., as a part of the Thirtieth-seventh Division, according to a story in a local paper said to have been written by Sgt. C. K. McElroy.

Members of the battery, a local unit, are opposed to an additional year of service, according to McElroy, and want to come home and share in the high wages being paid in private employment.

Gentlemen, I thank you.

Mr. SNORR. How many camps have you visited?

Mr. BENOE. The main camp that I have visited was Fort Ord, Calif.

Mr. SNORR. Did you seek these men or did they seek you, or what?

Mr. BENOE. No; I went out there to visit my son and talked to him and talked to some of the boys. I did not make any effort to cross-examine anyone, or anything of that kind. Then I have talked to boys in Cincinnati from Camp Shelby.

Mr. SHAFFER of Michigan. What figures do you have relative to the number of deaths in these maneuvers?

Mr. BENOE. I would rather not give my source of information, but I can tell you this: that one convoy, in night maneuvers, traveling 15 miles, lost 18 men killed in accidents.

Mr. SHAFFER of Michigan. Where was this? Where did this happen?

Mr. BENOE. I would rather not answer that question, because I am afraid the man who gave me the information would suffer.

Mr. SHAFFER of Michigan. We would like to have the information here in our committee. I have not heard of 18 men being killed in one convoy, and I would like to know where this was.

Mr. BENOE. It happened in California, on the way to Ulud.

Mr. SHAFFER of Michigan. What outfit was it?

Mr. BENOE. I could not tell you that. I could get you that information definitely, as to who it was.

Mr. SHAFFER of Michigan. Will you do that?

Mr. BENOE. Yes, sir. Shall I address it to you?

Mr. SHAFFER of Michigan. I would rather have you just insert it in the record.

Mr. BENOE. I see. It will take a few days to get that information.

Mr. SHAFFER of Michigan. What information do you have relative to the suicides that you speak of?

Mr. BENOE. Various people that I have talked to. There is one woman here who got a letter from her son telling about finding a boy hanging in a latrine.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your business, Mr. Benoe?

Mr. BENOE. I run a one-man parks business.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. BENOE. I just have a small automobile parks business.

The CHAIRMAN. In Cincinnati?

Mr. BENOE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not apply to the Navy for information with respect to this convoy that you are talking about?

Mr. BENOE. The Navy?

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy or the Army, either one?

Mr. BENOE. Just what do you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask the Army or the Navy for this information?

Mr. BENOE. No; I did not ask them for this information.

The CHAIRMAN. The information that you are giving us, then, does not come from the War Department, but from outside sources?

Mr. BENOE. That is correct.

Mr. HARNESS. These convoys that you are speaking of, are those organized by the Army to take the men back and forth between the different training centers?

Mr. BENOE. No; these were night convoys during the blackouts.

Mr. HARNESS. During maneuvers?

Mr. BENOE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. Of course, under normal conditions, in peacetime, you could reasonably expect a certain number of men to be killed or die or commit suicide, could you not?

Mr. BENOE. Well, that is true. But I talked to a Marine gunnery sergeant who was with the Second Division in France, and he told me—it was yesterday a week ago—that they did not lose a single man through accidents; the only men they lost in France in the Second Division were due to combat.

Mr. HARNESS. Were they traveling at night?

Mr. BENOE. They traveled at night. He told me that one officer went out one night and turned on the headlights on his car, and the result was that a German bomber came along, and he said it blew him and his car all to pieces and killed 30 men. They had to work at night in France just the same as they do now.

Mr. THOMASON. Mr. Chairman, the War Department could give us the accurate information as to accidents. Why not get the accurate information rather than hearsay?

Mr. HARTZEN. Was this a convoy working out of the camp in which your son is a selectee?

Mr. BENOE. That is right.

Mr. HARTZEN. What is the name of the camp?

Mr. BENOE. Fort Ord. It is near Monterey.

Mr. SHAVER of Michigan. What training has your son had since he has been in the Army?

Mr. BENOE. Well, with rifles; that is all that I know of. We received a letter from him recently. He said they have two machine guns and no tripods; they have two mortars, but they have never been fired, because they have no ammunition.

Mr. HARTZEN. When were you at your son's camp?

Mr. BENOE. In March.

Mr. HARTZEN. You have never been in any other camps in the United States?

Mr. BENOE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all; thank you, sir.

The next witness is Mrs. Mary L. Arbogast, of Fort Thomas, Ky.

Mrs. GROEN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question? This is a very serious thing in my mind, and we have heard it said that if we appeared before this committee our boys who are in the cantonments would suffer. Is there any truth in that?

The CHAIRMAN. No; there is nothing of that kind.

Mrs. Arbogast, will you take the stand?

**STATEMENT OF MRS. MARY L. ARBOGAST, FORT THOMAS, KY.**

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Arbogast, will you tell the committee, please, where you live, whom you are speaking for, and, if you represent some organization, tell us what it is, and give us your statement?

Mrs. ARBOGAST. I surely will.

Mr. Chairman and members of the House Military Affairs Committee, my name is Mary L. Arbogast. I am a member of the Mothers of Sons Forum of Greater Cincinnati and am here in the interests of my four sons, all of whom are or will be of military age. My eldest son, Lawrence A. Arbogast, is a draftee now stationed at Camp Hulen, Tex. (Company C, One Hundred and Sixth Separate Battalion, Antiaircraft, Coast Artillery).

I am not a pacifist, and I believe in adequate national defense on land and sea and in the air. I am quite sure that all of my sons would gladly make any sacrifice necessary to repel an invader. I am equally sure that each and every one of them would practically have to be forced to fight another country's battles on any foreign soil.

I do not claim to be a military expert but can never reconcile myself to the belief that our first line of defense is in the English Channel. The only reason that I can advance for trying to ram this theory down our throats is that there must be some facts with which the American people are not acquainted. Could it be that there are some underlying financial interests at stake? I would consider myself a very poor American if I admitted that England is fighting our war while we content ourselves with merely being the "arsenal of democracy."

I am here specifically to protest against the extension of the period of training for draftees. Defense of this hemisphere should not need an Army of the magnitude possible under the Conscription Act. I believe that a standing Army should be built up on a volunteer basis, and this could easily be done by making the pay sufficient to be attractive. This would create an Army of much higher morale than our present policy of taking men indiscriminately from civilian life and forcing them to remain in the Army against their wishes.

I have personally talked to a number of draftees and find them extremely dissatisfied and resentful of the fact that those who were lucky enough not to be drafted are making more money than they have ever made before. They are almost unanimously of the opinion that the extension of time is being sought for only one purpose—to eventually send an expeditionary force to Europe and Asia.

These boys and their parents resent the manner in which this whole thing has been engineered. Certainly General Marshall knew last October that one year was not a sufficient length of time to make a soldier. Why did he not speak then? Simply because the Selective Service Act would never have been passed had the time limit been indefinite.

These boys went into the Army in good faith, confident that their Government would not double-cross them. I do not like to dwell upon the state of the morale of our armed forces should their training period be extended indefinitely.

I thank you.

**Mr. HARNESS.** Mrs. Arbogast, you mentioned the dissatisfaction on the part of the men in camp because the men who were not drafted are making much more money. Do you think that if these men were paid more money in camp they would be willing to stay another year?

**Mrs. ARBOGAST.** My boy would never be satisfied to stay another year. He is 28 years old, and he is taking a position in defense work.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Of course you realize, Mrs. Arbogast, that the plan is to discharge these men who are 28 years of age?

**Mrs. ARBOGAST.** I hope so.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Thank you very much, Mrs. Arbogast.

The next witness is Mrs. Sadie Barry, representing Parents of Selectees, Taylorsport, Ky.

**STATEMENT OF MRS. SADIE BARRY, TAYLORSWORT, KY.,  
REPRESENTING PARENTS OF SELECTEES**

**The CHAIRMAN.** Mrs. Barry, you have a written statement, do you?

**Mrs. BARRY.** I have just a few notes.

**The CHAIRMAN.** You may make whatever statement you wish.

**Mrs. BARRY.** I am Mrs. Sadie Barry, and I represent the Parents of Selectees. I am from Taylorsport, Ky. I am the mother of a selectee in the service now, and I have another son who expects to be called almost at once. I am speaking in behalf of my son and these other boys who are soldiers in the camps. I have visited two camps besides the one my son is in, because I wanted to see and hear some of the conditions myself.

**Mr. HARNESS.** What camps have you visited?

**Mrs. BARRY.** I have been at Fort Thomas, Ky., and I have also been at Camp Knox. I have visited two of the camps these boys are in.

The boys talked reluctantly, but they will answer questions if you ask them to. One of the questions that I have asked is what they think of this extended service, and of course they all think that their Government should keep faith with them and let them out, or, if there is an emergency, that they should know what this emergency is. They also say "They expect us to do a man-sized job. Why don't they treat us as men and ask us to volunteer?" That is one of the things that they ask.

One of the boys said, "We can't talk for ourselves; can't you talk for us?" So I thought I would.

I find that they are all patriotic American citizens, and are willing to defend this country here, and here alone.

Another thing is the drafting of skilled mechanics and leaving a shortage in our plants; then they set up schools to train new men, with a shortage of skilled mechanics in the defense production. In the camp that my boy is in—he is at Fort Knox, Ky.—he is a machinist; a skilled mechanic.

**Mr. SHORT.** How old is he?

**Mrs. BARRY.** He is 28 years old.

**Mr. SHORT.** Where did he work before he went to camp?

**Mrs. BARRY.** At the Bradford Machine Tool Co., Cincinnati.

**Mr. SHORT.** How long had he worked there?

Mrs. BARRY. He had been there almost a year, and then he had been at the U. S. Pipe Foundry Co. before that.

Mr. SHORT. Is there a shortage of skilled men in those plants?

Mrs. BARRY. Absolutely. If you will go to them, they will tell you that there is.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one question: Did your son, when he filled out his questionnaire and entered the service under the Selective Service and Training Act, make any claim for deferment?

Mrs. BARRY. Yes, sir; he did.

The CHAIRMAN. On the ground that he was specially qualified for some essential national defense work?

Mrs. BARRY. Yes, sir; he did, and also the company he worked for tried to have him deferred.

Mr. THOMASON. Did he take that up with the local draft board?

Mrs. BARRY. He took it up with the local draft board, and the answer they gave—and my husband is also a machinist, and he also knows of the shortage of skilled mechanics, and he went to the local draft board himself and put it before the local draft board. Then they said, "They need the men in the Army as badly as they do in the plants"—which we know is not so.

Mr. THOMASON. Is that what the draft board told you?

Mrs. BARRY. That is what the draft board told my husband.

Mr. THOMASON. That was the reason they gave for not deferring him?

Mrs. BARRY. That was the reason; even after the Bradford Machine Tool Co. made an appeal to try to have him deferred.

Mr. SHORT. What draft board is this?

Mrs. BARRY. Draft board 35, over the river. We live in Kentucky. Our home is in Kentucky, but this summer we are staying in Ohio to let our children go to school, and by our being over there he had registered, because he was over in Ohio at the time, and he registered with draft board 35.

Mr. HARTER. Did he serve an apprenticeship in obtaining his training as a machinist?

Mrs. BARRY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARTER. How long an apprenticeship did he serve?

Mrs. BARRY. I could not say exactly. My husband worked for years in the Pipe Foundry Co., and he got him in as an apprentice; then he went from there to the Bradford Machine Tool Co.

Mr. HARTER. Did he have a high-school education?

Mrs. BARRY. He had 2 years in high school.

Mr. HARTER. Then he went to work?

Mrs. BARRY. Then he went to work, because he had this opportunity to go into the shop.

Mr. HARTER. To be an apprentice?

Mrs. BARRY. To be an apprentice; yes.

Also in this same barracks with my son is a die and machine-tool maker—a tool and die maker, I guess it is called; a welder, and my son. Those are three skilled mechanics in one barracks. Then they are setting up schools for training others, and it seems to me that is kind of foolish when they have already some who are trained there.

Then I do know that they have not the equipment in the camps that they should have. We know that. There are not the guns and things

that they need. One boy at one of the camps told me that there is a pond there, and he was put there to guard some civilians who went there to bathe. There were some men that came there to go in the pond, and he told them they could not. They laughed at him and told him, "You don't even have a gun; what are you going to do about it?" Of course he laughed and told me, "There was nothing I could do about it, because I didn't have a gun."

So, of course they went in swimming in the pond that he was supposed to be guarding.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your son in the Infantry?

Mrs. BARRY. No, sir; he is not.

'Then I think that these draft boards, in fairness, should be investigated. There should be some investigation about them. There are many reports of unfairness on the part of draft boards—men being taken who should be exempt, and others exempted who really should be there. I know of many people that make that complaint every day, and I know some that are justified in making those complaints.

Then also there is the state of mind of many of these mothers. Yesterday a mother offered me a dollar to help me pay my way here. She had received a letter from her son stationed in California, telling her that if he had to stay longer than a year he would commit suicide; and you can imagine the state of mind that that mother is in at the present time. I gave her what encouragement I could and told her I was coming to talk to the committee, and she asked me to do what I could, because she could not come. And you see many, many cases of that kind. It is all this uncertainty; that is what it is. We can truly say it is a war on our nerves; on the nerves of all mothers. There should be a definite period of service. Why should the period be extended when there are so many other boys that should be there training, the same as these boys that are there? Why should the few that are there have to shoulder the burden while the others are at home at their jobs? Should they be there for the little pay they are getting? I do not think it is fair. We know that they have not got the equipment to train the men with. We know that. I know it, because I have taken it on myself to visit the camps, and I have been there.

That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your son appeal from the decision of the local board to the Appeal Board on the question of his deferment on the ground that he was a skilled mechanic and needed in the tool production program of national defense?

Mrs. BARRY. No, sir; he appealed to the local draft board.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean he went before the local draft board?

Mrs. BARRY. To the local draft board.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did not take an appeal to the local appeal board?

Mrs. BARRY. He did not understand that. That was when it first came out, and he really did not understand that until later.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you, Mrs. Barry.

Mr. SHORT. This insignia that you have, and that the other lady is wearing, is an American eagle, is it not?

Mrs. BARRY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHORT. It looks a little better than the British lion.  
[Applause.]

Mrs. BARRY. I do not want you to think that my son is asking me to come and do anything like this. I am talking for my son, and a lot of people tell us that it will be held against our sons who are in the service.

The CHAIRMAN. You hear a great many things on the outside that have no foundation.

That finishes the list of witnesses that I have here.

Mrs. BENGE. You have not heard me yet. May I please be heard?  
The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to hear you, Mrs. Benge.

#### STATEMENT OF MRS. LUCINDA BENGE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

Mrs. BENGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The first thing I am going to have to do is to amplify a few of the statements that my husband made about the accidents. Some of that information he had of his own knowledge, as he explained to you. Some of the things I myself learned from talking to boys at Camp Shelby who were home on furlough, and I do want to explain this.

The accidents seemed to be of this sort: The accidents seemed to be from overcrowding of trucks and inexperienced drivers. Quite often the boys fall off and are crushed or hurt under the wheel. But one of the most serious and inexcusable causes of accidents is the practice of commanders in having one group maneuver next to another group who are asleep. That is, they have one group fighting and the other group asleep.

Now, these boys sleep in sleeping bags and quite often in the excitement close to them a truck will back over these boys while they are asleep. They have no protection at all, and the only protection that these boys have devised for themselves is that they have learned to find a tree and put their heads against a good-sized tree with the idea that they will block the truck as it comes along.

Mr. SHORT. If you will permit an interruption: you can reasonably expect, however, in maneuvers, where so many men are involved, that there would be a reasonable number of accidents?

Mrs. BENGE. I realize that.

Mr. SHORT. And you appreciate the difficulty of whipping a large body of men into shape?

Mrs. BENGE. I think I should explain that during the World War I was chief clerk of a draft board, and I know the percentage of accidents, and I know the things that happen where groups of men are being trained, just the same as there will be industrial accidents where men are unskilled. I understand that perfectly.

The chief source of trouble seems to be this, from what I can learn. The officers themselves are, too many of them, untrained themselves, and the boys understand that, and the chief source of training, guidance, and counsel seems to come from one source, and that is the Regular Army duty sergeants who are skilled men, but, of course, they do not have the authority that the commissioned officer would have.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I shall proceed, if you will allow me to.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mrs. BENGE. Mr. Chairman and members of the Military Affairs Committee, my name is Luncinda E. Benge. I am here to protest the declaration of a national emergency, designed as a smokescreen for the lengthening of the term of drafted men. I come in behalf of my own son, and other drafted men, who have been deprived of the right of free speech.

For the past 8 years the people of this country have been enduring a planned economy. That having failed, we are now being asked to submit to a planned emergency, as a preliminary to a planned war. The majority of the people of this country know that there is no national emergency. There is not even national hysteria, although millions have been spent in propaganda to create that condition. The term "emergency" in this case is most certainly a misnomer, as plans for the emergency have been in progress for a long time. They became apparent at the time of the enactment of the gold bill, in 1934, which was designed evidently to involve the United States in joint ownership with Britain of most of the world's gold, so that we would be inseparably joined to her foreign interests. Having completed plans for common currency, common defense was the next step. Copies of the Constitution of the United States put out by authority of joint House and Senate resolution, under date of August 25, 1935, contain a highly significant statement. Following Article 18, "Slavery Abolished," we find a parenthesis containing these words:

The drafting of men for military service does not violate this amendment, as a soldier is not a slave.

The Sesquicentennial Commission which authorized this publication was made up of the President, Vice President, Senator Ashurst for the Senate, and Representative Sol Bloom for the House. It appears from this that plans had even then been laid for the process of conditioning the people for peacetime conscription.

When the conscription act was enacted in September 1940 it was accepted by parents and men subject to it as a measure necessary for national defense, for the period stipulated—1 year. Those men are willing to abide by the contract into which they entered in good faith. Webster's unabridged dictionary gives this definition of the word "defense": "Resistance to or protection from attack." The proposed declaration of a national emergency is designed to lengthen the term of service of these boys for the purpose of waging aggressive warfare—for we have not been attacked. It violates both the letter and spirit of the conscription act, entitled as "An act to provide for the common defense."

The bald truth of the matter is this: These boys made this contract with the Government and they are fulfilling it. Now the Government seeks to alter the contract materially and to bar them from protest which would prevent such alteration. It is significant that for the first 2 months after the Conscription Act was put into operation, induction papers carried the statement that the period of service was 1 year. Late in February 1941 it was learned that induction papers carried no reference as to the length of the training period. About March 15, United States district attorneys were called to Washington

to discuss measures for lengthening the draft period. In other words, 4 months ago the administration was already seeking means by which they could evade the 1-year-service provision of the Draft Act. Apparently, it has been decided that a national emergency will furnish that method.

One by one the constitutional rights of drafted men have been taken from them. However, they and their parents still possess the constitutional right "to possess and bear arms" in order to maintain a free government. The majority of the people of this country have signified that they want no part in a foreign war. You, as our representatives, know that. If you continue to ignore the spoken wishes of the majority of the people, you will have to suffer the consequences. The responsibility rests entirely with Congress whether or not our Nation will continue as a free one in order to preserve our heritage of freedom.

I want to thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, for your courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mrs. Waters.

**STATEMENT OF MRS. AGNES WATERS, REPRESENTING WE, THE MOTHERS, MOBILIZED FOR AMERICA, INC., CHICAGO, ILL.**

Mrs. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, my name is Agnes Waters. I represent millions of voters in America.

The CHAIRMAN. You asked for 5 minutes time.

Mrs. WATERS. I represent We, The Mothers, Mobilized for America, Inc., with headquarters at 37 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, Ill.

We are organized in every congressional district in America. We are organized in every precinct for peace.

I do not merely represent the mothers of America; I represent the voters of America in every congressional district. I would like to say we intend to maintain peace in America.

I am here to say that I am opposed to this bill because I feel it is an outrage that we Americans are being continuously forced to defend those principles for which our forefathers fought and died and upon which they built this country.

This bill sets up a state of crisis. By whom are we gravely threatened?

This bill is an onslaught against our form of government. It sets up a dictatorship and inaugurates a military form of government.

President Roosevelt has already set the stage for war with his declaration of an "unlimited emergency," which he is trying to have ratified by this iniquitous bill. I believe in national defense, but this bill proposes the wrong kind of national defense. It will make of us a dictator nation, a militaristic nation, and dictatorships and militaristic nations are exactly the antithesis of our form of government. They embody all that civilization is opposed to.

This proposed so-called amendment or extension of service to the Selective Training Service Act and the act itself would put our American manhood in a strait jacket if not in a shroud. For thousands it will mean suffering, disease, insanity, and death.

The suffering of millions more will entail as a result of the loss of these dear ones, and dire poverty will follow in the wake should it be enacted. This is the road not only to war but to revolution.

The subtle pleas of the interventionists and communistic proponents of this measure should fool no one. It is a war measure, not a defense bill, and it jeopardizes the lives of every one in the United States. The dictator powers it confers on the President should be sufficient warning to all alert Americans to be on their guard.

The proposed concentration of tremendous armed strength at home would make us an armed camp and invite war, but when this great power is placed in the hands of one man it at once becomes a menace to all our liberties.

History is repeating itself now with Roosevelt here. There is little doubt that the President of the United States has committed the American people to war.

If you gentlemen will believe me, I am not merely reading a statement; I am telling you something so important to the American people that I think I should be given the courtesy of attention. I want to say now that I have had to fight for every step of the way, and if you gentlemen----

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mrs. WATERS. Will you listen, please? You gentlemen know me, and you know what I said at the time of the repeal of the embargo. You know that I have said that this is a Jew plot. You remember at the time of the repeal of the embargo I said to you, "You are taking us to war," and you said, "No, this is a peace measure." But the facts today prove it was the road to war.

Now, today, when you stand before the country on this measure, this means war. And you are well aware that it means war. You cannot explain to the American people that it is a measure for peace.

We want national defense. We do not want our boys sent to war. We do not want to have such a crisis set up that will ratify this Jew plot.

I have presented you time and time again with the secret protocols of the Elders of Zion, which show how hundreds of years ago this very plot was being evolved, that now is being perfected by the New Dealers involving the American people, written by the Jews with their pen dipped in the blood of Christians, for the destruction of the world.

This plan means a world revolution financed with our money and we are to become a part of the Soviet Republic. We are to join with Great Britain and Soviet Russia in the Jew plot of "union now" and Great Britain is to be defeated and surrender to Hitler, and then Stalin is to sweep the world, and we have the man in the White House advocating this bill. I have asked you before and ask you now that you will not listen to him and bring about a situation until the American flag is supplanted by the Communist flag, and we become a part of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics via militaristic dictatorship and involuntary servitude, and innocent blood of our people; I have a few more words to say, and I hope you will listen.

History is repeating itself now with Roosevelt here. There is little doubt that the President of the United States has committed the American people to war. It has been disclosed that a secret pact has been made between the United States and Soviet Russia against Japan, and probably against the entire world, and there are other secret pacts.

I have offered you the White Papers discovered in the archives in Poland, in which they said it was promised by the Jew Bullitt whose mother's name was Gross-Horowitz, that we would get into it. And we are going into it step by step now. But we will not go in unless you take us in with this bill, and if we go in you have to take us in against our will. If they create any incidents, those incidents are Jewish plots for the destruction of this country by a planned "New Deal" or "New World Order" or the "Four Freedoms."

The CHAIRMAN. Your time has expired.

Mrs. WATERS. I will submit a brief containing the balance of it.

General Marshall, who represents the President, of course can take hours, but poor women who represent millions of American people all over the country cannot be heard.

Will you give me another time to talk to you? I have a few more things to say.

The CHAIRMAN. We have given you nearly an hour and a half.

Mrs. WATERS. You have given me just 5 minutes. You have not given us anything like the amount of time you have given to the administration.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not need your criticism here.

Mrs. WATERS. I think the American people are entitled to say a few things.

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony is going in the record as you have stated it.

Mrs. WATERS. Then I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that you have always been courteous to me; you have been most courteous, but I hope you will let me have 5 minutes more. I never had any fight with any of you men on the Hill.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard me say in the beginning that we are desperately pressed for time.

Mrs. WATERS. I know. There was one other thing I would like to say, and that is that this bill is unconstitutional.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is in session, and I have a conference report on an important bill.

Mrs. WATERS. May I extend my remarks and offer a further statement?

The CHAIRMAN. You can submit a memorandum to me and if I think it is proper, I will put it in the record.

Mrs. WATERS. I have for years submitted statements before this committee on measures, which have never been put in the record because they were too hot stuff for you.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will go into executive session at this time.

(Thereupon, the committee proceeded to the consideration of executive business after which it adjourned.)

(The following was submitted for the record :)

## STATEMENT BY SEYMOUR ETKIN, SECRETARY, WASHINGTON KEEP AMERICA OUT OF WAR COMMITTEE

The Washington Keep America Out of War Committee is a membership organization seeking to enroll all those persons who agree with its purpose.

It works for—

1. An amendment to the Constitution to give the people the right to vote for war or peace. In the meantime, Congress should authorize an advisory referendum before it votes to declare war.

2. A negotiated peace—not an appeasement-to-Hitler peace but a just peace for the belligerents and the conquered nations.

3. World cooperation among nations with justice for all.

4. An extension of democracy, civil liberties, and security at home.

It works against—

1. Armament economies.

2. Extension of conscription or allowing it to become permanent in peacetime.

3. Dangerous legislation that will draw us closer to the war.

4. Intolerance, racial discrimination, denial of workers' rights, and infringement of freedom of speech.

The members of our organization are Government workers, non-Government workers, students, housewives. They come from almost every State in the Union. Affiliated to the Keep America Out of War Congress, our group, like its parent, is organized to promote peace, to extend our democracy, and to strengthen our security against want. It is unalterably opposed to all dictatorships.

### KEEP AMERICA OUT OF WAR CONGRESS

*National Chairman*.—John T. Flynn.

*Vice chairmen*.—Oscar Ameringer, John Haynes Holmes, Paul Hutchinson, Bishop Paul Jones, Oswald Garrison Villard.

*Governing committee*.—Devere Allen, Rabbi Phillip S. Bernstein, Dr. Charles F. Boss, Jr., Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, Rev. Allan Knight Chalmers, Dorothy Detzer, Albert W. Hamilton, Sidney Hertzberg, Abraham Kaufman, Frederick J. Libby, Minnie Lurye, Lenore G. Marshall, Mrs. Seth M. Milliken, A. J. Muste, Ray Newton, Mildred Scott Olmsted, Norman Thomas, Bertram D. Wolfe.

*Staff*.—Mary W. Hillier, executive director; Alice L. Dodge, organization secretary; Henry W. Dyer, associate secretary; Fay Bennett, youth secretary.

*Mid-West office*.—740 Rush Street, Chicago, Ill., Kenneth Cuthbertson, executive secretary.

*Washington office*.—532 Seventeenth Street, Washington, D. C., Seymour Etkin, secretary.

(Prepared by Washington chapter, Keep America Out of War Congress, 532 Seventeenth Street NW., Washington, D. C.)

### OR WAS IT CAMPAIGN ORATORY?

It will be a breach of faith to the men in the selective service camps, to their parents, to their wives, sweethearts, and friends, if the Congress extends the term of service of selectees.

This is the only conclusion one can draw after rereading the hearings for compulsory military training and service before the Senate Military Affairs Committee that were held in July 1940.

It is apparent that during the debate on the passage of the original Selective Service Act last summer many of those who appeared before this Senate committee in support of the act did so with the understanding that the period of service would be only 8 or, at the most, 12 months.

"Giant Army" not proposed.—One of the most ardent supporters of the Conscription Act was Grenville Clark, chairman, National Emergency Committee of the Military Training Camps Association of the United States, New York, N. Y. He was questioned as follows:

"Senator REYNOLDS. How many men do you propose to draft in the first instance?"

"Mr. CLARK. We are proposing nothing definite as to that, sir. Right there was another misapprehension, not on our part, but in the press, which I want

to clear away. There was some unfortunate publicity to the effect that his bill would create a "giant army." It has no purpose of that sort at all."<sup>1</sup>

At another point in his testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, Mr. Clark made the following statement:

"We want to make sure that this bill fits into the existing structure. We have our Regular Army. We have the National Guard. This bill is not intended to destroy or impair either. It is intended to help them."

"Now this is the way we argued it out: It is inconceivable that Congress would pass a law that would just draft a few hundred thousand men out of our whole population and put them in a long service of enlistment, the enlistment of the professional soldier. That is not democratic and it is not fair \* \* \*<sup>2</sup>"

Senator Burke, one of the sponsors of the act, was himself under the impression that only 8 months training would be required. Addressing Mr. Clark on the problem of returning men to civilian life, Senator Burke said:

"One other point in connection with that (the question of deferments for family men). I have had hundreds of letters from men within this age limit of 21 to 45 saying, 'What provision is going to be made for me to get my job back? I want to train. I will be delighted to go for 8 months but I have just worked up into a steady job now. Am I going to start all over again at the foot as the result of this legislation when my 8 months' training is over?'<sup>3</sup>"

It was obvious to Senator Schwartz, another supporter of the act, that the length of service would be but 8 months. During testimony by Col. Julius Ochs Adler, Senator Schwartz asked the rhetorical question:

"Do you think that a young American is going to lose his patriotism and disregard the welfare of his country simply because he is struck on some girl and will have to be away for 8 months?"

Further in his testimony, Colonel Adler said:

"And the other point on it, Senator [Burke], is that Congress will have to appropriate for whatever men are called. And, we went even further, to indicate to the Nation that we were not trying to harness a permanent, tremendous army on them, by putting at the very end of the bill this law is only good for so many years, and has to be renewed."

"We are very sincere that we are not making any effort to make it permanent."

The questions that follow speak for themselves:

"Senator GURNEY. Do you think that this 8 months' training period is long enough, or that it should be 12 months or some other number of months?

"General HABREL. [Gen. William N. Haskell, commanding the New York National Guard]: \* \* \* I think that 8 months' training, full-time training, will do; will make a good soldier. I think that our average time was 9 months in the last war and they got a bad start. If we have the equipment to train them with, I think that the soldier can be trained in 9 months in any arm of the service."

\* \* \* \* \*  
 "Colonel ADLER. My thought on it is that 8 months would be just about the right period, particularly assuming, as we all agree, that this is an emergency and that there would not be any holidays; the men would work on Saturdays and Wednesdays as they do any other time, and that the hours would be longer; and I think you could get in in 8 months what in peacetime might take some 15 or 16 months."

\* \* \* \* \*  
 "Senator DOWNEY. Before you leave that, may I ask this, Colonel? I understand that it is your impression that with 8 months' training you can turn out

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<sup>1</sup> Hearings for compulsory military training and service before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, July 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Hearings, ibid., p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> Hearings, ibid., p. 80.

<sup>4</sup> Hearings, ibid., p. 78.

<sup>5</sup> Hearings, ibid., p. 72.

<sup>6</sup> Hearings, ibid., p. 54.

<sup>7</sup> Hearings, ibid., p. 70.

a soldier who is about as efficient in this new mechanized warfare as if he had had 2, 3, or 4 years' training? Is that your conclusion?

"Colonel SANDERS [Col. Lewis Sanders, New York, N. Y.]. Under ordinary peacetime Army training methods; yes."<sup>8</sup>

"Colonel Frost [Lt. Col. Herbert H. Frost]. I recommend that the training period be 12 months."<sup>9</sup>

*Cost per man figured on 8-months period.*—In calculating the costs of maintaining the selectees, 8 months' service was the basis used:

"Senator REYNOLDS. I want to ask what you think would be the cost per man of keeping him, feeding him, housing him, and instructing him; the cost of these troops, as well as taking into consideration the transportation of the men into the camps. About what do you think would be the approximate cost per man? I think that the Congress and these gentlemen are a little bit interested in the costs.

"Senator DOWNEY. Yes.

"Colonel SANDERS. I do not have detailed information on that, sir; but I think Colonel Adler's estimates are between four and six hundred dollars per man for 8 months' training is pretty close to the truth.

"Mr. Clark, I think, estimated that as about \$400, did you not, Mr. Clark?

"Mr. CLARK. I think Colonel Donovan mentioned \$400. I thought it was a trifle low and we went over that further in the conference later in the day.

"I think that Colonel Donovan agreed that that was a trifle low and that this figure that Colonel Adler mentioned of \$100 or \$60 for 8 months—not a year—let us not forget that it is figured out on that basis. I think that is more like it. \* \* \*<sup>10</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

"Senator REYNOLDS. That cost per man of about \$400 for 2,000,000 men would be about \$800,000,000 annually.

"Senator DOWNEY. That is just for 8 months.

"Senator REYNOLDS. I meant to say 8 months. That would be \$800,000,000.

"Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir.

"Senator JOHNSON of Colorado. It would be \$1,200,000,000 per year.

"Senator DOWNEY. \$1,200,000,000 a year, Senator?"<sup>11</sup>

*Educators assumed 1 year service.*—Some of the leading educators of our Nation supported the conscription bill with the understanding that the period of training would be 1 year or less.

Dr. George F. Zook, president of the American Council on Education, Washington, D. C., gave his unqualified endorsement of the bill, but he also made this statement:

"It is our belief that when a young man 21 years of age is called up and is enrolled in college or in a university, the university will attempt to arrange his work so that he can complete it before he is actually selected or provide some other way by which he can complete it after the 8 months of compulsory service is over.

"We think that is an indication of the intense desire on the part of the institutions to be as cooperative as possible in this situation."<sup>12</sup>

Dr. Guy E. Snavely, executive director of the Association of American Colleges, said his organization also favored the Selective Service and Training Act, but included in his testimony the following:

"Dr. Conant is a member of our board. I had a long-distance telephone conversation with him yesterday, and he plead with me to see that the ages 18 to 21 be not included in any military training or service, and furthermore he said, 'Please use all the influence you have to give them an opportunity to have their schooling; not disrupt their schooling'; because, after all, as I said previously, that is a small group, and if you take them out of school for 9 months, or 8 months, or 12 months, a great many of them will lose the habit of studying and never go back again, and we need educated leaders."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Hearings, *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>9</sup> Hearings, *Ibid.*, p. 303.

<sup>10</sup> Hearings, *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>11</sup> Hearings, *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>12</sup> Hearings, *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>13</sup> Hearings, *Ibid.*, p. 133.

*Compulsory military training for a period of from 8 to 12 months.*—Appearing on behalf of the American Federation of Government Employees, a union of Federal workers, Mr. Charles L. Stengle said:

"I want to say in the beginning of my remarks that the group which I represent is 100 percent American and ready to do its part in any way toward furthering national preparedness. We have, however, without taking any decided stand on the question of compulsory military training, met with considerable distress and disturbance of mind over the question of what will happen to many of our people were they called in to compulsory military training. Many of them have been employed by the Government for many years. They have established their homes and are now paying for them, largely on the installment plan. Many of them have families to support. Many of them have dependent fathers and mothers to support, and as they look at the picture from the outside before this committee makes its report to the Senate of the United States they are wondering what will become of them were they ordered into compulsory military training for a period of *from 8 to 12 months* [Italics supplied], and at the expiration of that period find that their jobs are gone because of their absence from their daily work for the Government."<sup>14</sup>

*Idea was to spread military service throughout Nation.*—Brig. Gen. William E. Shedd, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (personnel), War Department, had this to say:

\* \* \* I feel that regardless of whether we can procure the men by voluntary enlistments or not, the principles of selective service are so fair, so just, and so democratic, they produce the men we need at the time we need them; they spread the requirements of military service over the entire personnel of the country in such a just and proper way that I believe that those reasons are so compelling we should adopt selective service even if we could fill our requirements by voluntary enlistments.<sup>15</sup>

**STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. LIBBY, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PREVENTION OF WAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(Submitted to the House Military Affairs Committee on the extension of the term of service of draftees, Reserve officers, and the National Guard, and related proposals)

JULY 28, 1941.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the House Military Affairs Committee, three proposals are before Congress:

1. To extend indefinitely the term of service of draftees, National Guardsmen, and Reserve officers beyond the 12 months specified in the draft law;
2. To authorize an indefinite increase in the number of draftees beyond the present limit of 600,000 serving at any one time;
3. To permit draftees in our Army to be sent anywhere in the world (the draft law forbids sending them outside of the Western Hemisphere and our possessions).

Each of these proposals would give more power to the President at the expense of Congress. The President would hold the draftees in the Army as long as he deems necessary. The President would determine the number of draftees to be conscripted. The President would have power to send the draftees to Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, or the islands of the seas.

**IF CONGRESS DECLARES A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, IT MEANS ALL-OUT WAR**

The President has asked Congress to declare a national emergency. The effect would be to permit retention of draftees and, as some Congressmen believe, and as we fear, sending them anywhere in the world, with the responsibility upon Congress. In any case, the moral effect of such a declaration, both abroad and at home, would be substantially that of a declaration of war.

The following arguments are offered in support of the Administration's proposals:

1. That the safety of this country is imperiled;

<sup>14</sup> Hearings, *ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>15</sup> Hearings, *ibid.*, p. 353.

2. That the Army will "disintegrate" if the draftees go home at the end of their 1-year term of service;

3. That the extension of the term of service will not break faith with the draftees because the draft law itself provided that "whenever the Congress has declared that the national interest is imperiled," the term of service can be extended.

**OPPONENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS DENY EACH OF THESE THREE CLAIMS**

(1) A little reflection shows that the country is not in immediate peril of attack, since all potential enemies are occupied with their enemies nearer home; our immediate danger comes from the aggressive policies of our own Government, which threaten to involve us in the European war via Iceland or in protecting British and other interests in the Far East. Some predict that we shall get into the European war by policing Latin America. Our Army was not conscripted for these purposes.

(2) The Army will not "disintegrate" if we keep faith with the draftees, because the inductions into service have been staggered. Of the first 400,000, 300,000 have not yet been inducted and have a full year to serve. Nearly 400,000 have only recently been inducted and have from 7 to 11 months to serve. Only 19,000 will complete their term of service before the end of 1941, 13,000 in November, and 6,000 in December. To fill the vacancies when these men go home a new draft of men who have reached 21 in the past year has just been held.

With regard to the National Guard, the situation is equally favorable to keeping faith. Only 57 of the 156 units now in service will complete their 12 months before the end of 1941. As for Reserve officers, only 65,000, which is approximately one-half of the number available, have so far been called and they could be replaced with the advantage of giving training to the other half.

(3) The violation of faith involved in these proposals is so fundamental that the wording of the law fails to touch the real issue. These men were inducted to defend this hemisphere and our possessions if attacked. Both major political parties had just adopted solemn pledges which meant that the conscripts were not being called to fight in foreign wars.

The Republican platform said: "The Republican Party is firmly opposed to involving this Nation in foreign war."

The Democratic platform said: "We will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our Army, naval, or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas, except in case of attack."

The President repeated these pledges again and again and again before a single draftee was called into service. Typical is the following quotation from the President's address in Boston, October 30, 1940: "Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars. They are going into training to form a force so strong that, by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war far away from our shores. The purpose of our defense is defense."

The contract with the draftees was based upon these repeated pledges. We are breaking the contract and undermining their morale if we send them to fight and die in foreign lands.

**NOT CANNON FODDER FOR STALIN NOR FOR CHURCHILL**

These men are in danger of being betrayed also from another equally important angle. They were not conscripted to fight for Stalin nor for Communism. They were not conscripted to fight for Churchill's war aims. They were conscripted to defend their own country. It is the duty of Congress to protect them in their rights.

**BRITISH GENERALS LOOK FOR ANOTHER A.E.F.**

The famous British generals, Wavell and Auchinleck, told Harold Denny, New York Times correspondent, that great American armies are going to be needed to defeat Hitler. "American manpower will be needed in this war as much as in the last," was General Auchinleck's frank statement.

**OUTPOST THEORY MEANS POLICING WORLD**

If the claim is made that the draftees must be held in order to man such remote outposts as Iceland and perhaps the Azores, with a view to defending America from across the ocean, one has only to examine this theory carefully

to reject it. Carried to its logical outcome, this reasoning would require our Army to seize the Azores in order to protect the Atlantic and then seize Portugal in order to protect the Azores; our occupation of Iceland would lead to our establishment of bases in northern Ireland and Scotland to guard Iceland. To protect Alaska we should soon be seizing bases in Siberia. This is old-fashioned imperialism under a new name. Its logical end would be an attempt to police the whole world. Our draftees were not conscripted for any such purpose.

KANSAS CITY, Mo., July 18, 1941.

**Congressman ANDREW J. MAY, Chairman, House Military Affairs Committee,  
United States Congress, Washington, D. C.:**

As commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States I have just completed a tour that has taken me into all parts of the country. I am confident America's overseas veterans of our previous wars heartily endorse Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall's appeal for legislation that will retain our present armed forces intact. We believe it is absolutely necessary to maintain our present Army forces intact and to increase the present strength of the Army with additional personnel. We favor repeal of that portion of the selective service law which limits time and place of service for those men who have been and are being mobilized in our present national emergency. The men who compose our Regular Army, National Guard, and selective service units have been merged to create one great unified military force. Release of any of these men at this time will destroy our entire army structure, creating utter confusion and chaos in the attempt to build an efficient military organization. This disintegration of our Army will greatly imperil our national interests and security. Such action would be as foolhardy as complete demobilization and disarmament. If Congress permits destruction of the defense machine we have been building during this past year, we can be sure the axis powers will be encouraged to bolder attacks upon our national welfare. The American people have already indicated their willingness to make every necessary financial sacrifice for national defense purposes. I am convinced the people expect Congress to support the expert advice and recommendations of our military leaders.

Commander in Chief JOSEPH C. MENENDEZ,  
*Veterans of Foreign Wars of United States.*

THE AMERICAN LEGION,  
EPH BOGGS POST, NO. 49, INC.,  
Williamson, W. Va., July 24, 1941.

**Congressman ANDREW J. MAY,  
Washington, D. C.**

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: Attnched hereto is a resolution adopted by our post on Tuesday, July 22, 1941. It is our unanimous opinion that the sentiments expressed in the resolution should be the policy of our Government during present emergency.

We sincerely trust that you will concur with us and that you will support the legislation pertaining to this subject.

With best wishes and kindest personal regards, I am  
Sincerely yours,

S. P. GOODMAN,  
*Commander Eph Boggs Post, No. 49,  
the American Legion.*

#### RESOLUTION

Whereas due to the world-embracing aggression of the Axis Powers, whose belligerent campaign is rapidly encircling the democracies in Europe and threatening our own Government, a national emergency and crisis exists; and, Whereas under the Selective Service Act, limitations and restrictions relative to tenure of service are imposed on all selectees; and

Whereas manufacture of implements and munitions of war has not kept pace with the number of men inducted into service and as a consequence, those men have not received the benefit of the military training to which they are entitled; and,

Whereas the national crisis apparently becomes more acute from day to day and a substantial increase in the complement of the armies of the United States appears essential to the safety of our form of government, rather than a decrease that would be entailed by a dismissal from the service of selectees and National Guard men who have served their 1 year; now therefore be it

*Resolved* by Eph Boggs Post, No. 49, Department of West Virginia, the American Legion, That members of the National Guard and particularly selectees up to the age of 28 years, who are now in the service of the United States, be kept in the Army so long as the present emergency exists or until they have received adequate training with proper equipment for actual combat; and, be it further

*Resolved*, That additional enlisted men and selectees be inducted into service as rapidly as equipment and training facilities can be supplied and that the maximum manpower of the Army be left to the discretion of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army; and, be it further

*Resolved*, That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to Senators Kligore and Rosler, and Congressman Kee, of the State of West Virginia, Senators Barkley and Chandler, and Congressman May, of the State of Kentucky, and to G. Stanley Hamric adjutant of the Department of West Virginia, the American Legion, for publication in the West Virginia Legionnaire.